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PREP ACE 
The postwar foreign relations between the United 
States and the Soviet Union were analyzed for numerou s 
years after World War II. Historian s ,  both the earlier . 
. 
ones and the revis ionists , who . aspired to any degree of 
- 111 -
sophistication, took care to comment upon Americ·an policy 
between 1945 and 1948, and they tried to determine where 
the blame , if any , was to be placed • . 
. Disregarding blame , the diplomacy and words spoken 
by the executive and legislative branches ,  the Department 
of State , and the American public actually shaped the 
future of the world. The. following pages were written 
because those actions greatly affected, and still affect, 
American lives. A second reason for tak ing time and 
effort in reporting the ."American Reaction to the Sovietiza­
tion of Poland , Czecho�lovaltia and Hungary· 194.S-1948." was 
to give needed attention to U .S .  opinions ot that ·period 
since they had �ot been much publicized. 
What I was concerned with throughout the thesis was 
that elusive element kn own as opinion ,  specifically that 
ot u.s. federal officials and public citizene duri�'the 
- lv -
three year period of time after World War I I ,  and the · 
�pproach used was hopefully that of· an objective historian. 
Newspapers , magazine article s ,  "letters to the editor,"· 
"editorials, '' the Journal of the Senate , Congressional 
Digest , and Congressional Record, plus numerous books were 
�sed for research and the writing of this thesis. Once 
that material was gathered , the methodology of arranging 
:�tatements of fact , quot�tions , · and interpretation on 
. 
paper completed the work. The outcome was not a s�rvey , 
but a specific account of the events in Poland , Czecho­
slovakia and Hungary which directly influenced the postwar 
=elations of the u.s. and the u . s . s . R .  at the governmental 
�nd public levels. 
The following thesis was founded upon the mass of 
printed material� directly �oncerning United States relations 
with Poland , Czechoslovakia and Hungary and events in those 
three states between 1945-1948. I am, therefore , greatly . 
indebted to historians who previously researched , reported , 
and interpreted that period of time. Using their professional 
information, it was possible for me to w�ite the thesis. 
By way of acknowledgments , friends criticized parts 
of this thesis or aided in other ways. In this connection. 
I would particularly like to thank Dr . Stephan Horak, Dr. 
�eonard c. Wood, Dr. David Maurer, Carl Davis,  John Roy, 
Docia Taylor, .sandy Trojello , and George A. Rogers. Many 
librarians , both at Eastern Illinois University and the 
Gniversity of Iltinois , also provided much needed help. 
- v -
.I feel es�ecially indebted, however, to· my parents, 
" 
�:r. and Mrs. John M. Balent. Without the help , considera-
tion, encouragement, and understanding qf these two wonder­
ful individuals ,  this paper would not have been possible.· 
I am deeply grateful. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTkODUCTION I 'THE PERIOD . OP' T�SI�ION . . 
. ··· 
. 
•
' 
.
' 
. · 
... ·: .. : . 
: 
' 
� . . . 
I .  From · Isolatio,niS!!l to the Poli9y of · inter\iention. . - · " 
. . 
Ttie ·period of · 194.5-1948 became one ot transl tion 
as the world proceeded from a W orld War into a Cold Wax". 
During that time of international strife and conflict ,  
th e Uni t�d States and · the Soviet Union h eld the future 
of the world in_ their hands. · They assl.fllled the position 
of w orld leadership ,  an extreme reverse after the · i sola� 
tion from European affairs that both practiced after World 
War I ,  and by 194.5 each superpower had formally accepted 
an interventi oni st policy in Europe. The philosophies of 
Wa shington and Moscow , however, were totally div ergent • . 
. 
·The situation was one of preordained. c onflict and dispute ,  
and i t  pointed to a posture of defiance.  
As World War II was swiftly c oming to its termina­
ti on, i t  soon became evident that th.e U . S . A .  and �he· . 
. . 
U . S . S.R. · w oUld ultimately have w orldwide influence iri · 
the social , ec onomic , .and. poli tical spheres. Military " 
strength had placed those .two states at the · summi t  of 
w orld power. , Technology , national - .r� souroea , and man.;. 
. . 
- 2 
power were to be their mainstay. When used toward the 
common cause of defeating a mutual enemy, these elements 
were useful and acceptable, but as peace gradually became 
a fact instead of an objectiv·e a less than friendly mood 
settled over American-Soviet relations • 
• • . • ( I ) t  W'a.s plain ·that the · task of 
building a lasting�eace .. would be beset with 
many difficulties. • .. · • Tot�l war by its very 
nature was at odds . with. the, concept of a 
· 
reasonable · peace. And �n �h� �artime coalition 
of the United Nations , . the ·Big_. Three were often 
held together· by li tt1e· m·ore. than their .common resistance · to· Germa:ri · expans_ion. • .• .1 
The first skeptic.ism �oncerning Allied· cooperati�n after 
the war came when �he �ilitary course of the hostilities 
changed . propitiously for the Al.lies • 
• • � By the beginning or·1943 �he tide .of 
. - .battle had turned in both Europe and Asia. The. 
· Allies could at least be fairly confident -.of _. eventual victory. But as warmaking evolved "into 
peacemaking, frictions within the Allian�e in-
. �nsified. In a series of conferences during 
;943-1945, Stalin, Roosevelt , and Churchill 
di�cussed the · kind of political· settlement which 
would accompany· victory J they uncovered as many . .  · . _ . 
p:of?und disagreements as �hey �roduced opti- . .. · .
.
. . . mistic but tenuous compromises, . . . . . :. . · :; : · ._: . . . . ,,. . .,. .  
Russia wa·s winning victory �ter victory over" the N.�z:i in' 
Eastern Europe, By January i?, 1945, Warsaw , the:capitcil"-': �: · . .. . .. · 
. . 
of.1 Poland , woulO . be · liberated after .. five y
·ears and four .· · :. · 
- 3 
months of German occ upation. As Communist military 
supremacy emerged, future Soviet aims in Eastern Europe 
became apparent. 
The intentions of that .monolithic state were diverse 
from those of Great Britain and the United States. The 
latter two were working · toward a permanent peace,  a strong 
c ommunity of nations, and �imited territorial expansion. 
The u.s.s.R. was working for the establishment of a strong 
buffer zone to protec t it from aggression by its western 
neighbors. Moscow had developed an almost paranoid fear of 
Germany after the bitter , devastating and c atastrophic war 
years. Therefore, the Kremlin desired to shield its fron� 
_tiers against attack by a barrier of satellite states • 
• f. 
The two states which could be most eff�cti�ely used in 
that capacity were Poland and Czechoslovakia, since they 
. . 
directly bridged the territQrial gap between Russia and 
the West or more specifically Germany. I ndirectly Hungary 
served the same purpose. With the Hungarian nation under 
control, the Soviets wouid be linked to Austria and Com­
munist oriented Yugoslavia _and �hereby have more territol'.Y 
from which to fashion an inpre�able c ushion against in-
vasion. 
. " 
I n  the final �alysis_, the Sovi·et U nion was eager 
to make pawns of Poland, · c_�·echosl
'c
:)vak�·� and Hungary. Two 
of those Eastern European . staie
.
s, however ,  lo
.
oked toward 
the western democraci�s fo�_post-war gov�rnmental models 
and ec onomic SUJ?pOrt·, and that merely hastened discord in 
the Allied coalition •. ·. 
4 -
: " 
II. The Yalta Meeting and the Potsdam Conference 
"' ' ' ;: .• • I 
The last intra-war·· cohf e.r.�n�-
� : ·held by the Big Three 
seemed to be a prelude to po stwar �llied cooperation, 
understand ing · and peace. but. such tranquillity was au� 
perfi cial. Throµg�out. the Ya lta m�eting, circumstanc�s 
were more advantS:geous ·to Stalin than to either .. Churchill 
. . . � . 
or Roosevelt� The basic reason · for the S oviet; .ruler .h�ving
" · · 
�he. upper hand was du·e to ·a · proposed ari thoietlc formula 
presented by th e British Prime Mini ster whel'). . he :visited 
. ,... 
. Moscow i� the autumn of 1944. At that time Churchill had • 
wished to reconcile the·Poles and Russians, but he f ailed 
on that point and settled f or an agreement on the t ut�e. '.-
of southeastern Europe• . , · 
· . . . .  
. . . " 
. . . .  
. 
. 
. . . 
• • • in Rumania the Soviets would have ·a "90-10" ... · . . .-.. �·: · . . . . . .. · · 
prepond erance i in -Bulgaria,. "75-25 " r j.n Yugoslavia .· '. · .. and Hung ary, influence would be d ivided "5 0-50". · ·· ·". · . 
\with the West1 in Greece, the balance would be . 
"90-10" ·• in the We�t.ern favor • • . ' . ,: . Secondly, the . . . 
Red Army's occupa tion of most of Ea stern · and · 
Central Europe ensured Soviet control of the se 
. co.untries after the war • • • • . Thirdl.y, Roosev�lt . still avoid ed · any showdown with Stalin·, in g eneral . .  
because . he wanted two commitments· from S taliria 
. " 
S oviet entry into the war against Japan, and S oviet 
partic-ipati on ·�n. the postwar 'United Nations. .  • � . • J 
Roosevelt and Churchill had to 'adapt the above warti�e facts 
to - their d iplomatic negotiations with Stalin for i t  was · · 
Jibid., PP• 156-157. 
. . ;,,· 
. ... ·
. •,' .·· . . . · . :·. · -. s ·-
imperative that the Soviet U�ion ·be retained as an ally.4 
Since they were. not '.w illing to apply mili.tary force 
. . to acquire the ad�erence of_ the u.-s.s.R. to. d emocratic 
principles -�d chance · a spl it in. the Allied w�time 
coalition, �ashington and London officials decided up�n. .. : 
•, 
a conciliatory_diplomacy toward Moscow's demand s. Special 
rights .fpr ·the Communists ln Manchuria, separate
. 
seats 
. l 
l 
j 
p ' 
in the United Nations Organization for Byelorussia and 
I 
- I 
i Ukraine, and Soviet control of the Kurile i slands were 
. ' 
•. • . 
. · . . i 
: .. . " .. I 
granted at Yalta. In return Stalin agr eed to. jo�ri in· · . � . 
. ·: : . I . . . . . . I the war against Japan .within' thr�e montbs after_ ·the· det�at . . '. .. · · . . . . : . . . .. . . ·. . �· · · ... . : . : "' 
of Germany and consented to amicable ,part�c ipation -in . . ·.· . 
J 
• 
. 
. . . . ' . . .' .. ·" ' . 
the . postwar UNO . · From the· ·meeting ·aoosevel t obtained . . . . .. . . .. ' . . . 
what .h� .had d esired - most, and Stalin• s: s��atuJ;� was _ _. 
. . . . 
placed . beneath the vague Md ambiguous Yalta Cbarter on ' . . . . ; . . 
.· 
. . . ·. ', . .: ' . . . . . ·, .:'' . .. 
. . 
February l� ,. 1945." . · · · · .
. · · . . . 
Future w orld peace was based · ·upon that d oc'-ent· • . · . 
I t  provi�ed for the · follow inga · . . . .. 
·1 .  
I I .  
I I I ." 
IV. 
v. 
VI. 
VII . 
A World Organization 
The Liberation of Europe 
The Dismemberment of Germany 
The Mi'li tary Occupation and Control of 
Germany w ith a Zone of Occupation tor 
France · · · 
Reparations from Germa.nY 
The Trial of Major War Criminals 
A Poland w ith an eastern boundary 
generally along the Curzon Line of 1919; 
and a Prov isional Government which would 
hold "free and unfettered elections as soon 
as possible on the basis of universal 
suffrage and secret ballot . •  
4Ek irch, .2l2· ,gl;t • • . p. 170. . . 
' 
•. 
. . 
·� . . .. 
: · .. . .  
' . � u VIII • . A Yugoslavia based on the Tito-Subasic1 
Agreement·and· the formation of ·an Anti-· 
Fascist Assembly of National Liberation 
(Aun:oj) · 
IX. Three Foreign Secretaries were to meet 
. . . 
ii· as often ·as ·ne·cessary" I the :fir
.
st meet-
. : · ·. ing was �et up to meet iri London· 
- 6 � . .  
Addition
.
ally· embraced ·within .the concord were �rrangemen
.
ts 
for ·governments·, after the conclusion o:f hostilities, to 
.be 0broa�y representative 
.
o:f all democrati� ·�le�ents •.. 5 
• 
Despite· these grandiloquent statements, the military and 
economic role of the United States and the Soviet. U�ion. . . . �  . •, . . . '• . . 
during Wo:rld War II made evident two facts • . . :Firs·t, both: , ' .: . 
powers would continue to exercise· an immense measure. ·o:f .: ·. :·:: �: 
world leaders hi� in the
. 
�uture. · · Second·, the peace ·of' .. the.· · :, . · . 
. . . 
w�rld would P.e establis��d upon all: �sta�le bipo�ar b�lai:i�e . . . . . . . .  
of power.. None.theless, the ret?u� ts of · the· Conference · in . . . 
the Q·rimea were ardently accepted. throughout th� .. . u.s�s· .R�·,'.·. :. ·, 
.. 
. . .. . . ·. ·.. · . .. . 
the British· Commonweal th, and the' u· •. s •. A� . The Ani�rican . . 
press w�s virtuaJ.1y.w:ianim�us in praising the· decisions 
reached by the Allied leaders. The endorsement. of the 
accords, however, was not gran�ed by the Pol.ish. Government 
in' London. It convened on February lJ, 194 5 ,  �d later 
issued a communique announ�ing its rejection of. the Polish 
I 
territorial question laid down at the Crimea Conference • .  
The negative objection of the Polish government-in-exile 
was not enough to nullify the Yalta Charter and so it re­
mained a legal international compact, 
5 U.S. Congress, Senate, 
A Decade of American Forei 
New Yorka Greenwood Press, , .pp. 
. . . . 
.· 
. . I 
- 7 -
T{\-e primary reason for the success of :the Big Three . 
meeting was Roosevelt's personal diplomacy, His position 
as "mediator between the declining foi-tunes of the British 
Empire and the rising star of the Soviets"6 had helped to 
insure the agreement at Yalta, but his death and a British 
election were to demonstrate just how tenuous the compact 
actually was . Roosevelt died on April 12, 1945 , and was 
succeeded by Harry S, Truman . .. 6n May 2J, 1945 , there was" 
a breakdown of the �oaLiti�n _Gov�rrunent in England a Churchill 
/ 
and the Conservatives in the general election of July were 
: . 
defeated, Half-way· through . the· P0�$�8.J!l Conference ,  Clement . ·· . . . . . . .. . 
Attlee and Ernest Bevin .bec�e·.: the Br�tish repre.sentative 
·: . . officials , and. Truman represente.d ''the United States. 
The three major All·ied .'powers met at Pot's9.am from 
July 17. to Augus� 2 ,· 1945, and the- points which Stalin, 
Truman and Prime Minister At.tle
.
e agreed to inter �lia were� . . : . ' . . . ·. 
. 
: . . . . 
. . · .· · . 
II '2 :J. 
. . . . . . . . . . 
. • . . . . .. 
'Pending the final delimi tation .. ·of Poland• s ' · "·· · · western frontier', ' t.he 'former German " · 
territories ' east of the Oder and Neisse .. : · : 
.. · : �: · ·. · ,. . Rivers and the fo�er free cit� of Danzig . .  
were to be left · under Polish administration . " : : ·. 
and should not.'be considered as part of the . . 
. 4 Soviet zone of . occup$ti�n l;n Germany. . : .
. 
. . . 
. . 
.. 
:. . .. . 
.
. . 
. 
' ·: . :.· . .. 
. .. :· 
· . 
. . . . . . .. 
··'. 
"
4 
, . ·" 
ti 5. 
Peace treaties should be concluded with 
Bulgaria , Finland , Hungary , Italy , and 
Rumania. 
The remaining German pop�lation in Poland , 
Czechoslovakia �d Hung� was to be 
transfered to Germany, "7 · 
.. a -
Although the terms of the Potsdam compact had not 
deviated from the basic form created at Yalta, the tone 
of the discussion had emphatically changed. President 
Truman inaugurated a tougher poficy toward the Soviet 
Union than Roosevelt had previously used. He pointed out 
Am�rica's military superiority · over �he u .s.s .R .  and "dis­
closed to Premier Stalin .the imp6rtccilt Jlews that American 
. 
. 
:·· 
scientists had successtully ��e.�elo.ped· .a.
· new weapon of un­
usual force , 118 in less than friendly tones. The new plan 
. . 
of action was coupled wi.th some sharp debates �ver Eastern 
Europe and the ar�entative atmosphere at ·�otsdam replaced 
accord and trust· with suspicion� misunderstandi�g, · and lack" . . . . ' 
of coop�r.ation. From .the comradeship of "arms during w.orld 
War II , the paths of the Wes.tern nations and the U�ion of 
Soviet Socialist Republics turned from an am1cabl°e re-
· � 
lationshi� to open ciritcism. During the immediate postwar 
. . . .. 
7Keesing' s Treaties and Alliances of the. Worid ·, Ah Inter..:. " - ·. . 
national Surve Coverin Treaties in Force and Communities·· of . 
States , Vieima-Zurichs Keesing' s Publications"Lt'd, ., · Keynsham, . . · 
Bristol , Siegl�r & Co. KG. , Boima · New York a Charl�s . Scr-i��'ie.r ' s."" ·.: 
Sons , 196�) , p. 17 . 
. . · 
" · 
1
8Eki.�ch , .2l2
·
· .cit • . , p. 1.78. 
. . . 
•• 
> 
.. . . I 
: . � . ::·' .. . 
. ' . . . . .·· . ;:. :· · . : .· . . .. • 1 •• ••
• 
• 
. , r . 
. . •, 
. . . . 
. . · . . . . . 
,· 
year�. Washington-Moscow relations were heading toward 
' .  . 
a conflict of interests in Eastern Europe ,  The formation 
of new regimes in Poland , Czechoslovaki� and Hungary 
between 1942-1948 brought the collision into full view • 
. : .·· 
•• 
. .. 
. . . 
. . . .. ·' ... 
. 
. . 
·, 
. . . · . 
- . . 
. � .. 
. -
: 
. •
, 
CHAPTER I I  . 
. -
FORJ4ATIO'N. ·op THE NEW . REGIMES 
I .  Poland a 1242-19·47 
-
·. - . . 
. . . . 
� 
. . 
.. 
In 1942 Poland was still under the oppressive weight 
of German occupation. The Soviet Union decided at that 
I 
early date to penetrate the Polish underground in order 
to assure Moscow ' s  chance s of ultimately formulating Poli sh 
policy. Toward that end a gr oup loyal to the u.s.s.R. 
were a 
• • •  ' secretly parachuted into Poiand to in­
filtrate the Polish underground, to set up cells 
for the later seizure of power, to denounce members 
of the patriotic Underground to the Gestapo, · and to 
set up new, s�emingly non-communist, underground 
groups which were actually under the complete con� 
trol of the Communist Party. The Kremlin exercised 
direct control over this group·by its agent and 
Secretar y  General of the Workers• Pa,ty, Marceli 
Nowo�ko,, who later was liquid�ted and replaced by · i 
another agent, Pawel Finder, also later liquidated. 
Authoritatively .but e onfident ially the Polish Communist.· 
Party, Polish Workers• Party or PPR --• Polska r'artja 
Robotnicza, was resuscitated in Warsaw on Januar)' s. 
�dward J • Rozek, ... A .. 1 .. 1,.....e .... d .,._.W=. ar ....... t=i= m=e--=D-.-==.------ -::...0--.-.::.o:ia 
in Po land, (New Yorka John Wiley & S ons, Inc., 1958 . 
p. 96. Pawel Finder, who succeeded Nowotko, was arrested 
by the German secret police in November of l94J. He was 
executed on July 26, 19�, by the Gestapo .  · 
.. 
. 
. .
. 
. . 
: 
. ·· . . '• 
- il -
·· 1942. * Marcell Nowotko was 1 ts first secretary-general• 
but he was assassinated by Edward Molojec in November of 
1942, in Warsaw . Molojec presumed him to be a collabora• 
tor with the Gestapo and a traitor to the Polish-Communist 
cause. Nowotko's successor as S ecretary General of the 
Party was Wladyslaw Gomulka. He was . the recip�ent of the 
top Party post in November of 194�. 
Six months la�er , May 4, 194), Moscow•a objectives 
reg arding P oland were advan ced when Marshall Stalin 
replied to . two interview questions posed by correspondents 
of � li!,! York Times .** 
QUESTIONa Does the Government of the U .S .S .R .  
desire to see a strong and independent P oland 
af.�er the defeat of Hitlerite Germany? 
.
.
. 
STALIN• Unquestionably , it does. 
QUESTION a On what fundamentals is it your 
opinion that relations between Poland and the 
u.s.s.R. should be based after the war? 
STALIN a Upon the fundamentals of solid g ood 
ne ighborly relations and mutual respect- , or shoul.d 
the Polish people so desire , upon the fundamentals 
of an alliance providing for the mutual assistance 
ag ainst the Germans as t�e chief enemies of the 
Soviet Union and P oland .  · · 
The authoritative advocacy of future Soviet actions had 
been supplied , and time·was. the 8carcely significant 
element which obstructed the ul� imat�. annexation of .�Oland 
. :·· 
*The Polish Comm\mist·· ·�·�.ty. · ha� _b�en prorog ued in 19)8• · 
**Journalists representing the · London Times were alao. · · pre sent. · 
2The New York·.1itoes, 
.
MaY .S. 194), pag e  l.
·
: 
·'· 
... . 
.. :· . . 
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by the Communists. Policies 'started in 1942 ·WeJ"e re tained, " 
and Stalin assiduously asc�r�� ined that the .Polish . state· 
was or soon would be controlled by Soviet �ympathizer_ s .  
The. �nfiltration of Poland had commenced.  The m odus 
P" 
operandi implementation �as the form ation of the communist� 
controll ed Polish Army. Colonel Zygmunt Berling , prewar · · ' . . : . . · _:: . . . . -. • . . . . . . , 
regular Polish army officer· and commander ot . thEf ·Kosciuszko·, .-.. . 
Division* , Major General Bevzlnk, - B�rling•� Soviet m�iit.� . .- · . .  :
superior,· _and Zlexan4er · Z aw�d·zki·• an NKVD•·•. colone l , · .were . · . : ,l . " . 
the · ag ent·s chosen _by the Moscow g ove�ent to command ,.the . . , . . . 
strateg ic. take over of the Polish mill tary -forces. , which . . .  
,. 
, .. . 
guaranteed that the political power in Poland a:t .the proper· .... : · 
· - · . · . . . . . · . . . 
time would be · transferred to comm�ist ·ag��ts � Ri�hard ·i. 
. . . . /, .. .. 
Staar depi�ted the manipulation�-
.He. siad . that many r�pres��ta� · " 
tives f�om the U;s . s.-a . joined the Kosciuszko Division and 
became officers in the p�litical education corps. 
These politi cal-education elements �ombined in 
1944 with the PPR , just emerg ed from the undergroun d ,  
on "liberated" Polish soil. The total streng th of 
both groups _w as only 20, 000 persons� This ntimerical 
w eakness during the initial postwar period made C om• . 
mun ist str�tegy subordinate socialism to nationalism , 
and forced comm� ism to pose as a native Polish movement. • • • 
. *The K osciuszko Division was the nucleus for the 
future Polish Soviet-controlled army. ·It was· establishe4 · 
on May 20 , 1943 , in the Soviet Union. 
**Peoples' Commissariat of Internal Affairs .(Soviet 
secret police) . 
3a ichard F .  Staar, Poland 1944-19621 The Sovietization 
of a Capt ive People , ( Baton Rouge ,  Lou isiana• Louisiana 
State University Press ,  1962), pp. 80-81. 
After January 1 ,  1944 ,· Soviet agents presented a 
show of popul.ar �upport wheJ'.1 . �hey shared in the leader-
. . 
ship of the underground leg�slati ve .National Counc.il of 
- lJ -
the Homeland , known as the KRN or Krajowa Rada Narodowa , 
in Warsaw. 4 That position also allowed them to b·e equal 
partners wi.th other political parties in Poland , all of 
which were vying for governmental superiority within the 
. ' 
Polish .st·a�e. The Soviet sympathizers presented the · 
illusion of poli�ical strength by being part of the .�N ,  
but it was an exaggeration of their actual power, Indeed, 
"it was not this weak coalition by the military successes 
and the physical presence of the Soviet army which guar­
anteed the Communists ·a monopoly of political power in 
Poland •.. 5 
Having obtai�ed key places in the newly revived · .  
government within the Polish state and possessing the . 
mainstay of the swiftly· ·advancing Red Army , the Communists 
were strengthening their strangulation .hold upon Poland . 
·An �xecutive body, the sixteen-man Polish Committee 
of National Liberation (PKWN --- Polski Komitet 
Wyzwolenia Narodowego ) ,  was established at the 
Chelm near Lublin on July 21 , 1944 by the Communists. 
(There was) Communist control ovgr the most important d�partments in the government(. )  
' 
"• 
.The Saviets had pressed their political advant�ge ta the 
4rbid. , pp . 80-81. 
5Ibid. , pp. 80-81. "At least nine of the original 
fourteen KRN members supported the Communists . .. . .  (Ibid. , 
p .  81)." 
61bid, , PP• 80-81, ' 
I . 
. . . � 14 -. . · .·. .. · . . . 
·full in Polan$1 by ·the t�m e  .. the Allies . met . fo.r t�e Yalta . : . 
conference of . February 4-1.1, 194.S. 7 Th·e�etor e ,  it was· �1th. · 
a spi�i t of · self-corµ'idence . that �t�in approach.ed the- .
· 
. . .. 
' . ·._ : .. '-"  . . . . 
- . . ·. 
question of ·a · po st.war settlement de�ing· w it� the territor- ·:: .- . : _ : . .. 
ies west. of soviet Rti s�ia. . 
Weste·rn statesmen f ostered the hope that •something 
resembling the liberal Europe .of the l920's would arise 
. . -
from the ashes of the conflagration," but apart from g eneral 
d ecisions,  "the principal work• in the Crimea "had to d o  . , 
w ith the postwar organization of Eastern Europe . "  The 
. . 
principal state within that area was Poland.8 
Rudimentary stipulations were espoused in the Yalta 
accord s for the creation of a Polish government which 
. . 
woqld be self-governing and embrace all d emo cratic factions. 
Moscow , however, was more concerned w ith its own protection ' 
than democracy for Poland . In a period of lea� than 
thirty years , Polfsh territory had �wice provided Germany 
with an almo st unobstructed passage t9 the Russian stat� . 
That fact . logically explained the ti .s . s .R . ' s  concern over 
postwar Poland . The . tide of battle shifted in the Red . 
Anny• s favor by· the middle of March 194·5, lµld so on Soviet 
troops were entrenched in Poland . That situation established 
the basis for Communist domination of Polish territory when 
World War II ended . A strong buffer zone ag ainst any 
7 ' C.E. Black and E.C. Helmreich, Twentieth Century Eµropea 
A Histo;:y, (New York• Alfred A. Knopf ,  Inc., 1966), P• 576.· 
8 . 
lbid • •  p. 576. 
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pos
.
sib�e future attack upon the Russian state from the 
West was also promoted. To advance its -immediate military 
and future postwar political policy within Poland , M�scow 
I 
proceeded " toward consolidation of. Soviet power within 
the Polish state, and " a  regular pattern of which the 
end result was the assumption of full power by Communists 
with the direct and indirec't support of the Soviet Union 
followed,"9 
As early as April 21 , 1.94.5 •" Stalin was confident 
that he could dominate Poland ·and" force an open agreement 
with the Polish Commi tte.e of NatiQnal Liberation. � . . . . ' 
. :•' 
The 
accord signed · was �he. 'rr_ ea1i. ot;· -: Fri�nd�.hip , Mutuaj.: Assistance .. . -. . 
and Post-War C9llaboration between the u. s . s . R .  and the 
. . . 
National Council of the. P'olish Republic . *  The Sovie t · 
Premier. signed t�e :.agreement for the former .• and Edward 
. �
· ·. . . . . . . Osobka-Mora�ski** was the signatory · for the latter. Since 
Moscow had broken .off . diplomatic relatio'ns with the London 
Polish government-in-exile during May of 1943 ,· 9.ve
.r the 
pressure the London Poles were using to inaugurate an in-
.� . 
vestigation of the Katyn Forest massacre of 10 , 000 Polish 
officers , the Poles abroad were barred from the negotiation" .· · · 
: . . 
9Joh� d. Campbell , ed. , "The United · States ·in · W6rld· · · · 
Affairs. 1948-1949,  (New Yorks· Harp·er & Brothers, · 1949),.', · . :·:: ;. p .  102. . . . 
. . 
. . . 
*The Council. was . given . sole legal authority in Poland 
by the Polish Committee of National Lib�ration on Juiy ��� · 
1944. .• . . 
. . 
. ·. . . . 
. . --: ,,; 
·. · .· 
. .. . .. . . 
**F�rmer · Polish Socialfst Party · member who was made . . . · 
Premier and Foreign Minist�r in the Provislona.J.:. Government .. ,. : · .. · 
of .Poland. · · , .. "" · - · � . . .. 
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of any ty� e of compact with the Soviet Union. Moscow, 
• 
therefore, transferred i�a attention to the Communist-
dominat.ed Polish Patriots• Union and subsequently signe� 
an agreem�nt with it. 10 
.
. . 
•. . 
The treaty_guaranteed·Polish� 
Soviet cooperation for twenty years .and ·th� b�sic · �1 �me�t . 
; . . .. ' 
· . . . .. . ,,,.. 
of the covenant was Article_ II, which .called for t�e" . _, 
.· 
._ · 
"str engthening of . 'a stable. �d permanent· . friendship in tim e · 
.. 
. 
. 
of war and after war"· between the two con.t.racting parties.·· · 
That relationship, .in turn, was to then . . . : ·. 
. . . · . . . ,., . . 
• • • strengthen th. e frl.endly · · colla:t>oratioi;l· : 
between the two countries in c;:_onformi ty with · . . . 
the p�inciples .. of. mutual r�·spect· for their in­
dependence · and sovereignty .as well as non• 
intervention in internal affairs of the other 
state.1:1 
The article offered the Polish people the illusion of 
' 
'. · .. 
security and provided Osobka-Morawski's group substantial 
political and military support from the ,u.s.s.R. In re­
turn Stalin acquired .a loyal regime in Poland. The entire 
treaty was just vague enough to keep the United States 
from detecting any desire to dominate Poland by non­
democratic elements. No diplomatic or Presidential pro­
test was given by the U.S. 
The image of political independence in Poland did not 
last long as the Communists proceeded rapidly to tighten 
lOBlack and Helmreich, fil1• cit.,- p. 576. 
•. 
.· 
llLel and M. Goodrich and M�i e J. Carroll, eds., 
Documents on American Foreign Relations, Vol, V�I, 1944-194 5 ,  
(New Jerseys Princeton Uriiversi1;y ·Pres� • . 1947), P• 857� . 
\.. 
·:.. 
.. . ... 
.• 
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their hold over the Polish nation . In March of 1945 •. 
Stalin arrested members of a delegation invited to n�gotiate 
with Moscow. Members of the group .were• 
The Vice Premier of the Polish Government ,  Jan 
Jankowski (Labor Party) . . 
Three Ministers of the Polish ·Government ,  perman,ently 
in Poland, Adam Bien (Peasant Party) s Stani slaw 
Jasiukowicz (National Democratic Party) s and Antoni · 
Pajdak · (Socialist Par�y). · · 
The Commander of the former Hom.e ·Army , General 
Leopold Okulicki . .. · The Chairman of the secret Polish Parliament ,  known 
as the Council of National_Unity, Kazimierz Puzak 
(Socialist Party) . 
Eight members of the Council of National Unity , 
.representing· the chief political parties in Polanda 
Stanislaw Mierzwa (Peasant Party) s Kazimierz Baginski 
(Peasant Party) ; Jo·sef Chacinski (Labor Party) a . 
Franciszk Urbanski (Labor Party) a Zbigniew Stypulkowski 
(National Democratic Party; Kazimierz Kobylanski., 
Piotr Czernick, and Michalowski (all members of the �. 
National Democratic Pa.r.ty) . · · 
They were. accused of carrying out disruptive acts in the 
. . 
rear of the Red Army as . it was "liberating" Poland .·. ·In 
fact all of them were democrat�c leaders whose · opinion. in 
the matter of the formation of the future Polish Government. 
had been important . As a group , they represented " a 
broad coalition of political parties in Poland and were 
members of the governing , military and political bodies and 
for, five years directed the Polish nation's struggle against 
' . 
the German occupants in Poland. "  They were generally 
esteemed by the Poles in the homeland and abroad, and the 
Polish government-in-exile was completely confident in 
th. 12 em. 
12Rozek, �· cit . , .P• 370, 
\.. 
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By arresting the fifteen eminent Polish political 
leaders, Moscow desired to prevent the formation of a new 
democratic Poland �d thereby undermine the measures agree� 
upon in the Crimea. The u.s.s.R.·'s explanation for the 
arrest depicted the duplicity of Moscow's actions and 
pledges. It was given by the Soviet News Agency, TASS, 
on May 5, .1945a 
••• the group of Poles mentioned in the British 
press and referred to in the House of Commons is 
composed of sixteen and not fifteen people. It _is 
headed by the well-known Polish General Okulicki • • • 
... ·This group of sixteen persons did not disapp� ar 
but was arrested by the military authorities of the · Soviet Command, • ·• • 
• • • All these men, or some of them, according to 
the results of the inquiry, will be tried.lJ · 
Protests against the obviously false accusation came from . . . 
several quarters. Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, head of the 
Polish government-in-exile denyed. the Soviet charges that 
the underground organizations were promoting and carrying 
out sabotage and justified their wartime acts as be�ng 
"the instinct of self-preserva:tion '-n the nation . .. l4 . 
. . . . . . 
Another expostulation was pref?ented by Edward R. Stettini.us, 
Jr., United States Secretary .of .. Stat
·� who on May 5, :1945,· . ·
· 
. 
. . 
. 
. · .  . •' . . . . . : . . ' 
commented on the Soviet: aqt
.
ion.� . : .. '.The. language was tempe�ate · �.. . . . . . . . ' . . 
.. ' •  . •  
but expressed American an�iety
_
--�yer ·soviet ac. t.ions in 
Poland. 
lJibid • • . Pi>�· 374-)75. At · firs.t the Soviet·s disavowed 
any knowledge-- of the missing' P.olish ·d elegation" (Ibid•-). . . 
14Ibid., p. )?S�· Se4a Appendix for ·full text of
. ·
: 
Mik�lajczyk's statement (D.ocument No. 1). · · · · . 
'- .. 
. . . 
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• • • Mr. Molotov has now officially informed Mr. 
Eden and myself that these leaders were arrested on 
the charge of "diversionist" activities against the 
Red Army. 
We told Mr. Molotov of our great concern on 
learning after such a long delay of this disturb­
ing development which has a direct bearing on the 
working out of the· Polish problem • • • •  We have 
asked • • • for a • • • full explanation of this 
action. • • • Further discµssions must await a 
reply, 1.5 . : ·" 
No insensate innuendoes were spoken • . The above weak pro­
test was the only U � s. p�essure ·_applied; to aid the captive . . . . .. . . 
· : " Poles, and no demand for. le�i�ncy· was e
.
spoused, . By not 
showing Moscow . a greater degr
.ee of· determi�ation on be­
half of the noted democratic· elements in Poland, the United 
States lost an opportunity to advance t_he. .. lr:i.dependence of 
Poland which. wa� contingent · with .t he . hol:ding. o� .:·
·
"free and. 
unfett.ered elections" . in .that state. 
To . eliminate the "courageous and patriotic .1 .e� ders of 
the Und�rpround" was imperative to Stalin. 'The alleged ;; 
crimes were• a "tactical move to extort confessions which 
. . 
would incriminate the London Government and its undergro�d: 
organizations in Poland." . . 
. . . .. ·. . . 
Having accomplishe.� ·that, . the. · � . 
· Communists had destroyed prac't�cally all "potential ".'competi� 
ti on to �heir absolute .rule of P_oland," ·a nd· several event$ 
prf·or to the Yal ta-promis
.
ed· . general" elections aided the· : · 
' . . . - . . 
development (!f Moscow" s· :Complete ciomin�t
.io!l of ·the Polish· : 
. . 
' , . . 
. i 
. . . . . . � � .. · 
- . 
. . 
. • > .  
. :· .· . : . 
· l5Goodr�ch and'.Carroli, eds,· , . .Ql?.. · . .£.il. , , . p •. �-09•. · on· · :-- ···�" . 
June 21, th·e Court in Moscow charged . twelve of - the sixteen : . ·· ... · . . 
arrested Polish. leaders with · underground activi ti�s in the . . . . : .
. .  
rear of. the Red Army· and s�ntenc�d them for p·eriods ·of fr.om. 
four months to ten years. Three were acquitted and one, . · 
owing to illness, was npt tr�ed at . that date (Ibid,),· · 
- 20 -
. 16 state . 
The Tripartite Commission in Moscow reached an agree­
ment on June 22 , 1945 1 the formation of the Polish Pro-
·vision�l Government. Six days later the Lublin Committee 
resigned. Osobka-Morawski became the Premier of the new 
Provisional Government of National U�ity, and Mikolajczyk ' s  
acceptance of the decisions .reached at the Moscow meeting 
"united" the Pole s . *  On· July 3 ,  1945 , the new Polish 
Government promised Britain and the United States that 
it would hold the long•awaited " free and unfettered elec­
tions. II** Two days later the J,r. s·. and the United Kingdom 
recognized the Provisional Go�ernment as legal authority 
in Poland. 
Dilatoriness tactics -enabled t.he .Communists to · 
. . . ·· prevent a general el�ction .. :foi:' . ·a·· .year:;· but they allowed . . . . " . . ·' a referendum to ·take pl�ce ·:on June· 30 , 1946 • . . It decided 
affirmatively to �hree important issues for �oland a (·l) · the 
. . 
aboli tio11 of the S.en-�te J ( 2) the nationalization of industry 
and land reform
.
J · ( 3 )  t·he a·ccept�ce of _.the new ·western 
fronti�.r � *-If;* The. si �uat_ion prompted a le'ss than speedY: 
16 Rozek , .Ql?.• cit. , p .  375. 
. C" 
. ... 
.� . . *Mik�laJczyk had acquiesced to the compact formulated 
during. the Moscow meeting and pledged friendship to and 
cooperation with the u.s.s.R .  
. . . 
. .• 
· 
. .. **It was not stated when the· elections would. be held·; . 
Therefore , _they could be put off indefini tei� .: ·· .". · :. · 
. . · . 
; . 
. . . . . 
***It was the frontier agreed. to during t.he' .. y8.J."ta C.e>n�·:: :-: ··· .. . ference � along the 09.er-Neisse rivers. · · · .· . · . . . · ·.- · .  · . 
' . 
•• 
. " . . : · •' ·. . · . .. 
- 21 -
note rrom Washington on August 20 , 1946 , charging the govern-. . 
ment in Poland with curtailment of democratic activity an� 
irregularity in . conducting the referendum , but the d��isions 
of the referendum became law regardless ot u.s. protest. 
Because of that situation, any elections specified in the 
Yalta Agreement were not immediately expeo.ted to take place . 
Finally on January 19 , ' 1947, the Polish state selected 
its new ruling government. The resuJ.ts were published by . 
the Conµnunists on January 28, 1947. The publication showed 
that orily 11 ,413 , 618 of 12,701,056 voters actua'lly oaat 
their ballots . .- The divis1on ot Parliamentary seats wasa 
TABLE l 
DI VISION OF 
PARLIAMENTARY SEATsl7 
· Government bloc ------------­
Polish Peasant Party - - - - - - - ­
Christian Labor Party ------­
PSL , New Liberation Party ---
.> Catholic Progressive Party --
394 seats 
28 
12 
7 
3 
Total - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - � - - - - - - 444 
The Communists together with their political allies had 
. 
·won a clear-cut victory, and the Red Army was present to 
ensure Polish obedience - to the newly elected regime. 
Soviet domination over Poland was complete • . 
17 -�· , P •  429. 
" .  
. .  · . . . 
,!· .· . 
· . . .  
: : •.. · 
.. 
' 
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. . . : ..
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I I .  Czechoslovakia a  1944-1948 : 
In the winter of 1944-45 , the Red Army had lib­
erated all of Slovakia and Moravia and most of Bohemia. 
The forces of the United States freed the city of Pilsen 
and most of Western Bohemia, but at the insistence of the 
Soviets they did not advance to Prague . and relieve Czech 
forces there . The troops of the u . s . s. R .  were to have 
the honor of driving the · Ge
.rmans from the capital of 
.Czechoslovakia on May 7 ,  1945 � 
Following the libe�ation of half of Slovakia and the 
whole of CarpathQ-Ruthenia by the Soviet Army , Dr.. Eduard 
Benes , the Czechoslovak President broadcasted from L.ondon 
to his people on February 17 , 1945. He announced that he 
and his government would shortly return to Czechoslov'akia 
from :London , but ten months later the c·zech government-in- · 
. . 
exil.e was still in England. Despite the delay , Jan Masaryk, 
the Foreign Minister, publicly presented the future foreign 
policy of the state of Czechoslovakia on December Jl ,  1945 . 
Our foreign policy will be based on the solid,  
unalterable , and mighty foundation of our treaty 
with the Soviet Union. • • • Our relations with 
our neighbors will be determined in the light of 
our Soviet treaty. 18 
18Keesing' s Contemporary· Archives , Vol . V ,  194)-45, 
(London a Keesing •.s Publications Limited·, .  1946) , p .  7052. 
. Masaryk was referring to the 1943 Czech-Soviet treaty 
. -
of alliance .  The treaty itself had previou�ly reflected 
the policy of Benes and the. · Fo'reign Min�ster to "rebuild 
their country as a bridge between East and West , " 19 It · 
was with the most minute effort that Soviet 'influence was 
established in Czechoslovakia, and the government-in-exile 
was prepared to acquiesce to that power. Indeed , upon 
re1;urning to his liberated nation, Benes ''voluntarily 
admitted Communists into the Czech cabinet , " 20 It was a 
procedure not prompted by reality since the Communists. and 
their political allies - had not acqu�red a majority of seats 
in the general elections of May 26, 1946, 
TABLE 2 
PARTY REPRESENTATION IN THE 
CZECHOSLOVAK NATIONAL. 
ASSEMBLY21 
Communist Party of Czech.oslovaki;;l ------ 93 
Communist Party of Slovakia ------------ 21 
. Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party --- 37 
Czechoslovak National Socialis·t Party --
4
5
6
5 
Czechoslovak People ' s  Par�y - - - - - - - - - - - ­
Democratic Party (Slovak) -------------- 43 
Other parties - � - - - � - � - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 5 
300 
The � York. Times reported · the �lections as ·being a 
19 . Black and Helmreich , .2l1• cit . , p .  758� 
20Ibid, , P • 758. 
. 21H .  Gordon. Skilling, "Revolution and Coritinui ty in Czechoslovakia,"  Journal of Central European Affairs, Vol , 
XX , No. 4 (January, 1961) , P •  377. 
. .  '- 24 ,.; ,: '. . . ' .. . 
"r.ebuilding 'of a democrat.ic ·l ife tn 
. . 
C
.
ze�hos�ovakl�, .. 2� 
but democracy in that state . was ·�erely a facade. Com-
. . 
munist influence was substantial. an� they were steadily 
gaining power. Pro-Moscow politicians held the most 
. . 
influential government81 positions. Klement Gottwald , a 
prominent member _of the Communist party, 1 became Premier 
on May JO , 1946. Jan Masaryk was retained as Foreign 
Minister, and on June 19 , 1946, the Assembly . unanimously· 
re-elected Benes as President of Czechoslovakia. The 
Soviet sphere of influence was slowly engulfing the 
CzephoslovaJtian republic, and just how far it had been 
removed from the West and democracy became lucid �n little 
over a year. In October of 194? , Raymond Daniel -made an · 
adequate observation. 
• • • There is no visible evidence of 
Soviet interference in Czech affairs or life. 
There doesn ' t  need to be . · The Russians quite 
wisely are leaving it all to their Czech comrades. 
There are 1 , 290 , 000 Communist party members and 
the party has a firm grip on the Goverrunent� • • • 
It was an experiment in political collaboration · · 
which resulted in the non-Communist e� �ments. becoming prisoners of the Communi�ts. J 
As l�ng as that situation held true , the Soyiets had no 
reason to intervene officially into Czechoslovakia' s 
domestic affairs , . and the . illusion of independence was 
maintained. 
22 The New York Times, May 27 , 1946, page 26. 
23Raymond Daniel, "Crossroads Between Two Worlds , "  
The New York· Time! Mag�zine� Vol. XXXXVIII (October 26 , 
.194?) . pp. 71 51- o. . . . .  "
. . . 
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Everything appeared to be going according to MQscow•s · 
expectations until the Czechs announced their desire to 
participate in the Paris disc.us�ions of �he Marshall" plan. 
�talin put a spe�dy halt to such freedom of expression, and 
subtle Communist· pressure became overt. Despite the Soviet 
intervention, President Benes continued to await a major 
move by them to restrain civil liberties. When it took 
place he .would then turn to the Parliament for support in 
preserving Czechoslovakia ' s  fre�dom. He had underestimated 
the ·Communists, however. When the move came it was not in 
the area of civil liberties. Instead , it was a Communist 
formulated political crisi s ,  which transpired on February 
25.  1948. 
The Soviet solution to the artificially created crisis 
was a new government under the Communist leader Klement 
Gottwald , but Benes refused to accep·t the Soviet terms • .  
His objection was .· exposed in a letter to the Presidium of 
the Communist Party in which he insisted upon "parliamentary 
democracy and parliamentary government, "  but Moscow ' s  will 
. . 4 prevailed. 2 
The United States ,  France , and Great Britain issued a 
formal protest on February 26, 1948. 
"·· (Through) means of a crisis artifically and 
deliberately instigated the use of. certain methods 
already tested in other places has permitted -the 
24•oocument, "  Current Hist2rY ,  ·vol. XIV (April , 1948) , 
p .  20 . 
..  
suspension of the free exercise of parlia­
mentary institutions and the establishment 
qf a· dis.guised dictatorship of a sin·g1e party 
under . the cloak of a government of national . 
union. 
(We) • • · • can but condemn • • • the con­
sequences • • • which can only be2disastrous for the Czechoslovak people • • • 5 
- · 26 -
The note had no effect and did not change the political 
situation in Czecnosloyaki�. On May JO ,  1948, national 
elections took place and the Communist-dominated N�tional 
Front received 6 , 413 ,963 valid votes out of a total of 
7 , 204 , 256 .  
Benes resigned on June 7 ·, 1948, because of ill heal th , 
and Klement Gottwald was elected to the Presidency by the 
Assembly. .seven days later. The Communist Antonin Zapotocky 
su·cceeded ' Gottwald as Prime Minister, and Czechoslovakia 
be.came a Communist ruled country. The means were called 
" democratic , "  but the end was the · loss of Czechoslovakian 
indepeiidence. 
• • • The case of Czechoslovakia show(ed) 
clearly that the active interest and impressive 
display of Soviet power in contrast to the West ' s  
hesitant policy not only formed the background 
but were the chief bases for Communist successes 
in Eastern Europe . Careful , professional in­
filtration of democratic instituti.ons . and the 26 wishful thinking of the democrats did the rest • 
• 
J 
2511oocument , "  Current History , Vol . XIV (April , 1948.) ,  
p .  235 . See Appendix for full text of the note (Document 
No. 2 ) . 
. � 
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26rvo Duchacek, "T�e Strategy of Communist Infil tra- .. 
tiona Czechoslovakia, 1944-48 ,� World Politics ,  Vol� . II 
(October 1949-July 1950 ) , pp� 3�S·J�6. . .· . ·•. . . . .
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The strategy . used by · the. Communi sts in · obtaining· 
. . .. . 
complet� control of ·Czechof!lovak .government was br
.oken 
·. · .. 
down into four basic steps by Ivo Duchacek1 (1) isolation. 
of the democrats a (2)  advance of the R'ed Army combined 
-
with the feeling and propaganda that the u . s . s . R .  was the 
only possible ally who could p·revent German aggression in 
I 
Eastern Europe ; ( J ) rapid Communist control of the main 
government positions ( agriculture and police departm�nts) s 
(4)  use of democracy and decentralizations as weapons for 
in�iltrating and disorganizing of the governrnent . 27 All 
four steps were followed very closely and assiduously by· 
. 
the Communists ,  but Czechoslovakia remained for a limited 
period of time a reluctant ally of Moscow, 
Regardless of Czechoslovakia' s  hesitancy, its fate 
had been sealed. From May 1945 to Fe.bruary 1948, the re­
public had b�en ruled by a coalition of parties headed .by 
the Communist Party.. Democratic elements in Czechoslovakia 
were led by Eduard Bene s ,  and they hoped that th'e Soviet 
Union would permit their nation . the freedom to choose its 
own form of government . Benes professed that belief as 
early as April 1946. 
It is natural that the socialistic system 
. of the neighboring Soviet Union should exercise 
an influence on the economic reorganization of 
Czechoslovakia. Iri ·spite of this fact, qzecho­
slovakia remains and will remain absolutely . 
independent , with her own politi�al democratic . 
regime and her own parliamentary democracy, 
· . . ·:. 
· . ··. 
• ' ,• 
. .  . · . ' 
The Soviet Union does not int
.
erfere in . any 
respect in Czechoslovak.- affairs. Czecho­slovakia is following her own2�ay, her own methods· and . traditions. • • • . 
.. 28 
Such dreams: . were t·radi tio�ally . . well-founded but not . . 
realistic a:c·c'ording �o the d�veloping siutatiori. Ul ti_mately. 
the Communist. PC\.rty seized· p·ower in February of 1948, ··and 
. . 
it was too �ate for anti-Copununist parties t.o pr�·vent the 
·complete bovimunist domination of the Cze.choslovakian gover?l-
ment. 29 · . . · · .· . . 
The future of . democracy in Czechoslovakia and .als.o · 
. that state• s .  independence had. been foun�ed .upoz:l, . "free. -and_ .' 
.· : . 
unfettered elections . "  The majority of the .votin·g· populas:�
:: 
� . ' . . 
. . . • 
known to be democratic and ·l'.'lo
.
n-Marxj,_st· , wa� . to assert-' ·i·t-.' . 
l 
· self at the polls�  but it �as naive · to b�liev� �hat �he · · . · .. . 
ballot box was an unimpregnable sanctuary:..
. 
·The Soviets . · 
. . 
. . . 
placed their faith · in subve.rsive ac.t.ions.- . ... ·They : ·th¢re�y . . .  · :_ : .. � '.:·: " . -. · · . .. . . . . 
. .. 
. 
won the upper hand and .t·erminated' d�mocracy _in Czecho.:.. . . . . 
slovakia. · "The . resu'i t.  was ·a depr.essing shock for. the 
Western wor�d , and an encouraging sign for the Eastern 
world. and Communism in generai . .. JO 
28.Eduard Bertes , "Post".Nar Czechoslov,akia,"  Foreign 
Affairs , XXIV, (April , 1946) , PP• 397 1 �09 .  
29ouchacek , .QQ• ·cit . , p .  372. 
-. �· . . � .
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J01vo Duchacek , "The February Coup in Czechoslovakia," 
World Politics, Vol , III (July , 1950 ) ,  p �· 5J2 ,  
III. Hungarya 1945-1948 
· As early as September 2J , 1945 , the United States 
informed the government of Hungary that diplomatic re­
lations would be established with it ,  provided free 
elections were held, The Hungarian Government accepted 
that criterion, and Washington gave its � jure recogni� 
tion on November 2 ,  1945 . Two days latex- , the Hungarian · 
nation went to the polls. The results were a 
PARTIES 
TABLE J 
REPRESENTATION IN· THE NATIONAL 
ASSEMBLY 
Smallholders • • • • • • • • • • • • · · · � · · · · ·  
Communists • • , , • , , • •  , , , , , , , , , , , • , , 
Social Democrats • • • • • • • • • • • • • • � · ·  
Peasants . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .  · • • • • • • • •  
Liberty • •  , • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  , • • • • • •  
Democratic People ' s  , , , · , , , , , • , • • • •. Citizens ' Democratic • • • • • •· • • • • • • �  Non-party • • • • • • •  , . . . . ... ,
·. � • • •. • • •  , • 
REPRESENTATION 
222 . 70 
69 
22 
16 
2 
l 
18 
Total , ., • •  , • •  , , • • • •  , • , ·, • , , • •  , • • •. • , 420* 
*409 members we�e elected ; 11 Were appointed . Jl 
Z oltan Tild� was .named Prime Minister on November 11 , 1945 . 
Voting presented clear proof that the Communists lacked 
. . 
• 
. . . .. . . . . .
. · .. . . ·, 
dominent · influence in Hungary. The Smallholders and ·the · ·, 
. \ . . 
West were encouraged to believe that Hungary .coul� e.scape : .:: .  : : ·. :·: .
. . . 
Communist. rule. Indeed ,  .Proclaniat1on ·. o·f · a · Republic it) " ) 
. . ' 
February � 1946, was permitted without direct Soviet in- · 
I ·4 . . . . 
. . 
. . . . . . . . . 
tervention. * . Apparently
. t�e S<;>viet Union . was not fear-· . 
ful of an established republic near its frontieJ; .. ; . .  Moscow · . . . ·. · .. 
was even co·oper�tive during the early., .postwar years. ** :. . . 
With .the ainicabi�:i ty of the \J. S . S .  R • and· the . diplo- . '.-.. . . . . . . 
ma tic re·cogni tion of th_e U . S.A. , the general belief was · 
that the Hungarian state would be consistent.ly gaining in 
strength and stability. That· illusion did-not last long, 
even though the November 1945 · elections had actually been 
fr.e e .  
. I 
• • • Now • • •  came the first disillusionment, 
for the head of the Soviet Mission insisted that 
the coalition for.m of government must continue , 
and backed by pressure from him, the Communists 
obtained the ministry of interior , with the con­
trol of the police. The Smallholders were al­
lowed to retain the Minister Pres1dency·, but 
were forced by ' salami tactics' of pressure an� 
blackmail to expel successively their more cou-
rageous elements as 'Fascists • • • •  -32 . · 
Following political consolidation of its influence , 
*Z oltan Tildy was elected President , and on February 
4 ,  1946 , · Ferenc Nagy of the Smallholders party became . 
Premier. 
**Moscow extended Hungary' s  reparation payment for a 
period of two years. Premier Nagy returned .from the 
Kremlin to Budapest on April 20 , 1946 , with the news. 
32c.A. Macartney, Hungarya A Short History, ( Chicago , · 
Illinois1  Aldine Publishi�g Co�pany, 1962� , pp . 2J?-2J8. 
. .  
- )l -
the Soviet Union proceeded into the realm of economics. 
Its program ot stripping Hungary began in July of 1946, 
which produced a protest from the United States,  The U .S .  
note invoked the Yf:llta agreem�nt, but it did not cause the 
termination of Communist· ·actions, Indeed , Soviet tech­
niques of _ infiltration were intensified. Within a year, 
Communist pressure had forced the resignation of Premier 
Nagy, and a new coalition government wae formed under 
Lajos Dinnyes of the Smallholders party on May )1 , 194?. 
On June, ·5 ,  1947 , the President of the U.S.A. , Harry S .  
·'· . 
T�uman, made a statement in which he described the change 
�f government in Hungary as an outrage. Nevertheless,  
the United States Senate ratified its peace treaty with 
Hungary on the same day. That action appeared as a sane• · 
tion of Soviet exploitation of Hungary, and it m&.de Wash­
ington seem indifferent tQ the situation. Therefore , the 
Hungarian struggle against Communist domination was . soley . . 
its own. . · . 
Michael T� Florinsky depi.cted the manner in which the . 
. . 
u . s . s . R .  obtained Hungaria.J) submisslon� The following 
. . 
observation was quite c·orre�t ... . . � · ·· . -. . 
The method ch
.
osen was uni.magi.native , crude , 
and painfully familiar. At the end of. February, 
1947 , Bela Kovacs , a p�ominent member of. parlia- . ment and secretary general of the Smallholders• 
Party, · was ar�ested by the Russians, an action 
branded by .t.he Am�ric� government as �unwar­
ranted intl:lrvention." • . • · • . Premier Nagy · • · • • 
was fo�ced to resign. A new coalition goyern-
ment·, nominally under Premier Lajos Di_nnyes,  . ._ . 
· . but . actually controlled . by the Communist leader, . · · 
. R8.koa1 , was installed, · Maaa arrests which b8Kan 
. ·.· 
· �  
.. 
., 
I 
"! 
the 
and 
. ' . . 
. 
. �. �� .-
. . . · . · 
I . in Marc� were iriten�if i.ed , the army .was purged , . 
and with the "voluntary" dissolution on July 22 · 
or· the Liberal party, ;the . l.ast vestiges of · ·po-
li tic�l oppositio� disappeared . 33 
.
·
. 
•• ! • •  
There was only· .mild poli tica� .sensation creqted · by' :· 
, 'r, 
overthrow on May JO , 1947·, �f the Budapest gov:erriment 
it hp.d
0 
already ��b�ided by se'ptember of that 'yea�� J4 . . : 
Dinnyes and · the other govex:nment officials were surprised 
wi�� · the absence of protests from the free -nations of the ' 
world , but then no nation had bothered to stop Soviet in­
filtration either. With that in mind , dinnyes himself 
sought close cooperation with the u . s . s . R . , but before it 
could be acquired several ste.ps had to be taken. More than 
5 , 000 anti-Communists were arrested i Bela Kovacs died in 
prison ; Jo�eph Kovaco was fired ; and Nagy was forced to 
resign, As long as· these procedures went smoothly for the 
Communists , the Hungarians had no· fear of direct milit�y 
intervention by the Soviets , but Moscow desired total dom­
ination of the Hungarian state, To· that end a new order, 
the " Iron Fist , "  was established. . It was headed by. Mat'yas . . . . 
Rakosi , Deputy Premier and Communist party leader , and i.t 
brought about the fusion of democracy and · the brave irori­
fisted Communist party. 35 
. 
· J�ichael T.  Florinsky , "The Case of Hungary , "  Current 
History,  Vol . XIII , (September ,. 1946 ) , pp . 154-155. Matyas 
Rakosi was one of the returning "Muscovite" exiles and a 
member of the hard core of the Hungarian Communist Party, 
. 34Ibid . , P• 15), 
J511Hun'gary 1 The New Order, "  Newsweek, Vol, XXIX· , No, 24 (June 16 , 1947) , pp . 42-43 . . . . .  
. ·, 
. . . . 
. . . 
.
. _:. : . . � 
After tne fusion, the Hungarian polltical � · social , 
and economic situation would . . remain status guo , The : 
actions taken by the u.s. in order to infl�ence · develop-
. 
': ' 
.ments witfiri that nation had no effect, Hungary had 
fought against the "Iro� Curtain" by itself and lost. 
JJ -
. . 
. . : . . 
The Soviets gained a substantial political base from . 
·. • ,  . 
which they enclosed the Hurigariari n.ation, �d ... the.i� Corri:. · · , :  ·" 
. . 
munist agents within the country .st�adily �tr.engthen.�� .. . . 
. ·. ' •.. 
their influence . Th� · ·c·omm�ists· conse>lidated their ·p.o.�er. · . : .·. . . . . 
qufckly during 19�7 , . and . on" July 25; the. As
.
sembly was dis-· 
I .• . . 
solved .al".ld a new election was held on AUl?;USt j1· •. . 1947, : · · . 
. ·.' ·. - . 
. 
. 
·• ' . : . : . 
I ,•  ' • "' • "• ·':, 
; . 
:.· 
. . 
. . . 
TABLE ·4 .
. 
· PERC�NTAGE OF VOTES . CAST 
ON AUGUST 31 ,· . 1947 
. . ;
, 
. PARTIES PERCENTAGES ·OF 
Coalition Parties 
Communists .. • • • • • • •  · • • • • • • •  Smallholders • • • • • • • • • • • •  
Socialists · · · · · · · � · · • • • •  
National Peasant·s • • • • • •  , 
Opposition Parties • . 
Democratic People ' s  • • • • •  
Independent Democratic , ,  
Father Balogy ' s  Party • • •  
Minor Parties • • • • • • • • • • •  
VOTES* 
22. 0 -
15 . 1 "  
14. 6  
'.l • 0 
16. o 
14. o  
5 . 0  
4 . 3  
*The percentages of votes cast in the 1945 
election were as follows a Communists 17 , 
Smal lholder�657 , Socialists 17 ,  National Peasants 9 ,J  . 
A coalition government under the leadership of Dinnyee was 
J�allory , _g,u • .£11. ,  1948, p .  95, 
. ' . . : . . . . . . � 
- J4 -
created on September 23, 194? , which included four Small­
holders , five Communists, four Socialists , and two National 
Peasants. Eleven months later President Zoltan Tildy an­
nounce� .. , his resignation after the arrest of his son-in-
law on charges of high treason and espionage , and on August 
3 ,  1948 , Arpad Szakasits was elected �resident by the 
P arliament and immediately assumed . office. The U . S .  De­
partment of State protested against these electoral mach• 
inations. 
(We) • • • are seriously concerned by reports 
from Budapest of widespread .. abuses of the already restrictive provisions of ·the new Hungarian 
electoral law, under which the national elections 
will be held on August Jl .: :. The· United S tates 
Government ,  which has taken note of the assur- . 
ances of free elections voiced publicly by the 
Hungarian Prime Minister and . other Hungarian 
official s, is prompted . • . • · � by its desire that 
freedoms guaranteeQ. by. ,·.th� · T��·�ty . ·.of Peace with Hungary • • • shl;ll  not be . derii•_d .. the Hungarian 
people . 37 . . : · · 
The note went . on to state· .  how . there was a disfranchisement 
of voters by the Communist controlled electoral organs on 
flimsy and illegal · pretexts • . I� was also noted . . that the 
lists of candidates prepared by · other po�itical · parties 
. . 
were supervised by the Communists. The lists !fere .. obtaine
.
d 
by pressure . The measures mentioned within the ·�ashington 
note was �ecognized as illegal means used by the Communists 
• 
. . · · .
· 
. 
I 
,I 
J7aaymond Dennet and Robert K.  Turner, . eds. , . pocuments " ... . : : . . . 
-
. ._: .. 
on American Foreim Relations , Vol. IX ,  (Princeton; New- ,- . ·· , . 
Jerseya Pri�ceton University Presa-, 1949) •. p·�· 69�.. . : · ' '· · . ·: · 
•• 
. ' . 
. 
' . . . ·' . · . 
". . : ... : ."· . . � 
.. 
. . .. · . 
'· 
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to provide them with complete control of the newly elected 
legi slature regardless of the outcome of the voting. 38 
Again , protes ting produced no justice or reversal of 
Communist ·actions previosly taken. The Soviet sympathizers 
had gained complete political control of the new regime 
in Hungary , and · the Hungarian republic· ·was at an'. ' end, 
· . . 
. . 
.: 
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CHAPTER III.. 
U .S.  STATE DEPARTMEN� DIPLOMACY. :TO�ARD POLAND , 
HUNGARY AND CZ.ECHOSLOVAKIA 1 . 
. . . . 1945�:191f8" : : ., : .  " . . . • 
. I .  Poland 
Moscow was t'1e:· mainstay of the Polish Committee of 
National Liberation , but · in July pf ·1944. the Co�i ttee 
• '  . . ·. . . : 
"proclaimed · friendship ·and a· permanent ailiance with �h·e. 
. . 
United States and Great Britain. "  A guarantee was also 
. . . 
made that the traditional Franco-Polish alliance · ·would be · v 
preserved and collaboration with every democratic nation · 
. . . 
. . . 
throughout the world continued. "These pledges were soon . 
. . . . . 
. . . " . :. . : . . . .
.
. .  ·.:i 
forgotten , as Poland became progressively int�.rgrated "kith ·: .. .. · " ·; - , · . ·i . . ,· . . . . . : . . . 
the Soviet orbit. 111 . , ·  . 
. . 
on J.uly 25 , 1944 , . the u . s . s , R .  stated .its relation .. tO. " . . . . . . : . " . . 
J . . 
Pol�d as ·being strictly military. "Mos�ow said that i t  . .. 
· di'.d not desiile to
. 
organi�e· an adim
.
ins 
.. 
tration o·f· its. own. . . . . 
within the territory of Poland ·but did hop� for. �he con- , .. , . 
tinuance of �riendly Soviet-Polish c·o1·1aboration • .' · An ·ac.:. . · !" . ' • • • •• 
cord was signed . the next day between the ·Liberation c·om- · . . . 
. . . . . 
mittee �d the Soviet Union. Article six of ·the agre�- · · 
ment was the most efficacious· 1 
1staar ,  .2.l2• .£1!. , P• 116 . 
.. . - . • f .  • •
• . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . 
. 
As soon as any part of the liberated terri­
tory of Pol�nd ceases to be a zone of direct 
military operations , the Polish Committee of 
National Liberation shall fully assume the 
direction of all affairs of civil administra­
tion. 2 
J7 -
The Committee ,  subsequently known as the Lublin Gove�hment,· 
vied with the Government�in-exile in London for �he politi-
. . 
cal leadership of Poland . 
The Soviet Union aided and befriended the Lublin Govern-
ment . It was the first step toward the Communist take over 
of Poland but appeared to be an amicable Allied action since 
the Soviets were fighting to liberate Eastern Europe from 
the Nazi invaders. Another manifestation of Allied coopera­
tion on the part of Moscow �as the solemn agreement to the . 
Yalta accords regarding Poland. A major segment endorsed 
during the. Conference was the Declaration on Poland 1 
.A new situation has been created in P oland as a 
·result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. 
This . calls for the establishment of a Polish Pro­
visional Government • • • The • • • Government 
which is now functioning in Poland should there­
fore be · reorganized on a broader democratic basis 
with the inclusion of democratic leaders from 
Poland and from Poles abroad . ( It) should then 
b� called the Polish Provisional Government of 
National Unity. J · . 
That written statement was to insure an independent and 
democratic Poland , but a mer� three months after the Big 
2Dennet and Turner, .Q:Q• cit. , Vol .  VIII , pp. 854-855. 
Ju . s .  Congress , S enate , Committee on Foreign Relations , 
A Decade of Amer· can Forei Pol · c  a 41-
�. New York• Greenwood Press , · 19 
' 
. , · . . .. 
. '. . : 
. 
� . .  . . .  . . ·:·· . � .. 
- J8 
·' 
Three met at Yalta. the Soviets began to · eliminate some of 
the Polish Democratic Leaders . *  
Despite such Communist t�ct.ics •. the United States 
established diplomatic relations with the expanded Polish 
Provisional Government of National Unity on July 5, 1945, 
thereby forming a good basis for friendly diplomatic re­
lations with the Government in control of Poland. During 
the s�e month,  the Allied l�aders met at Potsdam. The 
central issue there was still PQland. The West desired 
. . 
·. more assurances not merely that elections would be f're' 
but that they would actually be held. 
This time ; Stalin resisted any firm declara­
tions , arguing that. the Provisional Government 
was committed to free elections and should not 
be hectored or insulted by Allied meddling in 
Polish affairs.  Stalin • • •  did not mention 
that he effectively· controlled "Polish affairs" 
and intended to continue doing so.  The Western 
Allies understood this well enough , but ( they) 
were still hopeful that the. "fr
.ee and . unfetter�d elections" agreed upon at Yalta would be held. 
The United States had four specific points which the 
Polish Go.vernment was to meet , and Arthur Bliss Lane , U . S .  
Ambassador to Poland , presented the criteria to the Polish 
Foreign Office on August 19 , 1946 1 
• • •  it is  essential for the carrying out of 
free elections that (1)  all democratic and anti­
��zi parties shall be allowed to conduct election 
campaigns freely without arrest or threat of 
arrest. The parties recognized • ·• • (are) • • • 
The Polish Workers ' Party .(PPR) , the Democratic 
*See above pages 6-9 . 
4william P .  Gerberding, United States Foreign PolicY1 . 
Perspective6 and Analysis,  (New York• McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, 19 6) , P• 140 . 
' 
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· Party (SD) , the Polish Socialist Party (SL) , 
and the · Labor Party .(SP) J ( 2 )  all such parties 
shall .be represented on all electoral commis­
sions .and ballots be counted in presence of 
representatives of all · such parties 1 ( 3) re­
sults shall · be p ublished ·immediately by local 
districts J and { 4) there· shall be an adequate 
system of appealing election dispute s . 5  . ' 
. The four points were aimed · ·at prodding the . Polish re.gime 
into keeping the promise i1;· gave at the Yalta Conference to 
hold "free and unfettered elections . "  If these steps were 
ex�cuted , the United States believed that Poland would be 
an independent and democratic nation and still possessed 
the conviction that events in Poland would advance smoothly 
since· the Polish Government had announced January 19 , 1947 , 
as the date on which the Polish state would vote . 
Just two months prior to the general elections J how­
ever , an induced Communist election deal was forced upon 
the Peasant Part�. It was presented as a compromise politi­
cal action in order to prevent the dissolution of the co­
alition , thereby averting any political chaos which would. . 
follow the termination of g_overrunental functioning. The 
compromise , known. as the Moscow agreement , 
• • .• awarded Mikolajczyk ' s  party one-third of 
the places in government and administration--­
e�ough for a voice but not enough for power. 
· Their allotment was spelt out in detail s one 
Vice-President (Wincenty Witos) , one vice-Premier 
(Mikolaj czyk) , and five of the fifteen ministries. 
• • • ( T ) he vital internal security department 
was made into a special ministry led by Stanislaw 
Radkiewicz. He had spent iost of the war years _in the Soviet Union. • • • 
5nennet and Turner, fil2.· cit. , Vol. VII I ,  p.  ·883. 
6Nic�olas Bethell , omulak 1 His
. 
Poland 
(New Yorks Holt , Rinehart and Winston, 
m ,  
·' 
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According to the compact , Mikolajczyk • s  Peasant party Was 
also to receive fifty-four seats in· Parliament. "It  was 
party politics , Polish style . •Parliamentary democracy• · . . . 
and ' free elections • became mere words written into docu­
ments to salve people • s c.onsciences .  " 7 · · 
The United States failed to comprehend reality
.
and . 
merely addressed notes to the· Polish Provisional Government 
in regard to the arrange�erits for the holding of "free and 
unfettered elections" in Poland. It  was only when reports 
of t�rror tactics reached the u . s .A. that harsh American 
protests were conveyed· to both Poland and Moscow. The 
Polish Foreign Office received its note from Gerald Keith 
on November 22 , 1946. It s_tated that " the importance whic}) 
the United States Government attaches to the · Carrying out 
· of these decisions ( reached at Yalta and Potsdam) had re­
peatedly been brought to the attention of the Polish Govern­
ment , "  and only .by adhering to the four points stated in t�e 
August 19 , 1946 , U . S .  note could America "regard the terms ·- . 
of the decisions as having been fulfilled, " 8 Just a few 
days prior to the general election in Poland , Andrei 
. . 
Vyshinsky, Deputy Minister of the So�iet Union, received a 
. .  
note from the U . S .  Ambassador W, Bedell Smith, It empha-
7rbid. , p .  i10. 
8committee on Foreign Affairs , The Strategy and 
Tactics of World Communism, Supplement II , (Washington , 
D . C . 1 United States Government Printing Office , 1948) , 
p .  66. A second note was delivered by Arthur Bliss Lane 
to the Polish Foreign Office on January 9 ,  1947. See Appendix for full . text "(Document · No,  J) , 
" 
!'. 
I' 
I 
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sized .1he fact that the U . S .  had been a signat9ry of both · 
the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements and placed the most import 
upon the sections which delt 
with the establishment of a representative 
government in Poland through the instrumentality 
of free and unfettered elections • • • 
It also informed Vyshinsky' s  government that Washington was 
concerned with 
the pre-election activitie� of the Polish 
Provisional Government of National Unity 
• • • ( and was) es.pecially ·perturbed by the 
increasingly frequent ·repor�s of repressive 
measures which the Polish Provisional Govern­
ment ( had) seen fit to employ ,against those 
democratic elements in. �oland which ( had) nQt 
aligned themselves:·with the ·''bloc." parties. t:) . ,.. . · . . ' . . 
The Soviet reply.' was 
·'di;-et� 
.. 
and. t.incompromislng. It  
simply s·tated. that Mos-�ow c��ld "not agree with the accusa-. . . 
tions contained in· the ·note" sent by the United States. 10 
No U . S .
. 
answer \_Vas· 
.. 
made to . Vyshinsky' s sta tern en t ,  and 
� 
. . . . 
American or':ricials and a few: Poles continued to believe 
' ' that tn.·e election would mee� . the. requirements of 1!.he August 
19th note . In ·short , Washington was contented �to mix 
_ Gomulka· �d Mikolajczyk like oil and water , stand back, 
• 
observe and deplore the . insoluble result , " 11 but once the 
results of the 1947 elections were publicly known the Unlted .. 
• 
• ' 
•, • • • r 
•
, • • . . 
States realized that Poland would never be a>l'�ee , ·deino_. , ' : .. 
. . 
. · ,  . .
. . 
. 
99oinmittee on
.
Fo�eign. Affairs , .sm.� cit . . . p.  67�· : .. �e�_.· .. : . ... 
Appendix for full. text (Document No,, · l.f.) . · · · : · I . . . 
' 10rbid. ;• :e • 7o . . ·Se� Appendix· for ��11 text · of the 
. 
Soviet · reply_ (Oocument N� • . 5) • . .. · · · : · " · · 
�!Bethell , .2J2• . cit·. , P• 110 .
, . . · ·  
· ·· :  . . . ,
· 
.· . _, . ,  · .. · .. . 
� .  
. . . ·. - . 
. . ... . . . . .  . : ; , . 
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'l'ABLE 5 
OFFICIAL. RESULTS OF THE 
1947 ELECTIONS13 
Party designation Valid Percent 
votes 
Government bloc a 
Polish Peasant Party 
Labor Party .. . · ,  b PSL---New Liberation 
O.ther groupsc 
Unaccounted for 
Party designation 
Government bloca 
Polish Peasant Party 
Labor Party 
PSL--�New Liberationb 
c Other groups 
9 , 003 , 684 80 . l 
1 , 154 , 847 10 . 3  
530,,979 4 . 7  
379 , 754 :r .  5 
157 , 611 1 . 4  
181000 ----
11 , 244,875 lOO. O  
State 
List 
57 
4. ·· 
' $ ..... .
. 
.6 ·• .  
o · .
. · . .  
. . .. .. . . ·: . ' 
National 
List 
327 
24 
10 
7 
. 4 
. 372 
· Total Number 
of seats 
J84 
28 
15 
13 
4 
Unaccounted for . , . . "' -· ·--=-�· . 72 . 444 
�he breakdown of seats ·gained by the· individual 
parties formi�g the government bloc was a follows a 
Polish Workers· • (Communist) Party 
Polis}) Socialist - party 
P·ea�ant· party D.eJnocra1;ic party . '· . . 
119 
119 
lOJ 
3ia 
bA radical splinter from the Polish Peasant Party • 
. 0Progre
.
ssive C·�tholic ( three seats) and ·in��p'endent . 
S6cialists ( one seat) . · 
1�sta�r • .2.l2.• ..9.i.1· • . P • SJ . 
.. . . . ..  · · . ·  . . ··· . 
. 
� 
. 
. 
. ' ' ' 
. � 
. . · 
.· . 
. . 
• . 
" :: . : 
: . · 
.. ' " 
. ... 
: 
: 
- . . · ·. 
. : .. 
cratic and independent nation.·* 
. . 
Intimidation and fraud·.-had aided the Communists in 
,�: 
. ... · ' 
strengthening their c.ontrol .
. ove:r· .
. 
the'. :P·olish Government • 
:. " . 
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but not wishing to provok� a �ar ·with the S�viets. simply 
to make Poland a democratic . state . the u.s. co\114 only 
. . . 
expostulate what:h.ad taken plac�. · The >Jnerican position 
": · 
on the condu�� of the Polish· elections were ��e public 
January· 28, .1947 , but the actual note hBd been delivered 
to the Polish �rovisional Governm.ent on January· 9th. · . It 
containe� the following five points • (1) electio. ns which r 
would be in accordance· with the terms of the Potsdam agree- . I I I 
• •  • .. . • . 1 
ment could not be held unless repressive activities by th.e .. · · . : 
• . • . • ·1 
Provisional Government ceased immediately a (?.) · the· 
.
Polls�- � 
· .
. ·; -: ·
. ';. · .· ; 
. . . \ ... . · . 
Provisional Government failed . to . carry out· its · ·solemn ·. 
. . 
pledges i · ( 3) the U . S .  · Government still . maiJ\tained 1 t� in-·.· . .: . . . . ·. : .· ·. . 
. . 
· . . ·. 
tere.st in the we�fare · of . . �he Polish°· peopel a ( 4) the United . . I "f 
State.a . r.etained full liberty of action ·tc;> . d�te�ine 1 ts · · . . ·· · ·
· 
future ·attitude toward the · gove�ent of �.�land 1 . and ( S) · · · .: ; 
· · . .  
• ' ' " I  .' '  
Washington . would keep itself informed ·Of ·d�veloptiients iri . · ·: . .  . . . 
. . ' . 
Poland through · its diplomatic mi"ssion in· Warsaw.12 . . 
I� �eeping· with point three • Pres.i dent Truman ac;cepted 
the· Letters of Credence of the Ambassador of Poland to the 
United States ;  Jozef �iniewicz . on FebruaJ?' 4 .  1947. On 
that occasion. Truman present�d two apropos comments• The 
*See previous p·�e (42-A) tor the election results. 
12committee on Foreign Affairs . House, .ml• ,gll • •  
pp. 71-72. 
. '· . 
. I 
I 
l I 
� first concerned the Polish elections• 
• , • It is a cause of deep concern to me 
and to the American people that the Polish 
Provisional Government has failed to .fulfill 
that pledge ( of h�lding a free election) . 
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. . 
The second implied that the United States would not • turn 
its back" upon the Polish people and would keep diplomatic 
channels open in order to a�quire a more democratic Poland, · 
Truman' s  final statement was a · 
The Government of the United States has not 
lost interest in the welfare of the Polish people. 
It i$ with this in mind that I offer to your 
( government) the llooperation· ·of the officials of 
this ·aovernment, l 
Regardless of that expression of goodwill on the part ot . 
th_e U . S .A. , a glance at the new Polish cabinet revealed how 
much the Communist domination of Poland. had . solidified. 
The new governmental officials met on February 4 ,  
1947, and faced the drafting of a -new . constitution and 
the election of a president. The previous President of the 
Polish National Council , Boleslaw Bierut , was elected Presi- .. 
dent of the state , and .he appointed Jozef Cyrankiewicz 
Premier. Cyrankiewicz had been Secretary of the Polish 
.. . . 
Socialist Party. He announced -the composition of the new 
cabinet on February 6th� an� �ive of the primary ministries 
were held by Communists• (1) firsi v�ce-Premier and . �inis�er . .  
for the recovered territori�s "w�e ·Wl�y.slaw Gomulkaa (2)  the· .. . 
- • . . , . 
. 
· ·
" 
· . . .. .
. 
.· · . • . . . . • 
14commi ttee on Foreign �ttaira·, House • .Qll• .£11. ,  PP• · · 
71-72 • 74. 
. : 
: : ....  
. . 
. . 
" 
·. 
•. 
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man in charge of Foreign Affairs was Z·ygmunt Modzelewski s 
( J ) Hilary Mine , a member . of . the Polish Workers ' Party , 
was at the head of Industry s (4}  Public Security was 
plac�d in the hands of Stanislaw Radkiewicz s and ( 5 ) the 
Department of Education was given to Professor Stanislaw 
Skrzeszewsk i .  All five were known Communists . 15 
If the elections of 1947 and . the new Polish Cabinet 
. .. . . 
failed to make the Communist domination of Poland obvious, 
·the acceptance arid subseque�t rejection of 'the Marshall 
Plan did. Poland "declined to take part because of the 
personal · intervention by Stalin , "  which revealed " its 
strong ties w.ith the u . s . s . R .  and manifested Soviet in-
. 16 fluence in Poland . "  The United States could only stand 
by helple�sly as the "Iron Curtain" beg� to is'olate . Poland 
from the free world . 
1511Document , "  Journal of Central European Affaris, 
VII (April 1947-January 1948) , pp . 87-88. 
16staar , .2.U• .£ti, , pp . 6 and 94. 
.· 
; .... 
. ": ... . ·· 
. .. . . . .. . 
I I .  Hungary . . · " 
Following the · pene.trati'on of the Red Army : into 
Hungary , the Hungar1an
.
Communist Party was · organized on 
�. . . ' 
September 19 , :._ i944 , by Hungarian .Communists in ·Moscow, 
and -the · ·next. year ·its . first ·assembly met in Budapest,
· " �It . . . . 
enjoyed · the support of Soviet troop s ,  which controlled all 
Hungaria.11:- territory by April 4 ,  1945. Despite s'uch backing, 
;; 
the HC� potled only 17 . 11% of the votes · cast in the free 
elections of November 4 ,  1945 , *  The Communists , however , ,  
obtained : the key Minis try of the · Interior in -_.the· 
·:new . cabln�t. · : . .. , · 
of the National Front, 17 
... . : ·. : ;. 
The . United State·s -revised its for�ign. policy toward ._. . . ' � . . . . . J . . · . . 
the pew government of · Hungary , and between ·1945 and mid- · · 
I •• . 
• . • ' . 
1946 , . �h� plan of action was composed .of .. �iye
· �s�ential 
issues a · ( 1 )  concluding_ an armistice • ** ( 2 )  . . estab.� ish�ng . . .. . .. . .. . 
diplomatic .relations I ( 3) . extending· e conoini.c aid I ' (4)  p�sh�·: :-; . . ' " . . 
ing for fz:ee electi?n� which 
· wouid · lnsure a· �·represen�ativ� 
governi:nel'l:t and provide for freedom of political expr�ssion a "  
*They acquired o�ly 70 seats in Parliament . The 
Smallholders P arty polled 59 . 9% of all votes cast and 
obtained 222 seat s .  
17Ervin Laszlo , The Communist ---=---.-..........-=-=---...::..;:;;.;;..;:.---..-.."-"=----=.:i....-:...i.. Handbook for Basic Research, Dordrecht-Holland a 
Publishing Company , 1966) , P •  33. 
**It provided for the e stablishment in Hungary of an 
Allied Control Commission. 
. . . 
.. ••• # • 
. , · . 
. . 
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and ( 5 )  waiting to see if the newly �.liberated" Hungarian. 
state would comply �i th _ it� ·:-pledg�e �is " O f  the five points, ... . " 
economics was the �un��ental' fac t ,  and the prote·sts of the· . . . :
. · . . 
U. S. A. were generated by ·t ha:t situ'atiori in J:iungary rather 
than the socio-poli t�c-�1 · dev·�lopments of that -� t ate. 'If 
the Hungarians c�u+d not be . m ade financially independent -· . . . . .
. 
or brought w� thin. the trade' arid . f.Q�eigri . ·aid sp�ere of the 
United state�, .it w9u�d be_ lmposei_ble to
. 
prevent the ·u;S.. s .R .  · 
·. . . 
from using thei� state as a base for i naugurating extens ive· 
westward �xpansion. 
By Jufy of 1946 , Washington realized that Communist 
. .  
· .· . . i nfiltration of the Hungarian government was already so-
.. . . 
• .  . . 
lidifying and Soviet disintergration ·of the }i.ungarian 
. e·con-; . . 
. . · ... · . . . \ ; " . 
omy had just commenced, I n  re€;�d to Moscow ' s· ' actions·, . . · .  
the American Ambassador. to the Soviet Uriion·, W. B edell . . � ·. . 
. .  · .  
Smith, delivered a note t� Molotov,_ .
.. the . Soviet Foreign 
. . : . ; . . · . .. . 
I .• . . . . . . . " 
Minist�r, on July 2J , 1946. · I n  it Smi_th . �tate d. t hat · sj_.nce. 
. . . . . . . 
the end· of . 1945 , the U .s . · had proposed consi der.ation of , . .  _. · : · · .. ·. .. . .. . . . . 
a way i n  w}1ich the ·Bi g  Three c�uid." aid: in · r.ebui.'i�irig HWi-. · . . " ·"�· : .. · · · 
� . . . ' 
. .. ·� . . . 
garian economy •. 
I n  a reply dated April ·21 A. Y .  · Vyshinski, the:
. 
So viet Deputy Fore ign Minister, rej ected the 
United· States proposal on the· ground that the 
. working out of an economic rehabi litation plan 
for Hungary fell . within :the com petence of the 
Hungarian Government , • • •  ( and) that the cost 
to Hungary of Soviet rep?-I'ati ons an d  occupation 
was not in . any way respons i ble for1 the deteriora-
18oennet and Turner , .Q.12• cit . ,  Vol, VIII , p. JZ7, · 
· . 
• 
i 
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tior of economic conditions in Hungary • •  • • 
19 
D�spite Soviet non�ooperation , the United States 
publicized its decision to assist in the restoration of 
Hungary . I t  was presented on S ept�mber 24 '
· .
:1946� ·. 
' •  
I • 
• • •  ( T ) he United States has undertaken � . 
within limites imposed upon ii by th� .l�ck 0£ · 
(Moscow ' s )  cooperation ,. to - render such assis tance 
: ... : � 
·� . 
. 
as might b� effective . toward the rehabilitation· ·· · 
1 of -Hungary ; • • · ( I_t')" is designed . to assist 
( Hungany) directly ; on the other hand , Soviet . 
. aid mentioned in the Soviet Government' s note · of 
July 27 consists principally of. partial po.st"".' · 
· ponement of economic drains on the Hungar.�an 
economy in the form of reparations • . . Meanwhile . 
it is . understood that requi�i�iona arid :removals . 20
· 
by the Soviet .Army' are , in PI:'_a:.ctice , c.ontinuing. 
Communist ' economic 4i��ntergration and infiltration -.�f 
Hungray continued even · after. the ·tactful note of Septernb�r 
24th. The procedure provocated official U . S .  opposition 
' 
·. · ·. 
to the Soviet High Command ' s  intervention in Hungary. That 
protest was registered on March 5 , 1947� 
• • •  The pattern of recent political develop­
ments in Hungary appears to threaten the right 
of the people to live under a government of their 
own free choosing, for it involves foreign inter21 vention in �he domestic affairs of Hungary • • • 
The March 5th note also contained the request of Washington 
that the Allied Control Commission plus five top Hungarian 
l9Ibid . ,  pp . J27-J28. New York Times printed the full 
text of the note on July 27 , 1946; see Appendix (Doc-urnent 
No. 6 ) . For the Soviet reply ·see Appendix (Document N o .  7 ) . 
20commi ttee on Foreign Affairs '· .QI?.• sll• , pp .· 21-22 . 
"The U . S .  A. :returned $ )2 , 000 , 00.0 of · gold to Hungary and 
granted it a long-term c.:r;edi t ."qf $15 • 000 , 000 (Ibid . ) • " · 
21Ibid. , PP• 2J-24. · 
. � 
. . 
. . 
. . 
officials* analyze the conspiracy to .. over throw the . 
. . 
government and the case · a�a�nst Mr .• : . .Kovacs. After an 
.. 
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extensive investigati-on, th� -�oup would then make certain . . ' . ·. 
recommendations to the Government _.· of Hungary as to steps 
which should be taken for the orderly solutio� of their 
problem. The Was�ington offici�$ also requested the 
. 
. . . . 
Soviet authorities to take· no" furt_her measures:'. without 
cons_ul ting �he repi:e�entativ�s on the Allied Control · Com•· 
. 22 mission· first. 
Lt .• ,..General V .P.  Sviridov, the Soviet Acting Chair­
P 
man of the .Allied Control Commission for Hungary presented· . 
. 
. 
. 
. : . . . 
Moscow·• s reply on March 8th. I t  was delivered· to George : .. . 
H.  Weems , U . S .  Representative on the Commission. · 
. .. 
• 
# • •  
.
. .  
' •  . . . .. 
The . existence of an anti-:-consti tutlon8.l plot
. · . -. . . . .
·· 
and the threat that it represented to .the young· · · · · ·. · :-
Hungarian democracy is .not . denied . even by the · . .  
Smallholder Party itself. • • . ·• . · · .. · .. · . · . 
The investigations · on the subje.ct of the plot, . 
• • • �ve already . been completed by the Hungarian . 
�uthorities and the case of the plo�te�s · is at · . 
pre·sent being inve stigated . by the Itldependent ' 
. Democratic Court of the Hungarian Rep\.J.blic.. . On. , 
. this basis I ·c;armot agree · t9 Y9UX". PX"op
.
osal· for . . . 
a mut�al investiga�lon �f t�e . .  �.�-�sent· situation. • • • J . . . 
With the above . answer� the. ·U . S •. S . R .  obstructed any obJective 
investigation of Communist politi�al maneuvering in Hungary� 
. I 
*They were the Hiin.garian Prime Minister, the M inister 
of Defense , Minister of Inter�or, Minister ot Justice, and 
the President of the National Aesembly. 1 
22Ibid. ,  ' P • . 24_. 
2
Jibid. ,  P• . 26. 
' . 
: : 
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Notes of prote st against· Commu nist actions, compr omise · 
. . : 
proposals by _ the United State s •  and Soviet re'jections were 
delivered i n  almost rote fashion over the economic si tua-
tion in Hungary • .  The first signs of ob je ctions against 
politi cal activities within that stat� had been delivered 
on. M arch 5 .  1947 . There quickly followed another note 
on M arch 17 , 1947 . � New York Times printe d the text 
of th7 pr-ot�st as released by the State De partment. · Three 
important poi nts were made , Fi�st, it was apparent to 
� Washington that 
minority groups under the leadership of the · 
Hungarian Communist party ( were) attempting 
to se ize power through • , • extraconstitu­
tional tacti cs. 
Se condly, that such actions threatened " the continuance of 
democracy in Hungary, and finally, as signatory powers or · 
the Yalta Agreement• the Big Three w.ere " obligated to under­
take concerted action to· investi gate political conditions 
in Hungary . " · The . note also made public U . S .  rese ntment 
of Russ��• s position i,n Hungary·, The memorandum stated 
clearly that the u . s . s . R .  was " i n  a posit�on to take out 
.of Hungary all that the West put in. 1124 
Three months .later , another Ameri can stateme nt was 
· prese��ed to V . P ,  Sviridov. I t  was st�ictly i n  reference· 
to the arre st of Bela K ovacs, and i t  s tated that the U . S  • 
. expostulation to the unilateral action of the Soviets was 
i n  violation of the Yalta agreeme nts.. I t  also opposed 
2�ew York Times• March l�, -1947 , p. 5.  See Appendix· 
for full text (Docume nt No, 8) , 
� 
.· 
• 
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. - . 
their interference in Hungarian political aff'a'irs·, such as' ' :·· 
the derogation of the use of democratic rights and. the . .: 
free will . of the Hungarian people .  It wa·s ·an ·evaluati.o·n ,1 • 
. o� the poli ti4cal situation. irl Hung�y. wi�.h which . Sviridov 
disagreed. }ie contended that th� United Sta'tes '  " assertion 
of s�ine · change in the poll ti cal power in Hungary ;· the. · · . · · · · 
n":lllificatiori of: �h�· will · o:f the �aj.orlty o.f the Hungar�� .':: . . . . : .. ·: ,  
.· . · ' . 
people �nd . also . of the . est�blishment of som'e kind of .con- . : . . . 
. . . 
trol over .Hungary by th� minority appeared to be unfounded 
fict
.
ion. " 25 It was a blunt affirmation that the Communists 
would continue their politicai tactics . They did so with 
increasing intensity . as the . August national election was 
,
. 
drawing near. 
The next State Department news release ·concerne4 the 
electoral practices in Hungary. I t  pointed out Soviet 
activities and asked for a correction of the abuses. 
rn · as much as the Hungarian Government , under 
article 2 of the treaty of peac e ,  has assumed t.he 
obligation of securing to all persons under Hun­
garian jurisdiction the enjoyment of human · rights 
and the fundamental freedoms , including freedom of 
political opinion, the United States Government has 
instructed the Ameri can Minister in Budapest to · 
seek an interview with the Hungarian Prime Min- . ister and to urge him to take all necessary steps 
on . b7half of his Government to_ 2grrect the pre� vailing electoral abuses . ·• · • • 
The meeting took place and pledges . were mad e ,  but t.he 
.. 
abuses were allowed to continue . By using such pressure , 
25committee on Foreign . Affairs , .Q:Q• cit. , pp . 27-28. 
26 . 
. 
. 
. 
"Document , "  Journal of Central European Affairs ,  
VIII (April 194?-January 1948) , PP• 310-311 . 
� . 
, 
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the Communist-led National Coalition obtained 60% of the 
votes in the August election, . of which the Hungarian Com-
-
munist Party received about 23% ,  the Social-Democratic 
Party almost 15%,· and the National Peasant Party 8. 3%. 
The Parties of the oppos1tion polled 32% of th� votes. 
The remaining votes were taken up by the three minor . 
parties ,  soon pressured into collaborati9n with - the Com­
munists , �ho· had acquired f� ve portfolios in the new cabi-
. . 
·net. The Social�Democrats ·and Smallholders each obtained · . . . . 27 four , and the Peasant Party had two . 
The United States ·Government was fully aware that 
the Hungarian Government came under Communist control 
/ irrevocable ,  but it did not cease all attempts to keep 
diplom�tic relations open. In fac t ,  the tr . s . A. sought to 
ke.ep its prewar treaties , bilateral ones, with Hungary in 
force . *  I t. was only a dim light in the window to the Wes t ,  
and after only a short time the U . S . S . R .  pulled the "Iron 
Curtain" down on that window in order to prevent all 
Western contacts from reaching Hungary. 
27Laszlo , �· cit. , p .  ;4. 
*See Appendix for full text of the note (Document 
No.  9) . 
j 
.! 
. 
'· 
of the six main parties (40 seats to each) · and 
assure representation to mass organizations (44 
seats) , to outstanding personalities ( 11) , and 
to the Ukrainian population in Slovakia ( 5 ) . A 
similar parity of representation ·was maintained 
in the national commi tteea. · · · 
As a result , the Assembly was
2�
ot a reflection 
of a free popular choice. • • • . 
I . .  . 
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Regardless of whether the elections were popular ·and tree 
or not , the United States w�s obliged to conduct its 
foreign policy toward the newly �stabliehed Csechoslovakian 
government. 
The withdrawal of u . s .  forces from Czecho slovakia by 
the beginning of 1946 was the first American action toward 
the traditionally democratic nation in the realm of foreign 
policy. Next came the valuabl� credit of $20, 000, 000• and 
one for $50 ,000 , 000. The latter was suspended by the St�te 
Department , and t.hree reasons were given fo� the actions 
(1 )  the Czech nationalization of Ame·rican ent�r- · 
prises 1 (2)  the support by the Czechoslovak Govern• 
ment of Soviet charges that the United States ,  · 
through its ·foreign lending program ,  was engaging 
in • economic imperialism ' s  and (J) the transfer 
by Czechoslovakia of surpluses to Rumania.30 
Despite these political and economic actions by the Czecho­
slovakian . Government , Washington persisted in seeking' a 
c0.mmercial agreeme�t with the new republ ic. Each of the .' 
. .  
three Czechoslovak actions were diplomatically discussed 
Z9 6 68 Ibid. , PP • 3 7- 3  
• 
*The sum was· to be used for the financing of cotton · 
imports from the United States. The Export-Import Bank 
of Washington advanced the credit to the Prague Credit 
Bank in May ot 1946. . 
J0oennet and �urner, ml• 9.11· ,  · Vol. VIII, P• 895·; 
�. 
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.. :
· 
· and a commercial policy was Ultimately agreed �pon. 31 
From that point on, the.r.e w�s the illu11ion th�t the ·  
Czechoslovakian · nation was advancing toward a forin o� gov­
.ernment ·wpich would fulfill the democratic tradition inau-
. . 
gurated. in 1918, and the. U.S .A. , diplomatically and eco-
nomically, had come to amicable tenns with the new pro- . " .· . . 
visional government. The members o� the ne" governmental. .. -; .-. 
' . 
. . . 
offices were basically Social Democrats ,· Demo�rats., or �O�'!".::  ... : :. · . : • . • 
partisan• and that led· Washington to ass\DDe that the- . czeo)lo .... . � . . ,• ' ·. ' .. . 
. 
'· slovak state would tend to.ward the westein democracies 
.. ,• . . . . . 
instead. of Comm�ism• ·With e.a�h passing .:fear, however, : the 
whol�· poll tical complex b�g� to . . alter. 32 . · 41 t�ou� it' �as : ·�= 
. ' 
not boldly apparent ; th� Communis�s- we�e gr�ually gaining 
a hold ove;- · ·the· gov�rnment in c.zechoslovaki:a. . Compl�te 
control was not being acquired rapidly enough for the : soviet 
. 
. 
Union , though , since opposition to the Communists was 
stiffening. The opposing faction was given moral support 
and economic aid by the Uni�ed States ,  but the u.s.s.R.  
I 
swiftly created a political crisis in the governmen� and . 
artfully forced through a take over in Pebruar)' ot 1948, )3 
Jllbid. , pp. 895-897. 
32 .. No·tes , "  Jo r of Centr • V , .  
No·. 2 , (July, 19 5 , p. 185. "After negotiations between 
representatives of the various Czechoslovak political. 
parties in Moscow, President Benes on April 4 ,  i94S ap­
pointed in Kosice a new provisional government, a govern-
ment of National Front(Ibid. ) . • · · 
))"Is a u.s. -Russi� Breakup Near? , "  The United
.
States 
News t (Washington, D.C. a u,s.  Newa Publishing Corporation, 1947 J ' p. l.5. . . ' 
.· 
! 
, . 
· I I I .  Czechoslovakia 
The idea of constitutional continuity was valued in· 
Czechoslovakia, and in 1945 , an important feature of it 
was the consortium of the Communists with the . gradually 
emanating governmental institutions .. I t  "warded · off the 
danger of an independent , purely revolutionary approach_ , �  
and const·i tutiorial stability was· m�intained. The manner 
in which an ephemeral and revoluti9nary situation was 
avoided by the ' Czechoslovakian government was revealed in 
an acceptable manner by H. Go_rdon Skiilinga 
• • • (W) ith a semi-revolutionary assumption 
· of power,  without popula� elections , a Presi­
dent who had assumed powe� in London and a 
government which had been formed in Moscow 
took over off ice in Prague and proceeded to 
· exercise the full powers of a gov2anment , legislative as wel+ _as executive. 
Anoth�r development which aided in providing Czecho­
slovakia with constitutional stability was the election . 
.. 
of the Provisional National Assembly , but · it was not a 
. democratic election. 
• • • (T )  he choice of ·delegates and· �inally ·of deputies oc.curred ·in public meetings , and note 
through secret ballot. • • •  ( B ) y  agreement of 
the parties of the National Front , a common 
candidate list for the Assembly was agreed . to 
beforehand , so as to guarantee equality to each 
55 
The u . s .  detected th� increasing tension in Czecho­
slovakia and issued a joint declaration· w.ith Britain and" 
France .  
• • • ( B ) y  means of a crisis artifically and 
deliberately instigated the. use of certain methods 
·already tested on o�her places has permitted the 
suspension of the free exe�cise of parliamentary 
institutions and the establishment of a disguised 
dictatorship of a single party under the clock of 
.a Government· of national union. 
(We) can but condemn a development the con­
sequences of which can onl� be disastr�us for the Czechoslovak people • � . J  · . 
The note was issued from Wasni�gton , Paris , and London on 
February 26,  1948, just one 
.
. day af·ter the announcement of 
the new Communistic do�inated Czechoslovakian
. 
cabinet. JS 
. · . 
I t  was a protest which had l'.lO · affect, and the Commµnist 
coup d' �tat was · successful. The Western democracies were 
profoundly shocked because it was " the first forcible Com-
munist conquest of a strongly based free government . "  Most 
Western publics looked "upon the power, ferocity and .scope . 
of Communist aggression" in a different, ·al�ost hostile . 
' . J6 light. The united States appealed to the United Nations , 
and , over the opposition of the u . s . s . R. , the Security 
Council on March 17 , 1948, approved the inclusion of the 
Czechoslovak question in its agenda. J7 The U . S .  Representa-
J4 Dennet and Turner , .2.R• cit. , Vol . X ,  p.  625. 
J?0nocument , "  Journal of Central European Affairs , 
VIII , No. l ,  (Apri'l , 1948) , PP • 89-90. 
J�Walter Milli s ,  ed . ,  The Forrestal Diaries, (New York• 
The Viking Press , · 1951) ; · p .  J82 . 
37oennet and Turner, .212• � • •  p .  627 . 
! f f  I 
. ,  . . 
tive on the United Nations Security Council , Joseph Austin , · 
... presented the · American view of Communist actions in Czecho-;· 
slovakia o� March 23, 1948. 
Too much has happened which is not in character 
with the Czechoslovak people and Czechoslovak tra-
. dition. Too much has happened which bears a strik­
ing similarity to what happened in other countrie s ,  
for the Security Council to be satisfied with per­
fu�ctory or categorical denials , or with further 
red herrings . The Security Council deserves and 
should receive from the Czechoslova� representa­
tive the fullest explanation • • •  J · 
The United States sponsored resolution inviting the 
new Czechoslovakian Government to par�icipate wi�hout vote 
in the Counci l ' s  consideration was approved , but the invita­
tion was refused by the Czechoslovak Representative in the 
U . N .  on April 8th with th, excuse that " since the discussion 
of the internal matters· of Czechoslovakia in the Sec;:uri ty. . · 
Council is contrary to the basic principles of the Charter , . 
the Czechoslovak Government dqes ··not find it possible to 
take part in any such discussion. . .. J� 
..
. 
The u .  s .  A. lost c.z-�c�.o,.sloyald.a _to"·  the Sovie-t;;. orbit,  even . . . . . ' . 
though the two sup�r�·p_owers : 'had· l).ledged and . signed d·eclara­
tions at Yal t'a and Pot·sdain �o promote indep
.
endent govern­
ments. In the f.ina.J.· :analysis ,  pos.twar declarations by the 
u . s .  State Department had. no influence upon th� · governmentai , ._ 
social , and. econo
.
mic questions· in
. 
Czechoslovakla or in . 
}iungary an� Poland. · Such
. 
questions were decided . oy .the 
38rtiq. , PP• 631-632 • 
. 3�Ibid . ,  P •  632, 
... 
. ' 
. . . 
. . . . . 
. • . ·. .. . . . .
.. 
" . '• 
: . . 
. : 
; 
·.·'· . : ,. 
. . . ' . . . 
. 
. . . . . 
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facts of geography and the fortunes of war . · In short, any 
Eastern European state' which fell within the military op­
erations of the Soviet armies sooner or �ater relinquished 
its political power to the Communista. 40 
40John c .  Campbel l ,  �A�rn�e�r�i�c�a�n:....a...;;.:��..::..::�:J.:.:::.....1��:::.:.1.1� 
Eastern Europe a The Choices Ahead , 
The University of Minnesota Press, 
. .  
. . · 
, . , 
,: 
CHAPTER IV 
REACTION OF 'l'HE UNITED STATES CONGRESS TO 
EVENTS IN POLAND, CZECHOSLOVAKIA 
AND HUNGARY '· 194.5-1948 
I .  An Over-All · View 
President Franklin D
.
� Roosevelt ex·ercized emergency 
. .  
powers as commander-in-chief during World War II , while 
Congress remained in the ba.ckground . . After · 194) , however, 
Congress was more self-assertive. There were two reasons 
for that new mood a ( 1 )  the United States had assumed a 
leading role in world affairs s 1 and ( 2 )  the prominent po­
sition of the U . S . A .  as - one of the Allied superpowers al­
located it .to the _ preservation of peace and the promotion 
of collective security fol�owing �he end of the war • . All 
this placed a vital question before the Congr.ess a "How was 
. the world to be arrange_d · in order· to maintain perman.ent . 
postwar peace?" 
• • • It was generally agreed that there would
. 
be 
an international organization, but many questions 
remained unsett�ed. There w�re fears on . the part 
of mosti • • • 
The Yalta agreements later provided substance t� 
gener;al sentiment , but the terms -of the Yalta talks ·created 
. . 
1campbell ,  .22• cit . , p .  16 . 
2Charle s  John Graham , "Republican Foreign Policy, 
1939-1952" ( unpublished Ph. D .  dissertation , University 
0£ Illinois , 1951 ) , p .  108. 
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an illusi on of peace and ·COOperation between the U. S. S. R. 
and the u.s. A . J  Within ·three months of the endorsement 
·made at t�e. Crimea, however , the amicable relations between 
Washington and Moscow were detected as being deceitful. 
Communi.st actions were speaking louder than their solemn 
pledges, and Senator Robert A. Taft brought the situation 
·to · pub1.ic attenti on. At a ' meeting of J ,  000 Polish-Americans 
,_,: 
.. 
. held
. 
in New York on May 20 ,  1945 , Taft demanded that 
• • •  (a) firm stand b y  the United States aga'i nst 
Russia' s unilateral policies affecting Poland and 
other liberated countri·es under Soviet occupation 
and stopping of all lend-l4as·e to Russia " under 
present conditions" , • • · 
It  was the first in a series of one-sided Communist 
activities which became· up.popular i n  the U nited States. 
Another annoyance was the Sovi� t visa hitch,  bloc ki�g Sena� 
tors Russell and .Maybank from . ;:t : brief goodwill visit to . . ; . . 
Russi a. The two-man Senatori�l commission was detained· 
in Paris on June 16 ,  1945 . .. Th� Sena
.
tors believed .. that · the . . ' . . . ' . ' 
entire situation was a ,
.
ca� .e·:
·
 of. ,SQv1et ·double dea+ing since 
., 
, .  . ·. 
Moscow was totally aware that " any 
. . delay would. force c an-
3McGoerge Bundy� ."The Test o� Yalta, ". Foreign Affair s, . 
XXVII (Oc tober 1948-J uly 1949) , pp. 618 & · 629 • . "T�e basis . . . .  · 
of American ho11e s in 1945 was .. the d.ouble c ommi:tment of .' Yalta a self-government in E a'stern . . Europe• and :coopertation · . .  .' 
in the U.ni ted Nations(Ibid, , p. 629)  • "  . . 
4�ew Y�rk �i�es, · M ay. 21 � 1945, p. l & 1 1 �  I t  was a 
report ·of an address b y  Senator Robert A. Taft ·o f  Ohio, 
c hairman of the Republican Steering Committee in· the· Senate, 
The mee·t�g, during which the address was given, was under · 
· the j oin't 9-USpices of the American· Poli.sh Congress and the 
Coordinating Committee of .American Polish Associations, · 
. ·. '• . . ... 
, . : . . . ... . 
. . .  · . . . 
, . . 
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cellation of the trip" since they had "fixed plans to re­
turn to Washington. "  The -U. S . gesture was. one o� open 
goodwill. �he reply had been a .slap ln the face.
5 One 
branch of Congress had received a dpse of Communist duplici­
ty , and the publicity given to the incident made the House 
of Representatives and most Americans more conscious of 
Soviet actions. 
After four months of· vacillation, the formation of a 
stalwart policy regarding the u . s . s . R .  was encouraged by 
Senator Arthur H.  Vandenberg6. ·and · under.taken by the Eight­
_ ieth Congress elected· on November 5 , · 1946. I·t was a Con.:. 
· gress which contained a Republican majority in both houses 
and was to work with a Democratic administration until 1948. 
"Leaders of the new Congress emphasized their support of ·a 
bi�partisan �oreign policy but dema:nded that Congress be 
recognized as a full-fledged partner of the executive branch 
in the · cQnduct of foreign relations , "  an� through th.e efforts· 
of Cbarles A.  Eatop, chairman of the House Commi.ttee on 
Foreign Affairs and Secretary of State Marshall a firm 
foundation for a concurrent foreign policy was established, ? 
5rbid . , June 17 , . 1945 , pp . 1 & .3 ·· 
6u . s .  Congress , Senate , Congressional Record , 79th 
Congres s ,  2d sess •. , Vol . 92,  (Washington, D , C ,  a Governmen.t 
Printing Office,  1946) , pp . 1694-1695, 
?Dennet and Turner , � · .£i!, , Vol. IX , p .  22, See 
Appendix (Doc'ument No.  10) . · · 
. .. · : .. : 
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I . 
With a s�chronize� .Plan of action. · :the House of . 
Representatives . was able �o ;pass . . a resolution authorizing 
the pri�ting of add� tional �opies . ot . Hous�.· b()cunient Numbe.r . "· < · 
: . ··. 754 , of the ·seventy-nin�h Congress. · entl°tled· "Communi�m in . : . '· . 
. -
Action. ". The Senate . .  and House accepted the resolution. after 
minimal· Senate amendments regardin� the number of extra 
copies. the date which the7' w�re to be printed , and the 
amount of mone; to be 8pent on their public�tion. 8 It was 
the first offensive action by the legislative branch of the 
' , 
U.S.  government during the early months ot 1948. and it re-
flected the accwnulating skepticism of Soviet machin�tions. 
Additional efforts to maintain Congressional alertness 
regarding Communist acts were provided throughout the re­
ma�ning months of 1948. Three were protuberant. The first 
was an address by Representative Estes Kefauver on March 
16 , 1948, in which he read and commented upon the feature 
article in the Memphis Press-Scimeter of March 9 .  194·8. 
It was written by Edward J. Meeman. editor, and the major 
position professed was for the· ·United States to take the 
offensive against the �ovieta . but not with bombs. Kefauver 
then remarked 1 · 
• • •  (A)ll of us are concerned and alarmed ·about 
the expansion of Soviet influence in Europe and 
8 u.s.  Senate, al of th Senate 
States of America, . 0th Congress. 1st seas • • . Washington, 
n . c . a Government. Printing Office . 1948) , p. 96. The resolution was received •. read and referred, reported with 
amendments and considered·, amended ,  and agreed to • and 
the House agreed to the Senate ' s  amendments(Ibld. , pp. 108, 
110, 12,5, and 148; respectively) • . 
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Asia. Americans and other free people want to do 
something about it but we lack a long range pro­
gram. The European recovery program and Truman 
doctrine of aid to Greece and Turkey are • • • 
necessary measures which will help greatly but 
a policy for the future .and a program looking t-0. the years after the expiration of the European 
recovery program must be adopted • • • · . 9 
I.n his final statement Kefauver recommended the reading of 
Meeman ' s  article to those �h� were looking for a progressive 
and definite program to stop the encroachment of communism 
and to preserve peace. A reci tation of the author ' s  work 
was given and printed in the Congressional Record .  
The second effort :t·o keep Congress aware of Communist 
acts was led by the Depar.tment ·of State . On June 2 ,  1948 , 
• t  • • 
i t  submitted a · document� to ·the · s�!1ate Foreign Relations . 
Committe e .  I t  became known as .t h� �e.nate Report No.  · 1440 · 
of the Eightieth Congres· s , . :se�ond . .'�.�ssion, and the Senate - �· . 
Resolution No. 21,J .  · I t
. 
co�t8;.i�ed · :(our" majc:>r sect
.ions a ·(1) 
Germany ; ( 2 )  �ustria i  () ) ' . Eas�ern
. 
and Southeastern Europe ; 
and ( 4) Kore.a. Part :Three , a vital concern of : this the s i s ,  
deliberated· upoi:, . I;3u'igc¢.ia, :P·oland and Hungary. The analysis · 
of Poland �er.·ely expressed the . agreement �f " free and un-
.· .· 
fettered elections·, �  and the . .Violations of that promise by 
. . . � . 
the Poiish Provisional Government. There were three accords 
and infr�t1ons regarding Hungary, .but the primary one con-
• 
cerned Soviet abuse of i�s power on the Allied Control 
.. . 
• • ,;r • • 
• '• 
9u . s .  Congres s ,  Congressional Record , H.o.ttse , . 8ot·h . '· · 
Congress , '2d · sess . , Appendix, - Vol .  94, (.Washington , ·o . ·c . a. · 
Government Printing Off ice , 1948) -, p. Al6,58. . · . . · .:: . · : : .: ._ . : - . .  
. J 
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. 
The final action which followed· in Congress Wl(ls .a .. : · · .: : ' 
dir�ct result of . Senate Report No. 1440. It was initiated · · :, .. . 
. 
I . . . . 
. 
. by, Senator Vapdenberg· i� .the . form of a d�clarati()n of .u . �: • . 
. . . 
foreign · policy and placed ��1th in the United Nations. · 
.• • • ( It) called · for a voluntary agre·ement · to 
remove t�e vote . in Sec\,trity Co'l:lflcil actions con• · -
cerning pacific settlements and . the· admission of · 
new UN members. and for •maximum effor1;s • to a·ecure 
agr�ements on arm.a redµotion and the establishment 
of UN forces.  It also call·ed for u . s .  association 
with · • such regional, and other collective arrange-· 
. · ments as (were) based on · continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid • • •  • and dec�ared u . s .  
· • determination to exerci$e the right of individual 
or collective self-defense under Article 51 should 
armed
1
fttack occur affeot�ng its national security. • 
• • • • 
I 
Debate on the Vandenberg resolution was centered upon 
• f' ..
... 
the intention of the latter provisions. A Democratic Sena-
tor from Florida, Pepper, charged that the stipulations had 
bee� "carefully developed to prepare Congress and the coun­
try for a military alliance between the United States and 
. 
Western Europe . "  The accusation was denied , and the action · 
by Pepper to obliterate the parts concerning collectiv� 
security arrangements was rejected 6-61. "The Senate· then 
adopted the Vandenberg resolution, J�e ll , 1948, by a vote 
of 64-4 ," · an� the u.s.A.  finally · settled upon the use of a 
firm but flexible foreign policy toward. Communism, 12 
lOnennet and Turner, .21?. • .s.1:£, , pp. 919-1)), See 
Appendix for full text (Document No, 11) .  
pp. 102-10.3.· 
II . Poland 
The freedom and independence of Poland had been one 
of the major issues of the Second World War . It became the 
�entra� problem of the post-war years , and the U . S .  Congress. 
·oyertly deliberated upon Polish events. . The first · speech 
�oncerning the Polish state was presented by Representative 
Alvin E .  O 'Konski of Wiscons·in on February 15 ,  1945, A 
well known educator ,  journalist ; lecturer and editor, he . 
was an outspoken _denunciator of Communism in Poland. · 
• • • The names and. records of these so-called 
leaders of the Polish Nation read like a Communist•·s 
who ' s  who, These ·so-called leaders are about as 
representative of the Polish Nation as the draft 
dodger of Wo:rld W¥ No. 1., :.Earl Browder and his 
gang �e representative o:r· the American people. 
• • • 3 . . 
There followed a list of twenty ·Polish. governmental posts 
. \ . . . : .· 
and individuals who wer.� · 9.fticiat'ing, · . . The lives . ·Of all . 
. . . . · ·. · ·. . . · ,· ·' 
. . . 
but seven of these me� wer� then . bri·e.f ly depic:ted , and 
O 'Konski elo�uent1:Y disclosed the Communist lorality of each. 
Having been i�discriminatelY. .informed of Soviet acti­
vities thro.�gho'ut Poland , th� . Ho
.
use . . of Representatives con.;. 
. . 
tinued t9 e.xpound . on the sul;>ject. The next speech wa.s .- pro-. 
. . . . . 
vided by Represerttative Cha�les· R .  Clason of ·Mass�chusetts , 
13' c U�S .  Congress,  Congressional Record , Hous e ,  79th 
Congress ,  lat seas , , Appendix, Vol •
. 
91-Part . 10 , (Washing-
ton, D_. C . a Government Printing Office , 1945) , pp . A642-A64J� ·· 
. . 
. 
� 
: .. ··· 
. 
. . 
. ,• ·. · 
. .  
.. ..  . . . • . 
: . · 
.. . 
: : . 
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whose dissertation was devoted to the "future government of 
Poland." Clason delivered his address on March 24 , 1945,  
and the last section of it concerned resolutions adopted 
by the General Court of the Commonwealth ot Massachusetts , 
which were presented in a · memorial to Congress. These res• 
olutions called upon Congress 
• • • to take official cogni�ance of the inherent 
right of the people of Poland, as well as the 
people of other small nations , to determine
1�
he 
form and· kind of their ' .own government . • • • � 
Andrew John Biemiller, · Democratic representative · trom 
Wisconsin , presented similar views on March 27 , 1945. 
It is no secret that many groups and individuals. 
in America have been fearful for the future of 
· 
Poland as outlined in the Yalta agreement. • • •  
· The Russian Government must learn that Americans 
b�lieve in democracy. We have no intention of . 
interfering in the internal affairs .of the u.s.s.R • •  
but we do take seriously the Atlantic Ch�ter 
( ideals) of freedom and de�ocracy. , • �l5 · 
•. A few weeks later, on April 19 , 1945,  Representative John 
Lesinski of Michigan, of Polish descent and a member of the 
Polish National Alliance and the Polish Turner' s and Pellow­
craf't, maintained that what was desired was a •Polish 
Poland , not a Soviet-Lublinized Poland • •  16 
14 Ibid, , P •  Al457. 
in full on page 2519 of 
21 , 1945. . 
The resolutlons were set torth 
the Congressiona1 Record of March 
15u.s. Congress ,  Con Rec rd , House , ?9th 
Congres s ,  let seas. , Vol. 91-Part ) ,  Washington, D. C. a 
Government Printing Oftice , 1945) , p.  J049. 
16u.� . Congress, Congressional. Record, . House , 19th 
Congress, lat sess. , Appendix, Vol. 91-Part 11, (Washing­
ton, o.c. 1 Government Printing Ottice , 194S) , pp. Al8JJ• 
Al8)6. 
. 
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Although anticipating the· best , many members of .Con­
gress feared_ that Polan� would be lost to the Soviet orbit. 
The Hon. Daniel John Flood , Democratic representative· of 
P�nnsylvania and one time corporation lawyer, eloquently 
reasserted Moscow' s dictatorial comportment in Poland , and 
made his ma1n · point in the following manners 
. . 
The cause of Poland is a symbol of the cause 
for which· this war was began --- the right of 
�all nations , the right to be free from oppres-· 
sion, the right of all peoples to choose the form 
of government under which they will live --- and 
futher, and mark this well , the right to the res-
· toration of self-government to those who have been 
forcible deprived thereot. 17 
Thus, the tragedy ot Poland was kept in the minds of many 
Congressmen duri� 1945 • .  
The skepticism inaugurated in early 1945 was reiterated 
in 1946 and 1947. Only two addresses were presented in 
1946. The first was by Thom�s s .  ·Go�don, representative 
from Illinois. He . spoke on February 11, 1946 , of the "reign 
of terror in Poland . "  The second was :a speech given on 
March is ·, 1946 , by Representative Daniel J. Flood. It was 
a forceful address which denunciated the "unjust treatment 
ot. Poland" and contained two other bitter statements. 
• • • When I hear and read the statements made 
by the official mouthpieces of Moscow and the 
Warsaw Quislings I can only say • a pox on both 
your houses. • 
17u.s.  Congress , Congre.ssional Record, House , ?9th 
Congress, lat seas. , Vol. 9l•Part ) ,  .2:12.• .2J.!, , p .  415). 
18u.s. Congress, Congressiona1 Recors1, House, ?9th 
Congress, 2d sees. , Appendix, Vol. 92-Part 9 ,  (Washington, . 
D.C. a Government Printing Office , 1946) , � ·  A647. 
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. . · f The fact is that Poland_ is an occupied 
country --- occupied by Russia. • • •  19 
The above indiscretionary comments prepared the way . . . : 
for more elaborate attacks upon Soviet activities :during :. ·. · -': · � .  . . . . . . . . . . : . . , . . � 
·1947. That year, the major .issue . . with which · the u.s ·. Con-
grass concerned i tselt . was tne Polish general · elections�· . ,, 
: . . ' I . . . . . . . . " In ·t�e se.nate and .House ot ��present·ati v_es ,  · eleven addresses · . 
· we're printed ·41n the R.ecotd·� · They l�olud�d individual. · opln• ... · 
ions . r�adings of articles and 'editorials·. and excerpt� . ·. . . . . . 
. . . .  . . 
from ·books and spee.cnes. Two were ill�stra.tive 
..
. " · The: ·tirat·" >: . . · · 
was deliver�"-
· 
OJ'.l Februu-Y 3�  194_7 :  ·�Y  'ijepre���tatlve. Tho�aa · ... .  : ·: . 
. . 
s. Gordon of Ill�nois; 
. . 
He �ead aloud the Department ·of 
Sta�e • s  press release· of January 28, 1947 , concerning. the 
Polish Provisional Government. The main p<>:_int was that 
• • • ( T) he Polish Provisional Government • • •· · 
employed widespread me�sures of coercion and , 
intimidation against democratic elements which 
were loyal to Poland although not partisans of 
the government bloc. In these circumstances the 
United States Government cannot consider that 
=��t�
r
�;!:
i
��:n
o
�ui�ili�=�0
and Potsdam Agree- · 
The second speech was made by Senator Henry Cabot 
Lodge , Jr. ; and it was given on December 15, · 1947. On .t hat 
date , the Massachusetts Senator merely reread . an address 
which he had delivered on November )O ; 194? , concerning · 
19rbid. , Vol. 92-Part lo , p. Al4oo . 
20Ibiq. f 80th Congress , lat· sass. , ·A ppendix , Vol. ' . . · 
9J-Part 10 , \Washington, o . c .  a · G�vernment Printing 
Office, 1946) , PP• AJ?8-A)79. . 
. 
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Justice for Poland. I t  ·was a brief history ot the Polish 
nation which ended with a "Lodge solution" to Poland ' s  
problems a 
• • • I want my country to proceed vigorously 
with its announced policy. I don ' t  want it to s.ay 
t.hings which it doesn • t mean. • • • · I want it to 
be very exacting, indeed about any principle for 
which it stands. I want it· to do more than pass 
resolutions and utter pious words. • • • I want 
my Government to use its strong bargining position 
• • •  to implement its policies toward Poland and 
toward all · the world. If peace is to exist there 
must be justice. There can be no justice �f we 
do not keep our promises in word and deed. 1 
The solution submitted ·by Lodge , Jr. , was a reasonable 
one , but whether or not it was applicable to the world 
situation remained to be discussed. The United States · 
Congress continued to be indecisive , but it reiterated its 
disfavor of Soviet . activities in Poland during 1948, in 
clearly �crimonious language. 
Only three major addresses were given in 1948, in 
Congress. The first was presented by Representative Daniel 
A .  Reed, from New York, on . February 2nd. He urged every 
America,n· citizen to read Arthur Bliss Lane ' s  book, I Saw 
, ,  ... 
Poland Betrayed , because it would make them aware of the 
danger ·inherent in u.s.  foreign policy. Reed concluded his 
address by reading an articl& written by George E� Sokolsky 
which appeared in the Washington D.C.  Times-HQral.d ot 
February 11 , 1948. Sokolsky praised Lane ' s  book ·and 
2lu.s.  Congress,  Congressional. Record ,  Senate, �Oth 
Congress,  lat seas . , Appendix, Vol. 9J-Part l),  (Washing­
ton, D.C. a Government Printing Office , 194?) , PP• A4?16-
A4717. . . 
· 
. · .. . ' ·" . . 
. · . · ·'· · · . ... . . . . . � .. .... 
. .. . .. 
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_ 
.. ' . 
. . . 
published excerpts from . it. The jou�alist' �*. own op�nion 
.
. · · · ·  
was contairted in the "first two para�aphs of the artioie . . . ..
. 
· Ambassador Arthur Bliss Lane had contributed 
.· immensely to the American people by publishing 
I Saw Poland Betra.Yed. I.t is a report to his fellow countrymen . on his mission to Pol.and be­
tween 1944 and 19�7 . 
I wonder whether the title should not be s " I  
Saw America .Betrayed?" . ·for when the 1 officials of 
a country forsake its �onor and lower its dignity 
for whatever expediency, do they not disclose that 
its spirit has been fouled, its national morality 
abandoned?22 
The second speech concerning Poland was delivered by 
T.H .• Gordon on Monday. June 7 • 1948, His talk was merely 
a r.ei teration of an article by John E • . Thompson, chief' of 
the Berlin bureau for the American Newsweek Magaz�ne Company, 
who had recently returned from a tour of Poland • . The major 
point of the report was that Poland .had gradually progressed . -
economically, but a shadow of fear was also presen�ed, 
Poland will play a key role in the Russian 
scheme to give eastern Europe the industrial 
*George Ephraim Sokolsky graduated from the Columbia 
. University of Journalism and subsequently was employed by 
the "New Republic News Agency. "  He . was sent to Russia in 
1917�1918 and there edited the "Russian Daily News" in 
Petrograd , the only English language newspaper in that 
city. He wrote editorials critical of the new (Lenin) 
government and was expelled, 
· 22u. s .  Congr
.
ess, Congressional Record , House , 80th 
Congress, 2d sess , , App�n�ix, Vol. 94-Part 9 ,  (Washington, 
D .C . 1 Goverrunent Printing Office , 1948) , p ,  A812. See 
Appendix for full text (Document No. 12) . In an address 
a month before , Representative Charles J. Kersten of 
Wisconsin (January. 8, 1948) read an article from the . ·' 
Milwaukee Sent e which was a report by Stanislaw Mikola-
jczyk on Poland Ibid. , PP• A6J-S64) . See Appendix tor : 
full report <.Document No, lJ) , · · 
· 
.
. . 
. 
strength to survive without western Europe and 
the Marshall plan . Polish industry is to qe 
completely integrated with Czechoslo2 �k industry 
and with the Russian economy. , , • ) · 
70 
The · final address in regard t·o · Poland in the Record in 
1948 placed hope in. the future and faith in justice , bu_t by . . 
1948 the shining light of optimism . had dimed considerably. 
That last speech was made �y Representative Charles A .  
Wolverton of New Jersey on Aug�st ? ,  1948. His talk con­
tained two main pointsa ' ( 1 )  i t _ was generally destressing for 
a freedom-loving p�ople to be held " under the domination of 
a foreign dictatorial power" a and ( 2 )  it was the duty of the 
u . s .  
, • • to rectify • • , .the great wron� and in­
justice that had been - done to Poland (and) to 
sustain the spirit of Poland and her people a and 
encourage them to live on · in the hope and with 
the. f�i.th t�at libert24 freedom, and justice will again prevail. • . • · • . 
The feelings of skepticism, duty , responsibility , 
indignation, moral ity , and j udiciousness held by the Congr�s� 
between 1945 and 1948 had blocked. its realization of agree� 
ment upon a foreign policy which was neither inflexible nor 
flexible , but workable. 
2Jibid. , 
. .  
Vol . 94-Part 11 , p .  AJ595 • 
24Ibid . , Vol . 94-Part 12 , · p .  A5149. See Appendix for 
full text of the address (Document No . 14) . 
. ·.' . .  
• 
. . . . : · . . 
III. Hµpgaa ... . . 
.. : � . ·. ·:: : . . '• ; . 
The United States Congress concerned itself'· almo·st � · .  : ·- ' · �: :·· . _ . 
exclusively with the . poll tical developments in· Poland; . bui· 
.. : .·. ) ' . . . 
. r�g�ding H�gary .
' it wa� . more appr�henslv.e about the 
economic -situat�on. 'A s early � September · 2:5 , 194.S , 
Soviet maneuvering .was· revealed when it was ·. announced· .that ·. : · , .. . . . . . '., . 
' . 
the· Hungarian: state was .to· sign a. pa�t 
.
vd.th the · u:. s .s.R. : . , ·> .::.·::'. .: · .. . . . . . . . . . 
The U .  S •
. 
opposed the. · �ee�ent anq · viewed the · Balkan . ·. · · 
nation -as . the loser. 
To justify the economic arrangements ( forced) 
·on the Governments of the countries under her . . influence • Russia·· urges her need for reparations 
in kind and their legalization by the clause of 
the Berlin agreement t�at· authorized her to take over German assets in Hungary , eas�rn Austri� 
and Rumania. But the result • • •  promises to 
be indistinguishable from the most flagrant 
. . . � 
· imperialism of the west in the days when imperial­
ism was being reprehende� by Moscow. 25 
That opinion was vastly different from the one pre­
sented eight months previously by Representa�ive Augustus 
w. ·Bennet , who replaced Hamilton Fish in Congress. Bennet 
stated that the Soviet Union and the U . S .A. should be 
capable of working together toward a lasting peace a 
2.5The New Y9rt Times ,  Septembe�. �S, 1945, P • s� 
. " 
I 
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··· : They have no common frontiers a neigher wants 
anything the other has except by way of exchange 
in the open market, and there ls no history of 
victories ,  defeats , or injustices to embitter ·the peoples of the two countries agai.nst each other. 26 
The feeling was much the same . in February 1946, when 
a resolution was presented in the Senate which called for 
the reestablishment of communications and banking services 
with Hungary and two other European nations , 27 and one 
month later the Senate passed a. resolution for the immedi�· 
ate an4 effective relief for the ... war· strlckened population 
of Hungary . 28 Both were highly commendable acts , but they 
: ' 
failed to be effective b�cause" .Congressional concern 'for 
• 
• : •. • I 
the Hungarian nation was
. 
s�ci'n · t�e� .�p on the penCiling peac·e . . . 
. . ·. . . " 
treaty with that state . 
. . . 
Representative Robert Allen Grant of · Indiana made · a 
typical . spe�ch de�ing ·with the situation. · _It was a read-
. . . 
ing of a petl.�ion� on J�y 2"2., i946 , . . whi�h was �ntitled 
"A Just _Peace for Hungary. "  . It contained the formal vle�s. ' . 
of the New York chapter of th� Amer�can Hungarian., Federa­
tion. Monsi.gnor John Sabo , pastor of Our Lady of· Hungary . .-p . 
Roman Catholic Church of South Bend , Indiana, sent Grant 
the conclusions reached at· the meeting. There were seven 
points expressed in the message. The first, �.�cond � thi�d·,·-, 
..
. " 
. 
. ,• 
' . . . . 
. . . . 
26Ibid. , January _ 25, 1946 , P• 15. 
. · . . : .. . .. 
27u. s. Congress , Congr�s
.
sional 'Re
.
cor� , Senat�, 79th · · " 
. Congress,· 2d .• sass . ,  Vol � .
·9·2-]?art l, P.• 1·255, . . 
" . 
28u . s .  Congress,· Senate·, Journal of the· Senate of the " 
United States, 79th Congress.  2d sass . , (Washington , . D . C .,a . : . . Government Printing Office , 1946) , P• 124 . ... · " - : · . . , _  ' :. · . . ., ·, . . . 
•. . . . ,. . ..  
. .  ',• . . . : . . . ... � . .  . . . ' .. .  
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sixth and seventh w�re the most important. The leading one 
called for the prevention of a partition of Europe i�to 
zones of influence. The second wanted an assurance that · 
Hungary would regain its .rightful and traditional place 
with the democratic western nations. The third asked that 
the principles of the Atlantic Charter,  esp_ecial�y the 
ethnic ones, be applied when drafting ·Hungary• a  future 
frontiers. Points six and severi were1 
6. To relieve Hungary of the unbearable burden 
of reparations and of occupation which prevent re­
. construction and threaten the nation' s survival. 
7 .  To expedite the conclusion of  the Hung�ian peace treaty without· futher unwarrented delay. 9 
The United States · Senate did not ratify the peace treaty 
with Hungary until June S,  i947 , eleven months after the 
last petition by American citizens. All other actions by 
. . 
· the u.s.  during that time regarding the Hungarian nation 
I 
were executed by the Department of State or the President. 
29u.s.  Congress,  CQDgressiona1 Re9ord , _  Senate, ?9th 
Congress, 2d _· seas. , Vol. 92-Part 121 Appendix, p .  A4))4.  
See Appendix for full text (Document No. lS) . 
. . 
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' 
;· 
IV. · cze choslovakia 
· . . . . 
. 
· .. · .  .. . ' :
. ·.· . ' · ·. : 
The United States " legislative branch heard only two 
addresses in 194� regarding .Czechoslovakta· The first was 
delivered by Mrs . Clare Boothe Luce , Republican repre senta­
tive from Connecticut, on July ) , 1945. *  She commenced her 
speech by reminding the House that Mr. Grew, the Acting 
Sec�etary of State , assured four Democratic Congressmen that 
the U . S .  wa·s going out of its way in order to avoid offend­
ing the u . s . s . R .  Mrs. Luce then stated that he could or 
could not have meant that statement in reference to Cze.cho­
slovakia ,  and she brought forth the fact that several de-
velopments had taken place since Grew '. s reassurance . on . . 
June 1 ,  19'4). · A brief political · his>'tory of the CRS followed 
. and then she expressed her final view. 
American troops are still holding one· small 
corner of Czechoslovakia. But our right to be 
there·, has been challenged both by Russian occupa­
tion uni ts and by the Cze.ch government , which has 
announced it wished all armies---except the Russian­
trained Czech Army--�to leave Czechoslovakia. • • • 
( I ) f  we withdraw, all who do not support communism .. 
in Czechoslovakia are doomed. Liquidation of 
independent �lements---which means murder on a 
large scale---is a p�imary step in "unifying" a 
*The Hon. Clare Boothe Luce was writer, associate 
editor ,. and managing editor of .Varii ty Fair from 1929 to 
19J4. She wa:s also known as an author , .p_laywright , 
journalist , foreign c�rrespondent , and lecturer • 
.. � . 
·' 
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�ountry -µnder a one""'.party system� )O· : . 
. . . · . . . .. 
Ari · opposing opinion ·�as presented by .-Adolph Jo�ph' 
Sabath , 
.
Democratic representative from Illinbis·•:�- · He · �-' . :,_ ·':-. . 
. . . .. . . . ... 
· 
. . 
dr.essed the ·House .on October 1 ,  194S , . and read th� .fo�low .. 
. . 
. 
.. 
. 
. 
.· 
.
.
. 
ing article a "Iron Clir.tain Around . Czechs Undiscoverable -�· " · . . . . 
Country· is Described as .Parad�se o� Freedom for Foreign · . · 
Correspondents. "  The report was written by Maurice Hindus 
. . 
. -
and printed in the New·· Xork Herald Tribune on September 8, 
1945. Hindus was reporting . . from Prague and had been there . I 
two weeks. He began his statements with an interesting 
observation and closed with an equally attentive one .. The 
primal one was a 
• • • For foreign correspondents the country is 
almos� a paradise , There is no c�nsorship , direct 
or indirect. • • • We may write as we please and 
move about the · country as we please. • • •  
His final statement was a 
There is no secret political police organiza­
tion. Nor is there interference in the relations 
between Czechs and foreigners , · and the Czechs as 
well as the Slovaks, regardless �f their political 
persuasi.on, never hesitate �o _speak freely on any · 
subject, · . 
The rumor of an iron curtain over Czechoslovakia 
is a pure myth. Jl. 
30u.s. Congress, Congres§i0na1 Record,· House , 19th 
Congress , let sess . , Vol. 91-Part. 12 , Appendix, �· .2.1!• • p.  Aj26J. . . . 
*Sabath was born in Zabiori , Czechoslovakia and 
imigrated to the United States in 1881 , at age two , with 
his family. 
Jlibid. , PP• A410l�A�l02. 
- . 
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The ·only event in 1945 which hlnted at p()'ssible ·c o�.;. " : ·" · · : .. : .. : : . . . . . 
munist infiltration was the decre·e of a wide nati�naliz�-· : .:.· �: _ : � '. · : "  
ti on program by . the Cze
.
choslovak· Government ori October:. ·1 8th• . ... 
. After that difte , Congres� .. paid 11 �tl� or .no a�t��tion. to : . 
. . 
events ln Czechoslovakia, a,id reports• addresses; and speeches 
were . 
·
la�kirig regarding tha� state during 1946 ai\d 1947 • . An "-.·: ' ·  . . . .. . .  · '.-_ . . . . .  . . .. . . . 
. - . 
views, opinions , resol'utioJ'.ls, an� . protests. One of the 
. . . 
first sp.eeches in the S.enate . regarding Caechoslovakia· was . 
delivered by Senator Tom Stewart, Democrat �rom Tennessee , 
on. ·February 27 , 1948. ' On that date he read aloud an edi to­
rial which appe�ed in the Knoxyille � Sentinel on Feb� 
ruary 25th. Stewart gave his views on the article printed 
and had it placed in the Record. The Senator called it a 
timely editorial. It pointed out that 
• • • we should act quickly on the Marshall plan 
and �hat we should strengthen th� Uni te.d Nations. 
It also show(ed) the importance of strengthening 
ourselves here in America from within. America 
should have no patience with communism , • • •  ( a) 
most dangerous enemy of the civilized world · today. 
It challenge (d) the right of free people to re­
main free. • • •  3Z 
The event which had prompted the type of address pre­
sented above was the Communist 9oup. of February 1948 in - . 
Czechoslovakia. Representatives John Davis Lodge of Con­
necticut and K_arl Stefan .. o! Nebraska also added. thei.r views 
of the situation to the Record� Both thei.r 'spe�ches were 
delivered on March 1 ,  1948-, in the . House of Representatives.  
32u.s.  Congress , Congressional Record,, Senate , 80th 
Congress , 2d sess • . , Appendix, .212• .s:.11· • p ,  Al204, See 
Appendix tor tull text (Document No. 16) . 
j . 
. �: 
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Lodge vi ewed the events in Czecho slovakia as marking a 
vanishment in Czechoslovakian liberties . 33 .Stefan also 
viewed the development� as deplorable, but ended his state­
ments with an optimitic note . · 
It is true that a Russ ian rider sits in the · 
Czech saddle. But if I kno� those people , and I 
think I do , the spirit of· : Q:emocracy · will not die 
as long as on Czech live·s . .  . . 
It is also my belie'f that .. the Russian rider will 
�ind that 9� s�ts ast�ide a. str�n�-willed and buck-ing mount. . ,  .. . . . .. : . , . 
Hale Boggs , DemQCJ;"�ti·c �:rep:r"'esenta�ive of Lou-isiana, . . . . . . ·. . . . 
was not so assured.* He expressed· his aprehension by read-. 
ing an editorial from t·�e· Catholic Action of the South on . . 
March 1 5 ,  . �948 . · _The · artlcle was entitled "The Menace · Grows . "  
The more signiflcant p�rt of , the report was the · ·se
.
cond , ·. . . . . 
stress.ing .the ideologica� aspect of Communism in rela:tio.n .  
t·o other views. 
Red . ideologies don ' t  permit any others to co­
exi� or to be held by anybody wherever communism 
holds �way , least of all the teachings of Christ. 
In the light of that realization today , we can re­
call with bitter irony the fullsome writing in the : . .  · · .· · . . 
American press of not many years ago , when R.us.sia . · , . .. . -: . · ·. and her tyrants and their ideologies wsere ·'being . ·.· 
.. . · -· ._ . . .. , .  
vocifer.ously touted as "democratic . "� . ... ·"· · .. . ' ,  : .. · . .  . . . . . . . ..  .,. 
33u .  s .  Congress·, .
. 
Congressional Rec·ord ; Hous e ;  · �01;h · · · · Congress , 2d sess . , Appendix , .QQ• cit. , P •  ·Al259 and Al6 0 .­
STe Appendix., for full r.e.por� (Doctµner:it N:<;>. 17) • . 
·' 
. . , 
34rbid . , p .  Al266. · Se� Appendix for ·f�li .text . 
(Do c�ment No.  18) . The comments of Senator Tom Stewart·, . , . .  : ·. ; · · ·: . Demo9ratic ·representative from Tennessee :we:re o� . ... a. simi�ar . . , < 
· . . . . .. . · . · tone ( Ibid . , . pi:. A12·a5 and Al292) ; . � · ·: : ·· · .
.. 
· . . : · · : " . · :� � .· · · : . .  : .. .  . .. J 
. . . . . ' :� . . . :· . ' ' 
*Boggs . .  ser.ved in the U , S ,  �aval Reserve U!lti� 1946, . · . . 
35!.bi·d . ,  p·._ Al612. 
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· The final address in Congress concerning Czechoslovakia 
was delivered on April iz� 1948. by Representative Alvin F, 
Weichel of bhio. · He read a letter which he had sent Sec-
retary of State Marshall . In· i t  he requested that the State 
Department withold trade privileges to communistically dom­
inated Czechoslovakia. · The ��P�Y was ma�e by Charles E.  
Bohlen for the A?ting Secretary of State . Grew, and attached 
to .it was a Presidential press releas e .  The former informed 
Weichel that the Department of State had decided to apply 
the general trade agreements to the Czechoslovakian govern­
ment . The latter was the proclamation to that effect , 36 
The Congress desired to introduce a more
. 
inflexible 
and · less friendly policy toward the newly established Com­
munist Czechoslovakia, but the State Department and the 
executuve arm of the u . s .  government were willing to re­
tain open trade in the economic realm and secret communica-
tions in the diplomatic area. Congress acquiesced . and it 
followed , rather than led , United States foreign policy 
regarding the newly established �ommunist governments in 
Eastern Europ.e of .· Czech<;>slovakia • Hungary 1 and Poland. 
J6 
. . ' 
. Ibid. , PP• A2471-A2472. 
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CHAPTER V 
PRESIDENTIAL AND PUBLIC OPINIONS 
CONCERNING POLAND, HUNGARY 
AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA 
I .  · The Executive Position 
A .  Franklin D .  Roosevelt • Friendship Above All 
. . . 
The Allies desired to win World War II  in order to in- · 
sure the pres.ervance of· a: lasting world peace , and as early. 
as the concluding months of 194 ) ,  that single goal was more 
on their minds than the actual waging of the war , The year 
of l94J was also the period of the great international con­
ferences . *  At these , Franklin D .  Roosevelt acted as leader 
and me9:iator. Each meeting ended in compromise regarding . 
·.': 
the Big Three ' s  war strategy and postwar peace policy, Co-
operation was essential for it promoted unity within the 
coalition , but it was �ften obtained by Roosevelt catering 
to Stalin ' s  demands,  Since it was a fact that the Sovit 
Union was " fighting our fight·" in Europe , maintaining ·amica­
ble relations with the Q . s . s . R. was ever present in F . D . R . ' s  
*Discussions between Roosevelt and Churchill were 
held at Casablanca(January 14-24') , Washirigton(May 11-24) , 
and Quebec(August 11-24) ;. the three Great Powers met at · _ .  
Moscow(October 19-November 1)  ; · Chiang Kai-shek , Churchill , · . . 
and Roosevelt talkeQ. together a:t . Cairo (November 22-26) a · · · · 
Teheran was where the Big .Three (No'(eipber 28-December l) - · · " 
solved the issue of the .:second· ; front , .-. . . · . .  . . • . . . .. '• . . . ... " . 
' ,:·: . · ' :·· ., . ,- ,• 
I 
' 
' : ;: ' ,. : • � • ' ' '· ': 
. ,· . -· 
' 
! 
1' 
1! 
, . 
- 80 -
mind. Consequently, trust and conciliatory action were his 
1 
key · diplomatic tools during the war p.µ-leys. It was excel-
lent military strategy and good for morale but far from ad­
equate· �r realistic political maneuvering. . . . 
The Yalta Conference , held between February 4-11, 1945,. 
provided a great task, and postwar peace and international 
cooperation were contingent �o that Big Three · meeting. Once 
more Roosevelt was the guiding force , but his control was 
not as predominant and his influence was ebbing. Again, the 
desires of Stalin were �ccepted , because the u.s. believed 
that the defeat of Japan, with. emall loss ot American life ,· 
could be achieved only ,with th� _:.aic;l · of the u . s . s . R .  There­
fore , F .D.R. was bo�d in the .mil·i tary area. He was al
.
so 
restrained in the poll tical re.al.Di .• ·. : First his flexibility 
was limited because a lasting �·_pea()� depended upon Soviet . . . . . . . . . . ·. participation in the United· Nat�ons Organizati.on • . Secondly, 
the Washington representative hindered himself by thinking . . . . . . . 
in terms of moralism and idealism .instead ·Of the realities 
of politics. A� · a result cif . . that i>revailing at.titude , the.· 
American. executive was ·r orced to accept · a compromise· .wh�c.h . 
was . to .b e far more favorabl·e to the Soviets than to · the 
United States in the postwar world • . ,... 
p 
Roosevelt addressed the Congress on March l ,  l94S , t� 
provide it with direct information concerning the Yalta 
( Crimea) Conference.  The President saida 
Speaking in all frankness , · the .que�tion. of w-hether :. 
it is to be entirely fruitful . or not . lies ·to. a . . gx-.,,at· . .- :  � 
extent in your hands. · .For unless you · here in .t he . . . " . . '• .• 
\ . 
•• 
. ' . . .. . ·. .· · 
. . 
· . 
. . : . · · .. . · ·· 
•• • # • 
.·· 
•. 
halls of the American Congress---with the support 
of the American people---concur in the d�cisiona 
reached at Yalta, and give them your active 
support , the meeting will not have produced last­
ing results , 
There was on all 
enthusiastic effort 
regarding Poland) , 
sides at this conference an 
to reich agreement ( especially 
• • • 
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Roosevelt skipped over the concessions made to the 
u . s . s . R .  because he believe? th�t when the Big Three met 
for the Potsdam Conference the Yalta co�promise could be . 
. . 
made a more equal proposition. It might hav� happened, for 
he was beginning to strengthen his tone and · way of thinking 
about the Soviet Union , *  Whether it would actually have 
been accomplished remained unanswered for the President .. 
died on April 12 , 1945. His successor , Harry S ,  Truman, 
represented the United States at the Potsdam Conference .  
Potsdam , August 1945 , proved publicly what was already 
facts  the " Iron Curtain" of the Communists had divided 
Europe .  Truman showed that ·he would not · be weak in the 
' 
face of t
.
he .spviet challeng�· •. but the situation which had 
developed could not be stOPJ?.ed by mere words , 
B .  ·Harry S � Truman a An End of a Friendship 
The Truman Administration inaugurated a policy of 
patience and firmness.  It was only a short time before that 
strat�gy was ababdoned, but it  was Stalin who had first 
1 d . 
. 
11 . 1 8  1 Goo rich· and Carro , .2.2 • �. , PP• - 9.  
*See Appendix (Document No . 19) , 
. .  
' 
- 82 -
spoken of an unsolvable conflict between communism and 
capitalism in February of 1946. Churchill presented his 
views of the same _ subject one month later. In his sp�ech, 
'· he talked of an "Iron Curtain" which had descended acro ss 
Europe. 
Amid the growing split between the t�o great 
powers of the world ,· Aluericans sought to es­
tablish a perspective--- a policy --� toward 
the Soviet Union. That task was not easy. 
Postwar events ·had been too sudden , and hopes 
of international peace and friendship too 
strong, for reassessment to take place quickly 
and with consensus , 2  
The first major public speech on future u.s.  foreign 
policy was · delivered by President Truman in New York on 
October 27 , 1946, and was known as his "Navy . Day speech . •  
In it five important points were made . 
1 .  We seek no territorial expansion or selfish 
advantage. We have no plans for aggre ssion againet 
any other state , large or small. We have no ob• 
je ctive which need clash with the peaceful aims 
o� any other nation. 
2 .  We believe in the eventual return of 
sovereign rights and self-government to all 
peoples who have been deprived of them by force. 
o .  We shall refuse to recognize any govern­
ment imposed upon any nation by the force ot any 
foreign power. • • • 
8. We believe that all states which are 
accepted in the society of nations should 
have access on equal terms to the trade and 
raw materials of the world. 
12. We are convinced that the preservation 
of peace between nations requires a United 
Nations Organization composed of all peace-
loving nations of the world who are willing · 
jointly to use force if necessary to insure peaoe . 3  
: . . . 
2Peter G. Pilene , im• J&il •. •. p .. · i6?. 
. . . . . 
Joennet and Turner:, a·. ,gU.-· ,'·· p ,  · 12. 
. . . .. . . : . ':. 
. 
. . :: .... 
I ·  
. I 
/i;_? far as a clear-cut policy toward th.e Soviet Union, 
the speech was vague . "What policies , in concrete terms , 
the United States would regard as reqµired its interests re­
mained an open question , "4 b·ut substantial terms · were soon · 
to follow. Through the Marshall Plan, .the "Truman Doctrine , "  
and the policy of containment , the world was shown exactly 
. 
what Washington would do to keep democratic rights from 
being infringed by aggressiv·e powers. · . Economic and · mili t·ary 
aid would be given. primarily, . ·b u·t if the · need arose armed 
intervention would ensue.· · Containment was the plan. of 
action, and · . . ' . . . 
... ·.: . . 
• • • here , bet�e:r -thah a:ny:: ,otner:.· term , was. ·the 
expression of ·the" ·emerging: Truman policies in 
foreign and domestic affairs·. · Abroad , ·communist 
expansion was to b.e ·halted and prevented · from 
affecting American life· any further. • � . • · "we · 
aim , "  Truman put it , . " to keep America secured in�· 
side . and out" :.-�-: · to contain a general situation· 
which 'the President was sure , could much more 
easily, .  get "worse . than better. 5 . . . 
.. .. 
Truman . had taken a · realistic look at the postwar '.world · 
.... ·. 
and ui timately decided up.on 
·
a c�ncrete policy tha.t wo:uld 
. - . 
maintain the bal.ance of a world which had soli.dif ied into 
· C 
a bipolalized power structure . "The ' strange alliance'  had . 
given way to the policy of ' containment , ' "  6 and i t  broug.h1; .. 
. ·. • .  
: ' . 
4Joh� C �  C�pbell,  The United States in
. 
World Affairs . . . 
· 
.
. " 
1945-1947, (Minneap olis , Minnesota.a _ . . Univer�ity of.· Minnesota : .. . .. . · · 
Press , 1951 ) , p .  24. . . . . . . . . . · . . . .. .  . . ... 
;_ 5Eric F .  Goldman , . The Crucial Decade - And After
·
, .
. . . 
. . . Amerl:ca, ·1945-1960 , (New . .Y.orka Virita.�e B.ooks , . A . Divi.siQri_ . .. . . 
" ·=" 
o� Random Ho\JSe ,  1960) , · pp • . 80-81 . : · · · . · : . : . . . · · . . . . . .. .. . . . . . 
6Fll
.
ene , 
.
op. cit . , p �  167 .  · · ·· · · · · · .. .. . 
· · ?' 
. . . : . 
. -. ' . . .. 
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the· ideological differences of the Soviet Union and the 
United States into the open. Washington wished to b.uild up 
and consolidate free institutions wherever posoiblc . The 
Communists desired to gain complete control over· the govern­
mental positions within various Eastern European ·and Dalkan 
states . 
Each great power became suspicious .of the other • a 
actions. Soviet leaders r.egarded weste�� �oves as atte�pta 
to create a capitalist-imperialist bloc which would encircle 
their country . 
. • • • They redoubled their efforts to strengthen 
their own bloc , to wreck the Marshall plan, to 
create difficulties for the western powers in 
Asia, and to thwart American policies in Germany 
and Japan. • • •  
Moves perpetuated by Moscow were regarded by the United 
States as acts of . aggression and dangerous to the "democratic"· 
way of life . 7 The relations o·f the two major · powers o f ·  the. 
world were unstable '· ·but Truman· and other U . s  . . leaders were 
· never so anxious · that t_otai war against the spreaCl: of · Co111-
m.unism in Eastern Europe wa·s thought to be the. answer to · 
tense international situations. 
7campbell , .2l2.• cit . ,  p .  6 ,  · 
'· 
II.  Public Opinion and the Press 
President Roosevelt expressed an opinion ot far 
reaching importance in his annual message to Congress on 
January 6 .  1945. 
• • • We and our all.ies have -a duty. which we 
cannot ignore . to use our influence to the end 
that no temporary or provisional authorities in 
the liberated countries block the eventual exercise 
of the people ' s  right freely to choose ·the govern­
ment and institutions un�er which. as free men • 
. they are to live. • • • · . 
The attitude of many Americans was the same. especially 
in r�gard to the duty being a joint venture. U.S.  citizens 
also retained the opinion. that the wartime alliance should 
continue in·
· 
the time of peace . 9 It was even almost impos­
sible for them to think of � single act by the United . .  
States since 1917 which would cause Communist distrust once 
·peace was assured.  · Ami�able . foreign relations were expected. 
but. following the conclusion of hostilities. there was a 
rapid deterioration ot Soviet-American relations. The pos�­
war foreign policy of Washington �as molded by that collapse 
of the East-West coalition. The · situation disturbed many 
8u .s .  · congress. Congressiona1 Record• Joint Session� 
?9th Congress. lst · sess • •  Vol. 91-Part l,  �· .sa!• t . P•  71. 
9 
.. u.s.  Opinion on Russia." Portune• XXXII . No. 4.  
(September. 1945) , pp. 2))•2)8, See Appendix (Document 
No. 20) . 
. ' ·. ' •  . . 
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Americans for �hey had ·cer�aill:lY riot hoped to see such a 
confused state of affairs corifronting them at the war' s  
termination. lo 
The· evertts in Hungary, Poland • . Czechoslovakia• Greece , 
and Tur�ey , &ided in gaining ·�he support of .numero"':� Ameri• 
. . 
cans . ·for· the idea that Communism had to be stopped some-. . . where. � Chicago  Tribu�e 'printed two articles worthy ot 
. . . 
note . �he first concerned Czechoslovakia and waa the har­
bringer · of situations to come. The pre as release contained .. . . . . . . .  ·. 
· . .  · . . . . 
. . 
. .. . • ,  
�· � . one vital �ointa having the Red Army in Czec�oslovakia: Diad- ·, .· . . 
life unpleas�t. 11 The second repor:t wa8 in .re·g� · to . . . . ... 
Hungary , and it cover:ed ·the 194? ·voting bill of the H�ga- : . . . 
riari nation which .•as . cut. to" the R
.ed" pattern. .. . . 
. . In setting out voting procedure , · the· . bill 
specifies that any quilif ie4 voter may cast 'his 
. . ·' . ·. . 
ballot . wherever he . happens to be on ele.ctic;>,i . " . " · · ' · '� · ·· .: · 
.· 
day. It makes· no provision for . ascer.taining · .· 
whether. a person vo�es only �nee .and providef 2 no penalty for voting more thaz:i. ·once . • • • . 
. . . .. . . . . �· 
Such inf'ormatio� �pread the. idea that the U.S.S.R�  
needed to be shown that ·the United States would not back� · 
down �hen face� with a Soviet .challenge , and ·by the fall of 
194? • many individuals .
. 
in the U.S.A. were willing to exert 
force in order to prevent MO'scow from exrending. its sphere 
of influence , The Soviet Union "waa always on the offensive , 
the u . s .  must act constantly on the defensive. Eastern · 
· 10w.w. Rostow, The Unit{d States in the World >.renaa 
An Essay in Recent Hlstorx. New Yorka · Harper • Brothers, 
1966) • p.  14). . . 
llThe Chicago Tribune• February s.  1946, P•. 9. 
12 ; Ibid. , July 171 194? , PP• l & S. 
:;., 
j 
• I  
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. 
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. .  
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Europe was go�e . Russ i� ;, in. �ffe 6 t , stood on the Elbe 
H ivcr and t}')e Adriati.9 S�a."11 ·� 3  And by late 1947 and early 
1948, many real��� ,f th�t th.e U . S  • . and U . S · .. S , R .  were at 
.. 
loe;gerheads ,:* ·:· 
With each passing month, · the American public ;__ waf; be• · 
coming more educated in the area of Soviet.-American affairs , 
. for the · ir-ess kept it well ' informed of the international 
. . . 
situation in the postwa� years. Texts of the peace treaties ,  
Washington protests of Communi st actions in Eastern Europe , "  
. .. .. • , 
and diploi:nati c  actions regarding e conomic a�d··· anct gover·n ... · ,  : .· 
.. 
mental recognition of the new -reglm.e in : Po.land
.
� . �d . tho�� .�f �· 
Hungary and Czechosl.ovakia .were -printed. J 
1 Even though ."pubiic . �pinion ·ge��ral,ly .followed rather 
•• 
.. 
. ' 
·1 3'rime Magazine , . Vol . L ,  N o .  12 , · ( S�ptemb�r. 2.2 ,- . 1947) : , ... : 
P •  29 . · · ·· · .. . 
*During that· period , many wf��ly · read magazine s .  and 
. . . . 
journals �ere publi9hing cr�tical material · concerning. the 
Soviet Union. �he November 1947 � · Reade r ' s  Digest p�blished 
a condensed version of "How the Russians Stole My Govern.:.. · 
men:t" by Ferenc Nagy , which had appeared in the Saturday · 
Evening Post ; The January 1948, School Life Education con- . 
tained a five ,page article by William H . E .  Johnson entitled 
"W·hat Shall We Teach About Russia? ' ; A fe-fN articles printed 
during 1947 and 1948 wer e  optimistic , others were just the 
oppo s ite . The January 10 , 1947 , issue of The United States 
News printed an article which told of $p,500 , 000 , 000 Ameri­
can aid to Europe . The result was not a trend toward 
democracy but toward socialism and state-owned industry. 
Time Magazine (September 2 2 ,  1947) painted � dark picture 
of international relations. Pointing out political and 
economic crisis , the article · said that the u . s . s . R . ' s  
military and pol�tical advantage was obvious. In containing 
Communism, the u . s .  was forced to approach Russia from all 
sides , at widely scattered points , with widely scattered re­
sources . ·Russia could strike where she ·wished , A few 
article s ,  such as the one printed in the August 1 ,  194
.7 � 
issue of The United S tates News , were more optimistic. Ac­
cording to i t ,  the inventory of a divided Europe . showed the 
u . s . A . ' s  sphere in the most advantageous positi�n. 
' . . . 
, 
. 
- ·. . 
.. . "!'t 
� 
· 1 
.· I 
. .  i 
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than led the development of ti.s. policy , 1114 a few· citizens 
had very definite and intelligent opinions concerning foreign. 
policy. The expression. of these beliefs were found very 
often in the Neditorial.N . and "letters to the editor" columns 
of widely read newspapers like The· Hew York Times. some .. 
views were exp�essed at . ral;t!e.s .. and group meetings and 
then reported to · the generai public V:.ia the newspapers, 
and a vast amount were found to .
·be. ·:��ey,. hyper-critical of · 
American policy. Wit� ·: tl:\e·"wat
.
<:still :t>elng fought . the 
American citizenry opposed certain . diplomatic .actions , and 
the Yalta agreements .were · assailed • 
. Only men · �ith a touching faith in the ignorance 
of the public could at· �he . same time agree . .  to. one­
sided Russian annexation of a third of Poland and 
reaffirm their belief in .the Atlantic Char-ter, 
which condemns • territorial changes . that do not 
accord with the fre,ly .&xpressed wishes ot the 
· people concerned. • l.J. · · . . 
In a letter to The New York Times, Carleton= P.  Wells . ("" 
"' 
of Ann Arbo'r , Michigan, was expecially vociferousa 
Now that Poland has been told its fate by 
. .. 
the Big Three , we Americans may well ponder the . , . . 
. 
final words of President Roosevelt 's  recent · in- . . . . . . .. . ·:. · 
.
. ·, .  
augural' "Let us live as men, ·not as ostriches . ..
. 
:· · · . · 
Marshal. Stalin• s demand ·that Messrs. Ch\.irohill ·. · · .  · ,. .
. 
' . . I 
and Roosevelt acquiesce in this partition of -a . - . .,:: . .  · ... . ·, . � · . : .. · 
United Nations ally has . won. an ominous · triumph. · . .  ·.· · · " · · 
� Likewise t�e terms ot .Moscow• s notorious puppet · .' .· " . · · : . .. · . · 
1 reg�me first. set ·up in· Lublin. : . · 
· · · . . . . . .. \ . . 
Concluding his letter Mr:. Wells condemned the ·U .• S .  tor .
. < .. · 
its �o�e . in Polish affairs.·16 · · · · 
. . : . . . 
.. 
. . . . · 
._, ·. • , , . . 
,• . . ..  • •  I • 
·, - . 
. . . 
14campbe11 . • .211• sll· ,  ·1947�194a�
""
p. - . 2zr. 
. .
. 
. . .  '• 
1 5 . . . . The New York Times. ' February 16 , 1945, ,'p .  · 10 . .
. 
: 
16Ibld;. ,  February 19, 1945 , P •  21 .  
·'·· . ... 
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The· �ollowing year, reports were of a similar tone • 
• 
Two were representative of articles published during 1946. 
The first was in :t.rut New Statesman .mu! Nation on April 6,  : 
. . ·,. 
. . . .· 
.. . . 
, · . 
1946 • and .it concerned the poll ti cal purges taking place : , ' .: . . . 
. . . .  
in Hungary. 17 The second was an article regarding
.
· the _: · . .. .. · ;· : · . . . 
Czephoslovakian �lections,  which ·declared that Csecho.� 
.
· 
. 
· 
. -' : : . .. 
slo�aJcia ·was "not .'yet·" . in the Russi� . sphere. 18 
. I t . . . . . . , . 
As far as Poland was concerned, U.S. : citizens grew 
.
. " 
I ' ' ' 
recUl".ringly apprehensive about that state in 19.4?· and "· 
fl'.'eely aired the�� views. · 
. .. ·. 
The United St�tes is bound by the Y8.lta agt-ee­
merit to help insu.re democratic elections in Poland , 
Charles Rozmarek, president of the Polish Congress, 
. asserted today in a telegram to Secretary of State 
Byrnes. 
Mr. Rozmarek said that Jan. 19 elections would . . be a " a tragic farce , serving merely the purpose of 
confirming Soviet control over the country. "  Po- 19 land , he added, is living under Russian terrorism. 
, 
This represented the views of Americans who had become 
. . 
.. . . 
extremely suspicious of the Soviet Union, since they . 
realized that Poland ' s  fate had been decided. The Govern- · . 
ment of the U.S.A.  asked both the British and Soviet 
leaders to cooperated in assuring the promised "free and. 
unfettered elections" for Poland, but the results were a 
flagrant sham. 
l 7Paul Ignottis • "Poli ti cal Purge in Hungary, ..  The 
New Statesman and Nation, XXXI-XXXII (January 5,  191i'6-
December 28, ·1946), pp. 242-24)• · 
18•czechoslovak. Elections , "  The New Statesman and . · 
Nation, XXXI-XXXII (June lS , 1946), PP • 426-427. 19Tbe New York, Times, Janu� 4, 1947 � P• 16. 
. . 
.. 
. ' 
. 
Two commentaries were found to be typical ot the 
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various opinions given publicly between 1945 and 1948 , wi'th 
regard to Poland, The tirst was an editorial on December 
2),  1946, in The � X2J:k ·Times , w�ich reporteda 
It is • • • evident that the present Communist­
dominated regime in Poland is determined to (keep) 
itself in power by· turni�g .the national elections 
• • •  into • • •  farce . and fraud ( . )  That is quite 
in deeping with Communist · practice , which does not 
disdain to uti�ize deomcratic processes to attain . 
and legitimize powe� but would .ne�er permit such · 
processes to overthrow ;: a Commtinis�. regime once 1 t 
is established. . · 
.. '. · :  . . . 
• • •  Meanwhile � the. American and .British 
Governments would only stultify thems.elves and 
violate their own .. obligation to the Polish people 
if they gave the least
23
id or comfort to the 
present Polish regime, . , 
•' 
�· 
The second .:report .was a speech made by Miko.lajczyk in · 
January ot 1948 , under the auspices of the Comniittee to stop . 
·' . . world .c.ommuni�. The · central· point contained within the 
address urged the u.s. to grant aid to Poland to .fight
. the 
.Reds. 21 · �he Polish people had not given up democratic • 
ideals, · but with the ass1stance of the Red Army, Polish Com� :. . . . . 
munists held firm control of that westward looking state. :_ .:· · ... . : . : · · · · · .· ..
. 
. . . . . . 
The futµre of Hungary• too , was already_ .known, . . It wa�' _. .. · ' . ;.:.. . :·. 
� . . . . ' . 
quite adequately described by Andrew Gyorgy in the. Review· Rt �: . .. . ... 
Poli tics,  where .he reveBled that· forces· which prompted. -� . : 
·. : . . 
. d�mocratic re.constructi�� ··of. the H.un�ari� nat.
i�� wer' 
" swiftly ·destroyed by the rising intlueno·e · of the Communis
.
t . . . . . . 
. .. 
Party. which brought intern� disruption and" soc1.� - cr'i�i.
·a. ·�: .. ' ... ' · · "" 
. · . . ·. . . . . . ·. . . .. . . . : '. . . � . :.· . ·
.· .. : : · !" • .. ·
.
, 
• 
. . . " . 
20Ibid �· , December· 23 , .1946 ; P• 18, 
2�he Chicago Tribune• J_anuary 26, 1948, p. 26. · 
.. 
. '• .
. 
-· ?l -
Gyorgy ' s  closing remark was that Hungary was "headed toward 
the more permanent status . of a political and economic sat­
ellite nati�n . " 22 · 
Czechoslovakia ' s  path ·remained uncertain ,  and �hether 
its place was to be in the Western or Eastern sphere of 
influence was not revealed . until 1948. Early that year 
yarious politica� and military events �egan taking place . 
The. ultimate conclusion of these incidents was an overthrow, 
and the American public reacted ao·cordingly. This was 
illustrated in a �  York Time s '  editorial which emphasized 
three . majoi .·points a 
First ; 
.
.
. 
Shocked by the Communist coup d '  �tat in Czecho­
slovakia into their first joint action on Russo­
Communist expansion , the Government of the United 
States , Britain and France have condemned what they 
characterize bluntly as the estaolishment of a one� 
party dictatorship disguised· under the cloak of a 
Government o·f National Union, • • • 
Secondly ; · 
• • • Today, ·stalin • s acquisitions already amount 
to more than -four times those of Hitler prior to 
the war , and ,· like Hitler , he i's reaching out for 
more. • • • • 
And f inall,y i · 
It seems amazing that , having seen these things 
happen in Germany under Hitler , the Czech leaders 
. and parties still dedicated to democracy should have 
permitted them to happen in Czechoslovakia---going 
. 22Andrew Gyorgy , "Postwar Hungary , "  Review of Politics, 
·rx , No ... 3 ,  (July, 1947 ) , PP · 297-321. 
·.'· 
t. �! 
!I �I 
:: l 
!· 
.. 
·. 
· along step by step , makina one concncsion after 
another, until they �ere powerless to reaiat.  
Tha� in itself is a warning to all countries 
still under the delusion they they can cooporate 
with the Commu� ists withou� signing their own 
death w�rrant. J · · 
. 
One man had vocali zed the sentiments of many U . S .  
. . 
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. citi zens who had .discovered ' that . their country had . lost 
another state to the Sovie � s . · C�ns�quently , speciiic facts 
were unve iled an� championed by popul�r publications like 
Life , which reported in its March ' l948 issue that 
• , • · ( t) he Czechs obvious:l;.y were surprised to 
learn that you can ' t  do business with Communists . 
So , apparently', were the Western democrac ie s ,  but 
with less excuse , · 
The fall of Czechoslovakia to the Moscow puppe ts · 
• • •  underl ine (d)  · the fac� that U , S ,  foreign policy 
was still vague in the face of European realities , 
The best the U . S .  government could do , while its 
citizens began to experience that ' here we go again' 
feeling, was to j oin France and Britain in a note 
of protest tha�4was stupidly late and pitifully little, • • •  
United State·s citizens were dismayed , surprised , and 
•up- in-arms" ,  but they accepted the government ' s foreign 
policy ; they did not advocate fighting a total war for 
Cze choslovakian independence .  T�e American public recognized 
that the irr�concilable . conflict between East and West had 
been solidified by the middle of 1948, and they were willing 
to let the Washington officials handle the situation. 
2JNew York T imes ,  February 27 , 1948, pp . 1-2 • 
. 
24tife M�gazine , Vol , XXIV , No. 10 , (March 8 ,  1948) 
p·. 27 ;;_, 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION • A SUMMARY OF TRANSITION 
The postwar period· of �945-1948 brought forth 
several crucial points • . One was the final tabulation ot · 
the cost for the Second World War. 
Military expenditures of th� combatant nations . 
exceeded one trillion dollars ($1 ,117 , 000 , 000,000) , 
and property damage has been e�timated at twice · 
that sum. • • • In balance , Worl.d War II killed 
more than twice as many. people .... . as .World War I ,  
cost thirteen ti�es as "mu�h. · in · calculable monetary 
terms, and devastated a tar larger area or Europe.  
Finally, there was t�e lncalculable loss .in terms 
of human .misery an� what . the expanded resources 
of life and w�alth might have meant coutd they 
have been applie� to · the artE:J or peace. : 
" . 
A second po.itlt wa·s. the . emergence of two sup.er states .. . . 
. . . . 
from the War
.
years tow�d a position of worldwi<le influence " 
. . . 
in the economic . political. .soci.al. and ideolo�ic� realms·. 
The United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
.were fuse� in a battle against their mutual enemy on the 
European continent , Germany, and coalition diplomacy was 
. .  · · .· . . 
. .  . . maintained until the Potsdam Conference which was . held . ·  . . . . . . .. 
from July ,17 to August 2 , 1945. That meeting·"marked the · , � ... : · · 
turning point in Soviet-American relations. . . . " . 
. .. . 
. 
1 1Wallace K. Fergu
.
son ·arid Geoffrey Bruun , A Survey o:' 
. 
· 
· 
· European Civi!lization, 'l'hircl' Edition,· (Bostons . .  Houghton .. : .. · 
Mifflin· Company, 1962) , PP• 9J6·9J7. = : . " • 
· 
. . . ... 
.. . . 
. . � 
. . .. 
. 
·. ·. .. . . . . . 
\ . : . :· . '·• 
. . ' , .. . . . ... 
.. 
. .  . • .,. . 
.. • . 
·!' if 
For while an outward show of unity was preserved , 
and important decisions were taken, rifts and mis­
understandings appeare� which were never bridge� 
or properly corrected. 
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After that , international peace was a dead issue , 
and the Red Army ' s  penetration of Eastern Europe _dictated 
future planning for both the. U . S . S . R .  and the U.S.A  • . The 
presence of Soviet troops i.n th.at area could be utilize� 
by the Communists bu�· such military pow�r could not be 
ignored by democratically
.
orientated Western�re. · 
The third point revealed in the immediate postwar 
period was that as the two great states transformed 
friendship into open criticism ,  the conflict of interest 
was most intense in the Ea�tern European states of Poland, 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The newly ·established govern• 
ments in those states after World War II brought th� 
American-Soviet collision into full view. Finally, whe� 
Washington protests , indignation and pleading tailed· to 
change Communist actions, "th.e confrontation between the 
United States and the Sovie�. Union became increasingiy 
open and rigid. " J  Ironically , though, the period of 
transition ended in much the same fashion as it was 
, .  initiated, 
•. 
Early 1945 was a year of limited action. The u.s. 
policy was one which entailed rejection of total war
.
and 
hope for a better future . The United States •  Departn)ent of 
2Ibid, , P• 94). 
3Filene , .srQ.• .scJ.l. , p .  2)). 
State and the Congress c.lung to that plan of action and 
followed , with but a few ..
. 
dissentlrig vo'ices and votc n ,  the 
lead of the executive in relati.on to foreign policy and 
diplomatic conduct. Ail three branches of the government 
desired to avoid an all-:out · war with the Soviet Union and 
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substituted three plans to promote goodwill and lessen the 
chance of hostilities between the two states. The three 
were known as the Truman · ooctrine , the Marshall Plan ,  and 
the Vandenberg Resolution. The first aimed at containment 
by improvising a makeshift · buffer zone . It was to prevent 
the Communists from gaining a larger sphere of influence 
.. .... ' 
but allow a healthy and free exchange of t·rade , idea& , and 
culture. All of which would be supervised by · the United 
Na�ions ·and protected by military power. The· second was for . 
the reconstruction of war torn Europe .  As " indefinlte · com­
munist expansion would mean atomic war ; what sounder way to 
halt the,. expansion than by revivifying the economic ·life of 
that . critical ar��( ? ) "4 The final plan set forth an· ex­
plicit policy but placed major confidence in the United 
Nations Organization. *  
More often than not , thoug� , the President, Congress 
and State Department were at a loss as to what type of 
action to take in relation to the events in Eastern Europe 
between 1945 and 1948 • . The "free and unfettered" eleptions 
in Poland brought a cry of indignation and a mountain of 
4Goldm� , .22• cit. , P •  79. · , ,  ' . 
. *S'ee above pages 62 and 63. · . .  
·' 
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protests from them. All three divisions were greatly con­
cerned that Hungary would not maintain its economic inde­
pendence �d were extremely distressed when it fell under 
the "°Iron .Curtain. "  Finally, each expressed shock over the 
coup £!!. )tat in C�echoslo�akia. The crisis of that state 
ended 
· • .. .• · • wl th the discard'ing of the last trappings 
of· true democracy and the establishment of an . 
unadulterated Communist dictatorship. • • •  (T)his · 
development represented a defensive reaction-�-
and one foreseen by ourselves---to the success of 
the Marshall Plan initiative. • • • The result 
was that the Communist crackdown in Czechoslovakia, 
when it came , was received generally as a new Com­
munist success---the evidence , in fact, of the in­
adequacy of the methods of containment ·employed up 
to that time. • • •  5 
As far as preventing . the events, the leaders in 
Washington yielded no answers �d ·presented the picture 
of being at a los� as t� what �c�ion was most appropriate 
when contending with Soviet acts ... · 
The American public and press �ere. just as confu1;1ed. · 
The newspapers, magazines ,· and: .news· coinmentators reiated · : . • 
• • 
• . .. . 1 • • •• • • • 
events as they occurred� an�i' :.personal · views we:re attached 
. . ' . 
at certain times to the reports. The public read or j.ust · 
listened and fonne�. opinions of th� $ituations within . Po­
land , Hungary arid. Czechoslo,;�ia�
· but·, on the whole , the press 
and indi vidu8.l.s within the United States·,· excepting certain 
pockets of indifference , retained seven princip� ldeas a 
5a��gf! F. Kennan, Memoirs (1925-1950) ,  (Toronto , 
Canadaa -Bantam Books,  1969) , P• 399, . .  . . 
.··· 
.. : . . .. .  ·, '•, . . 
: . · ... 
. . 
. · . . ... . . ' . 
. . . . · .
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(1) the Soviet sphere ot influence an� Communist ideas 
had to be stopped from expanc:iinga· ( �:). the democratic form . . . . 
,
• 
.. 
of government was a r�·ghteo�e go·at · wh.ioh should be perpet-
uated a (J)  most Americans · were of .the opinio� that the 
United States was the Number ·one power of the world s (4) 
many were criticaJ._ oi the leaders . in both Moscow and 
.: . . ' . . 
Washington an� .. the policies ' of e�cha · (.S) . more o.�ten than 
not , . arudety and the feeling ·o:r repetition were predominant . . . . . . ' 
. 
·.. 
. 
iri regard to sov:iet-American confr�ntatione a (6) - beoauae 
of that iQ..Secure feeling . the u.s.  press and
.
publ'ic 
p 
followed , rather than leading or forcing· a change in. 
foreign· policya and (7) actual policy making was apecifioallJ 
. " 
left to the President , Congress and State Dep�tment. · ' 
.. _. ·. ·, . · · 
.. 
,
. 
. . . . . . .. ' 
I . ' " . 
By the end of 1948 • the tran$i ti on from cooperative . . . . .. . 
. 
·.. . 
" 
u . s . A . -u. s . s . R .  relations ot 1945 to
. 
sµspic
.
ion and
.-
o�en 
·� ".:" _° . :- _ : ·� :  .. · : -: . 
I • 
• . 
•• 
. , . . .·
. . • '. •·• • . 
conflict was compl.ete� · Th� . public , _press, Congress, Depaj;-t- · ., . . . . . ' . 
. 
. 
ment of State · and President., however, · c.on�iriued ·to adhere · · . . ... · . . .  . 
' 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. . . ' 
to two basiQ ideals• (l )  rejection · or· an ��d c��liqt 
with the Sov:iet Union a and . ( 2) . th� ret_enti°C>n of h�pe for<: 
.
. 
. 
. . . . · . .. . 
and belief in a .better .and more peaceful tutilre. The . first · 
did not prevent the infiltration· and take-over of Hungary; · 
Poland and Czechoslovakia, and it oril.y showed that moat 
Amer.leans feared total war. · The second ranked words above 
military force . The Universal .Declaration of Human Rights · 
adopted on December 10 , 194S, by the UN �eneral Aesembly 
s�pplied a document for the ·direct p�blio e�reeaion 
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of peaceful and humanitarian ideal s .  It wao a noble 
eesture on the part of the U . N. members , but the Declara­
tion provided merely the hope of a better existence for 
th6se �eoples to whom freedom and justice were illuaive 
. shadows . In 194� as i t  had been in 1945, idealism waa 
placed before realpolitik.  The implications o f  and re-
. 
actions to that policy were far-reaching and generated the 
vengeance of the Cold War. 
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(Document. No .  l)  
Mikolajczyk fipeaks Out Agains-t; .Soviet Ac -ts in Poland1 -
I reject this accusation of �abotage by the 
underground 'organi zations . · I wa_s prepared for 
this accusation and even expected the Soviets 
to say that not just a hundred but a· fe� thriu­
sand Soviet off iccrs and men were shot by the 
Poles.  This figure. of one hundred shot , even 
if true , docs not prove anything because • 
(a )  Surely during the fighting certain 
German units operated behind the Soviet lines 
until they were liquidated . We know from 
previous experience that when the German Army 
is retreating it leaves behind it  some agents 
for special jobs.-
( b) In the environment of the l ife in the 
underground in any country , a certain amount of 
criminal element exists , and it acts in an ir­
responsible way. 
( c )  It cannot be rul e .  out tha:t during the 
arrests and terror which the co·mmunists are · 
perpetuatingi certain acts of self-defense 
undoubtedly to.ok plac e .  I completely reject 
any assertion o.f organized sabotage against . 
the Red Army. Our· instructions were full. of 
warning against il�egal actions because these 
would provide an excuse for the Soviets .and 
the Lubl.in group to introduce political terror 
and even deportations. I have reports that 
these instructions were carried out because · 
they . reflected the instinct of self-preserva­
tion in the nation. 
l . Rozek, .QR• cit . , P •  375 . 
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(Document No •. 2)  
. . 
Three-Power Join� Protest . on Communist 
Coup in . Czecho»slovak.ia2 
,
�· 
. 
� 
·
: 
. . ..... . . -� ... 
: 
·
: :
'·: 
. 
·
. 
I '• 'I � . . 
On February 26, 1948, the gbvernments of the United States, Great. Britain, 
and France issued simultaneously an official condemnation· of the Communist · . 
coup in Czcchosiovakia. The full text of the joint protest follows: · 
: 7hc governments of the United States, 
·i�cc and Qr�at Britain have attentively 
:owed the co�se of the events which have 
,:t just taken plaee in Czechoslovakia and 
... ch place in jeopardy the very existenc;e of · 
·e principle.a of liberty to which all demo­
·i'.ic nations are attached. 
:bey note that by means of a crisia artift­
i�ly and deliberately instigated the we of 
�� .�e��- -�'-� �� � oth_!�. !1!� 
2 . 
. · 
.. 
· -
--·
�-
· 
·,'!", • 
. � . . ': . 
. 
. . . .. . . 
. " 
. .  . • 
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"Document , "  Current History XIV (A:pril ,  1948) - - ' p .  235, 
, 
.• · 
( Document N.o .  J) 
. . · 
' 
El t '1 J u . s .  Note on the P o l i sh ' cc ions 
'/'r;1•l of ri 1w/1J cl1•lh•1·1 · ti. t m  ./1111u1try .? at Jrl: 16 1'· m . •  ·warRtWJ UmA, b!J Amfifl.�.'lmlnr Jld/ 1111• /Jlis.v J,,,llf: to ll1r. /'oli.�li /1'01'r.if/1L O/lt't;o 
I hav1! ll1n honor t o  rofor lo 11111 l•:111l1:i�;y':i 1101 l•!i of  AuH. I!> l� uncl 
Nov. ��!, .l!>·IG �• n·g:u·cli11;� t.lto ·Poli::h N:it.iowil (d1l1'l.iom11 to which no 
n•ply h:ts yet, lic(•rt t'C(�nivr.cl, :incl 11111·:.mn.11t to i11sl.1·11ct.ions from my 
( :o\'1'1·1111u•nt l.o in fo1·m Yonr Exc(•I l'( •1tcy, n!l ll sig1rnl.ol'y of l.ltn Ynll 1L 
:nul Pot..,1lam Agre<'lltr.nt.<>1 with p:tt'I icul nr 1·1·g:1nl to tl1oso sr.ctifJml of 
!ho (.wo a:.71'('1'1lll'lt(S whidl th•al wilh the <'StahJishrnr.nt of  ll gr>V<:l'llmr.11t 
in J.>ola1111, through t.ho i11st1·lmtt•nl 1tlil.y of fr(�O an1l i111feLlcre1l cfoc­
t.ions1 of lllr Oo\'l'l'llllH�llt!s co11t.i1111c1l COll�Cl'll OVCI' I ho prn.r,lcction . nl'l.intirn-1 o · t.he Polish Provisio11a) Govcrnnu�nt of N:Ltionnl Unity. ; 
My GoYCl'lll\\t'llt is cspC'cially pcrtnrbc1l by tho incrcnsi11gly frt1p1cnt · 
i·eports of rr.pr<'�'>sive mcaslll'C'S which tho Polish l'rovisionnl Go\ 1il·n- ' 
mcnt hns seen fit to m11ploy ngainst those democratic 1:lcment!i ii) '. 
· Poland which havo not 1digncd themsclvt's with tho "bloc" pnrtics. 
It is n. so11rco o-f l'<'t;rot t9 my Government that its provio11s e!Tort� · 
lo call t.ho nt.tontion of tho Polish l>rovisionnl Government to its fniluro · 
: to perform ils obligations under tho n greemcnts cited havo not resulted · in any change in tho courso which that Government has pursued in 
connection with pre-election political nctivities. According to infor­
mation reach\ng my Govemment :from vilr.ions nutli.oritativo sources. 
t.hcso rt'lpressivc activities on tho pnrt of the Provisionnl Government 
ha.vo now incrcnsed in intensity to tho point where, if they do not 
cease immodint.clyf 
thcro is littlo likelihood that election� can hr, held 
in accorda.nco 'vi t  i tho terms of the Potsdam agreement which caU 
. for free and nnfettert'<l elections "on tho basis of tmivcr!m.l suffrago nnd 
secret ballot in which 11.ll democratic n.nd nnti-Nnii parties shall havo : 
tho right to tnke part nncl put forwnrcl candidate.�.'·' · · · 
It is tho viow of my Govcmincnt that this matter involves the snnc­
tity of inl.crnn.tionn.1 agreements, n. principlo upon which depends tho 
r.stahli!'11mcnt a.nd mnintcnnnco of pence n.ncl the reign of justico under 
lnw. Tho oblignt.ions with respect to the Polish elections which my 
Government assumed nt Ynltn · nncl rcitcrnteu nt Potsclnm, ·together : 
with tho Soviet and Ill'itish Governmcnt8, nnu tho obligations sub- . 
scquently n.ssmnecl by tho Pol'ish Qo,·crnme:nt n.nd frequently reitcr­
atncl, ·provi<le for the conduct o-f fren nnd unfettered r.lcctions ot the · 
t.ype r:nd in the manner dt'.scribed ahem:'. Tho fact thnt tho subject :. 
nmtter of these ur,l'c<'ments relates to �lc.ctions in Poland is incidental. .·: 
: Tho e:>sentinl fo.ct is that t h('y · constit11te nn int�rnntionnl agreement . 
· Hn<lnr which nll Cour nations concemecl hnvo nssumed obligations .. I • 
. need hnrdly sny that my Go\·N·nmcnt is intcrcstncl only in seeing thnt · 
the Polish people hnvo t.ho opportunity to pn1'licipn.to in n. freo and ; 
1111fcttcrc<l olcclion and that my Go,·C'rnmcnt docs not rcgurcl tho rc-·1 sult.s of snch an olcction as l>oing n.proper co11ce1·n of anyone other tha.n 1 
the Polish peoplo t.hemsr.l'vcs. . · . · · · · / � My Government would ho rnilin� i n  its clnty it it did not ngnin point i 
. out thnt the continuation of the present policy of suppression, coercio�, , 
1 n.n<l intimidation ·:ts nppliecl to· polit.icnl opposition ip Poln.n<l con- : 
1 stitntcs n. violation of tho letter ns woll as tbe spirit of tho Ynltn nnd '. 
Potsdam Agreements (Bulletin. Jnnunry 19, 1947, p. 2G).. ' · 
-- -- .  . . .. . .._.. . --· . . . � ..  . - .. ·• . . . - ·- - ···-·-·-... '"'-- --· -· 
J u . s .  
The Strate 
Washington , 
'· 
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(Documen� N.o . 4)  
United States Position on Poli�h d1ection�� 
'N0'1%'i 1mr.1 n:m:11 TO 1·1 w 11111·1·r�m, Hov11·:r, " N O  ror,rnn <1ovt:nN M.1'.N111 1. 
[ rtrlrnMr•l t'> th� l"I'•'"'' Jnn11nr1 7, IO·ITJ 
1\wt r>/ twlr. 1·1·yrrrdi11g lhti /orlhr.omiM/ I'olis!L cktltio1M dr.lit11'/rr,fl on. 
,f111111ary 6, /.?.�7 lo I:ord /1111crrl1ap,:l, JJriti.vA A.11wa:PwAor in I Washi1t!flo1' 29 • • I 
J·�XCl·!f.U:�W\' : Tho Governmnnt or l.1 10 United StntCEi,11 M n. si1�nid.ory I 
o f  the Yalltt 1111<1 Potsllnm J\ gn?P1m•11lH1 with partic11l1ir rr.�n1·d lo tho�:l! ll �Pct.ions of tho. two ng1·eenw11lH which clcnl with tho C\�f:nt>lishrn'cmt of 
n 1·1•1n·csc11tntivo gov1�1·11mcnt in Poland through tho instrumnnt.11lity 
o f f  1·cc oml unfotler<-d clt�ctiomi, wish�s mn to in form yon o-f tho concorn 
wit.h which it viows the prc-eh·ctio11 nctivities of tho I>olish Pi·ovisionnl 
G0Ye1·nmcnt of Nnt.ional Unity. My Govcrnmont is csp<»nio.lly pcr- f 
tul'hcd by tho incn'asiugly frequent report."! of. rcprc.�s1vo monsurc!I : 
which tho Polish Provisional Government hns seen fit to omploy ; . 
ngainst thoso clcmocmtic clements in Poln.nd which hnvo not o.ligncd . 
Lht'msclvcs wit.h lhc "bloc" pnrties. i 
I Accord ing to infol'lliation reaching my Government from vnrious \ 
authoritntivo sonrc<'�, tltcso rcpt't'.ss\ve nctivitics on tho pnrt of tho , 
Provisi?na1 Government hnyo no\� increased it� in�nsitY. t� the point \ 
. where,·1f the.y do not cease unme<lrn.toly, .thero is httlo hkehhood thnt · 
elections cnn be held iu accol'dnnco with tho tcrrm1 of the Potsclum 1 
Agreement which co.11 for freo n.nd unfettered elections "on tho bnsis : 
of universal snff rnf�o nncl secret ballot in which o.11 democratic nnd l 
anti-Nazi parties s rnll hnve the· right to tuke pa1't o.nd put forwar<,1 1 
candidates." . . 
On December 18, H>46, Vico Premier Stnnislnw Mikolnjr,zyk ad- ; 
dressc<l n communication to the Americnn Ambnssador in 'Vnrsaw in i . which ho called nttention to tho reprchonsiblo methods employed by ' 
tho Provisional Government in denying freedom of pol itical action to l 
tho Polish Pcnsnnt l'arty. This communication pointed out inter alia . 
· t hut tho methods used by the Govemment in its efforts to eliininnto · 
tho participation by the Polish Pensnnt. Pnrty in tho elections incluclo ! 
, political n.rrests n.n<l murders, compulsory enrollment of Polish Peasant . 
Pu.rty members in tho "bloc" po 1 iticnl p nrties, dismissal of Polish r Peasant Pnrty members from thei r employment, searches of homes, I 
� attncks by secret police and members of tho Communist Party on i 
Polish Peasant Party premises and pnrty' congrcssc.'31 suspension and • restriction by govemmcnt authorities •)f Polish Peasant Party meet-
; ings and suspension of party nctivitiN1 in 28 l'owiat.'3, suppression of '. 
tho party press and limitation of circu1ntion of pnrty paper� nnd 
nrrc::;t of tho editoria.l staff of tho P:u·ty Bulletin and ot tho <razeta 1 
L1tdowa. Authorit11.tivo n�port.s :from othor qnnrte1·s in Polnnd 15erve I to sub::tnntiato tho chnrges brought by l\fr. :Mikolajczyk in tho com­
municution cited. Tt is unclerstooci that coph!s o·f this communication � 
were n.lso doliverc<l to the.Soviet nncl B ritish Ambnssadors at 'Vurso.w I 
. as rcprcse1�tativct1 of tho othpr two·1';n.l�n powers. l 
� " :\  �lmll11r note wns .dcll'l'cr�•l on .J11n. G, iMT to Andrei V7ehln11k7:De;ut.)' Mlnlater of : 
ti.le RoYl�t Union, by U. S. Aaib:l�ilndor W. Dttlcll Smltb. · 
1 ,, Io the note to tbc l:io\'Sct Uoloo, "1117 Oonrn&ilont" 1e 1al>1tltate4 for"the 00Ycr111Hat"I. ·of Ulo United 8tntu'', . . . . . . : . . . , 
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(Document No.  5)  
Reply from the u . s . s . R .  to the u . s .  Not� 
on the Polish ElectionG5 ,.. . . . - . . ·-• 1'ra11.�latio11 ,,f .�11ln1!11n<!<: tt/ So-1·frt 11t>!t?.1i11 11vli.vlt rlcctivn�. '1'11r. 11011!, 
. dalc'<l J111111<ll'// lj, .19.$1 a111l .'li!Jll<'1l by Forci!Jlt Minister JI/ olotov, 
tNt$ ddit·u�·d fo tlw Ami.:riran Nmbct.•.�y at It! o.�cow on Jttnt1nry1 
J,$, J.'J41 • : :. . 
: Jn co1111�·1·! ion with your 11010 · of J1inunry G, HH7, l'(•gn1·<linl-{ tho 
: impcmlin� 1•l.�·c! ions in Polnnd,· l co�1$id�1· it necessary to in Conn you· 
. of ! ho follo\\'tng· : . . ; 
Tho SoYict. <1on•1:11nwnl cannot n�rcQ wH h ·th'e nccusa lio11s contn.inr.'1 
· i n  tho no!o 111HlC'r i·cfct\'IH�e.n:!:tiust. the Pol ii-h.Provisionn I Govcrnnu:nti 
' 0{ National Unit.y of ,��ol-ai in(j Jho ohlig�1t-\011·s hnpo�ed on it hy tho,. 
: <lcl!isions <.Jf the Yn lt!l n ncl"llrrin(co1�f.�r.eqccs cnvisnt.ting th� holdi11r� in 
1 Polnnd of free an<l mtfcltcred c>,le�t.1ons on tho. bns1s of umversn.1 suf-
frn�e, by �l'Cl'Ct bnlJot, in which aH dcmoCr;Ltic -0ncl n l1ti-N azi purtic.�'  
j 'vill hn,·o tho right to take part and put fo1•wnr<l candi<lntcs. · 1 
. The Go,·crJ1mcnt of tho United. Stntcs·of America ndvrincin_g in its = note of J:rnunry 5 3� :\ sei·ies· of nccusntions n�ninst tho Polish Govern-
ment, states thnt tile b!lsis· t hc>1·c-for arc rcporls coming to the American, 
· GoYcrnmcut, nnd n1akcs i·eforcncc to the sole source of tho informntion 
· rrcch:ed-to tho c;ommnnicntion. of the .Vico Premier of tho Polish. 
; Gonmunent .• :$.' �fikolajt�zyk,.,'\·ho tr iuismitted to tho American· Am·'· � ba�saclor .i!l 'Vnrsaw i:cpol'ls of t�1e n:bovo.chnfactey, �hich �ho .L\.meri- 1. 1 can Government considered poss1blo to'reproduce m its noto. : • 
: In tho noto are repented tho nccusntions n�n.inst tho Polish Provi-l .sional Gov�rnmcnt .c01�tainccl i� )!.ikolnjczyk's statement of reprcssiv:e· 
, mcasn.rcs d1rectc.d ngamst cert:uri members o� the party he r�pres.ents . .  · · In tlus connect10n, however, thero are completely wnoretl widely, 
I known facts concerning the particiJ.>ation of certain of tho members of· 
1 i\fikolajczyk's party in the activities of underground orgnnizo.tions, 
i 1'.·�> resort to every ki ucl of thrca t, to violence, an<l to mu rel er in order. 
i to !ntin:fcre with the normal conduct of the electoral campai gn for thef 
;,Sc)m. · · i Among other thinrrs, numerous facts nro known concerning bandit' .1 attacks on ckctornl 8istricts, terrorization of electors with thre1tts inl 
respect of ndherents of the government nnd of th" democrn.tic hloc nnd; 
even a wholo series of mnrclers of members of tho electoral commissions.j 
· In this situation, the Polish Government cnnnot remn.in inili1forc11t1 
and not· undcrtnkc decisive measures with respect to lhc· criminal cle- .. 
men ts who .nre endcaYoring to <lisr:upt the ir<'� nn<l 11!1{ct.�re<l elcctioris, . 
for the SeJm, even though certn.m members of M1kola.J<;zyk's pnrty, : 
shonlcl he gnilty in thiSJ; . · . . . I · 
· 
As is known, Poland sn fTP.red grievous years of Gcr1nan occu p ntion,1 . . .. . · tho r.ons<'<pr<'n'cc!j of which arc still npparcnt at the present time both in; 
the <l ilTicn lt econmnic conditim1s ns well as in the. diflicultics in overcom-: 
ing the 1•cmnnnts of tho b:mdilry gcnernte<l in i:.i10 period Qf occupntion, 
�of Polish territory by Gcrmnn troops. . : . . . . · . 1 
'. It is impossibhi also to ign()ro tho criminal activities· of fnscist emi·J 
grec circles cndciworing to baso themselves ·on t.heir unclcrgroundt . 
lorgnnfan.tions· in Poland; particularly, hn:YinJ;; in view th'o coam.'C<?�ionl 
: "Bollctin ot J'll11�•'7 it. lHT: p, t84:· 
' . •· .' ·: ··· . . 
·
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. o ( llH•s1• \111cl1;1-i�1·01111d 01·1�11 n iia l ionH with t110 hand it el1•11H�11 l.:1 wf 1() nvail 
'. t hPt11SI' l \·1•s of O\'Cl',Y It i11cl 0 ( V iolnn1:01 O\'Cll 0 ( Ill lll'dt\l' 0 f l't\pl'l\!·;1:11 t.1ili Vl'.!j' o( I Ito Polish n11Lhorit i.-s .an1l J1.,:i1l1it1i o( l ho rkmocrntic parl.i1:s. J 11 
t.11t·:m cir1'.tllll:·;la111·1!!l llH1 Polish Ooven11111:11t would not ho f111filli11v it11 
; duty to lho proplo i ( it (lid nut t.nko nu.•:is111·cs ll/�:lim;t th1·!:1: cri:11i1rnl 
d1•n11i11ls to :iss11 1·0 tho co111lit.iom1 11<•1:1ls811 1·y fo1· tho holdi11g 11f fn:ll 
cl1•mocrnl ic cl1?cli01rn. 'l'o inl11d ct•o wil h tho ':nrrying out of 1;uch 11u:nH. 
11 t·cs wuul<l bo in111lmissihlo p1u'ticu lnrly on tho ptirt of foreign 
govm·umcnts. . 
' 
In vimv o{ lho forl.'g-oin�, th!! Soviet Govo1·11mont <loc.q not pcl'ccivoi 
1111y basis fo1· tho t1tkin17 of n11y such dcp H , ns tho Government of tho I 
Unit.ell SL.'\t1!s of A mr.ncn. /m>po�l'S, ,., ilh rc8pcct to the ] •ot ish Gov­
crnm('nt in connr.ction ,\·it l llto impcmti111� elections in Politn<l nnd : 
. thereby in this fnshion bringinp-
I 
nbont i u
.
terfercnco i n  tho internal', 
nfl'a irs of I>oJnnd on tho part of t 10 po.wm·s who signetl tho Y nltu und I 
Borlin ngrcoments (IlulLctin, ."!anunry.'26, 19117, p. l<H) .. 
27. U. S. Posrr10N ON CoNDUCT Ol' RECENT PoL1su ELECTIONS 
(Rclcnscd 'to tho press 'Jnnuury .28;'.tMTJ 
On � anunry U) 'n getiernl c'tection ·,v.1tS. �\�l<l it�. Polt\nd, �he results �- . 
. of which are expected to bo·a.\mounccd: shortly. 'l'ho Umte<l States ! 
i Government has followed clpsQly .tlio.devclopmorits leading up to. this I 1 event in accordance �vitlr tho .commihneilts it t\cceptcd at. Uie Y nltn . 
1 nn<l Potsdam Conferences. On numorou_s .occasions it bns expressed , 
its concern over tho courso of ov'ents -ill ' Polnn<l, which increasingly ; 
indicatccl that the elect.ion would not. bo conducted in · such ma11n1:t . . 
l as to n.llow a fr.cc ex1)rcssio1i of tho will of tho Polish people. On · 
August 19 13 nnd Noyenibcr 22;'1 HHG, formal notos were a<ldtc.c;setl to 
tho Polish Provisjo1i:il Government on this subject. On Jnnunry 5 3:1 l 
·. this Govcrnment' bronght the situation iri Polnnd to the attention of J 
i tho British antl Soviet Go':"ernmcnts nncl cxl?rcsscd the hope that those · 
· Governments woultl ass0<�rn.tc thcn·1selvcs with the Government of the 
: United-States in an appr.oach lo tho·Pollsli ProvisiOnnl Government of · 
.'.Ntt ionul Unity. 'l'his .proposal was rcjcctccl by the Soviet Govern- '. . . 
ment.�/ 011 Janunry' !> 37 this Government delivered n further noto ' : · to the Polish Provisiotml Govnr'nmcnt which stntccl among other thii1gs . . 
" that if the. repressive nctivities on the pa.rt of the Pl'ovisionn.l ·Gov- , 
· crnment clicl uot·ccnso immediately there wns little likclihoocl that elee- ·( 
. tj.9ns·coulcl be helcl in accm:dnnco with the terms of the PotSdnm agree- 1 
J;fcnt./ Tho British G.ovomment has also protested to tho -Polish i 
Provisional Governn1ent tho violation of it.s election pledges. : 
· The rcport8 l'('Ccivecl from tho United Stntcs Embassy in Poland ' 
; in tho period jmmedintcly prior to the elections t\S well ns it.� sulise- : 
. qucnt reports basccl upon tho observations of A merican ofiicinls who l 
: visited a m11i1ber· of Polish voting centers confirmed the fen rs which : . 
. this Government had CXlH'c:-scll thnt tho· t'l1•ction woulcl .not J.>e . freo. ' .... .. 
,Thl!SC rcporls wcro conobomtc<l bv tho gcucrnl tenor of tho'dispatchcs ·, · 
·from 'foreign correspondents in -l�olo.nd. It is cJenr thnt �ho Provi- j 18io11al Gove1·nme11t did not c�nfino it.self tc? tho sup�r�ssi�!l �f. th: so� ·i 
l .. nullNln ot �r11t�mbcr 1, 11'"10, '[\. 4!?2. . . ' I 't' " Tlullr.lln ot 0<'.:cmhN· 11, llMO, p. IO!"if, l _u llulhltlu o! .lnnunr1 ·lfl, 11H7, p. 134. · u »ullnlh1 ot .• rn11nnr7 �11. 1017, p. lli4. 
� �uJ� !_n!���-!_l�:.��!!.?.'..  l�O�· ---- --· 
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(':\ lh•1l "untlcrrrrn1i111l'' hut l'llll'lnyl'li ":irlo-i-prc:1<l .1111·:�i�111·�� or ('�c·t·cion . 
' :11111 int imid:iiion nga.iHst lklllocml ic cl1•11n•nls whi<'h w<•1·0 Joynl to ' 
0 }\lh\ 11<1 a l lhou�h twt. parl i!'ans of tho Gowrn11w11L 11bloc". J n' tll<'.!>O 
.. <'ircmnstn.
n�cs thc Un1.h•1! Stntcs Gonorm1wnt cnim�L collf>hler th:\t '[
; t ht� proy1:::1ons of l h\l l: nlta n ntl l,otsdam agremucnls ha vc been 
� fulfilkd. \ . - . Tho United Stah's Gow1·11ml'Ht has mado it dear that it hnli 110 1 
:desiro to interwnl' in the intcrnal afi'nirs of Pol:lll<l. Hy vi1'L11c of tho 
: rl'�pon�ihility whfrh <icrnlYcd 111'>on it n'!; ono o f  tho principal powers : 
: l'llg:q!ctl in libcra t iug tho counLric8 of Europe ·•rom N1t7.i occupation 'I 
! it. \m<lertook, to�l't.hc1· with the Bdtish nnd Soviet Govcrnmcmt.'3
i 
to 
• secure fo1· tho Jo.11g-:<1tfl'l•t'ing Polish people tho opporlunity to sc cct l 
I :i. �m·cmmcnt of thcir own choosing. It wns in connection with thiR; 
j 1m1lertafring thnt this Go,·ernment agl'eecl to the decisions respecting 1 
· Poland that were tnkcn at-tho Ynlt::i Conference, includi11t? tho de- ; I! cision to 1·ecognize tho Polish Provisional Government of National ! 
. Unity. 'l'h.ese decisions with respect to Polnnd, which were accepted 1 
J bv lite Polish Provisional Gon�t'llment in their entirety, formed pa.rt • 
' o"f a series of ngrccmcnts be! ·::cen the United States, British, nnd i 
. Soviet G0Ycrmi1cnt!'l. Tho Unjtc<l States Goycrumcnt .considers that 01
· 
! tho Polish Provisional Government hns fnilccl to carry out its solemn , 
. pledges. · . ; 
1 The United Stutes Government intends to ml\intn.in its intorest in I 
lthe welfare of the Polish people. 'Whilo retaining full lih�rty of ac- ' 
'. tion to dctonninc its future nt.titude.townrd tho government of Poland, I 
; this Government will continue to keep itself informed of developments '. 
. · in Polnnd through its diplomatic mission in '\V nrsaw. 
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(Document No ,  6 )  
·S tate . Dcpartment • a  Announceme n t  on Russian Activi­
ties in Hunearyo 
tn thn Ca·imrn D<'elnrnllon on 
II brr:\ led J·�u rope, the hr11d11 of 
<lm·ri·nmrnt or thr. U.S.�.R., 
flr<'l1t Uritnln and lh<' United 
Stntr:o unll<'a·took "to concca·t dur· 
ini: the lr.mrornry po1·iod ot In· 
i<t:ihility In llhl'rntcd Europe tho 
policic:o o( their three Govern· 
mrnts In nllslsllni; the peo1,ll.'11 lib· 
rrntc-d from the domlnntlon ot 
N:izi Ge1•n1nny nnd the peoples ot 
· the former Axis 1111telllto etntes ot 
· 1'�uropo ln solve by democrl\tlc 
mea.ns their prcllslng political 
t-connmie problcm1." 
In Collo\\'lnit closely tlie econom­
ic recovery problP.ms ot tho conn· 
tries ot Europ�. the United Sta.t�s 
Government. bccnme seriously 
concerned several . months ngo 
. over the alal'mlng· deterioration 
1 ot the HungArian economy. Thia · 
conce1·n hns mounted In the rn-. tervening months, during which 
the Hungo.rian economic situa-· .. 
lion ho.s become · p1·og1·esslvely 
. worse, culminating In tho p1·esent 
chaotic lntlatlon. 
Since December, 1045, the Unit­
' ed States Government has to.ken· 1 the Initiative In proposing that . 
'. the Soviet Union, Great Britain 
I 1md the United Sta.tu consider· 
1 means whereby the three Powers · 
: as contemph<ted in the Crime� 
1 Declaration, could assist Hungary ·. 
;. to rebuild lta shattered economy. 
1 These propo11als, however, have 
I been rejected by the . Sovl't Gov· 1 _ernml'..nt. , . 
· 
. ---::�·\ ·--. -
.: 
- �  
.. 
U. S. Ollt't" R�hullfcl �  Jlu"''R TnkrA llulf of. Out11ut 
In a meeting oc the Allied Con· .Jn connection · with thl11 elC• 
lrol Commleslon In Budapest In ' chnngo ot notc11 ·concerning · the 
December, 1045, tho United Statea ·, . economic 11ltuaUon In Hungary, ·1 representnUve recommended the 'i , the Amt'rkan Amba1111ndor In 
fstnbllshment of a 11ubcommlltee ; 1 ?.ro1cow, upon lniatrucllons trom 
of the control commission to con• • · ,_ thh1 Government, ha• now dellv­
sldet' question• o! Hungal'ian In• I • ' ered a lurthtr note to the Soviet ! ctuiltry, tlnnncc nnd economlce,·: , • Government under date o! July 
This nppronch was .unnvallln&:. I i 23, 19o&6, the text of which 11 u 
l Subsequently., In a note to the ; I Collowa: 
: f:lovlet Government on' Mn'rch 2, : · 1 ' "July 23, 1948. 
1940, this Govcnim�nt ni:-nln rnlscd.'. "Hlia Exctillency 
the l�1uc hy reviewing lhe l:'ravo "V. ll. llolotov. 
cconomlo l>illl'ht ot HunA'nry, by ''lllnl!ltcr tor Forelp Attain 
cnlllng ntt('ntlon to the ovct" oC the U.S.S.R., · 
bm·denlnJ;" ol thnt co1mti·y with 1 "lloscow. 
· repnrnU01111, · req11t11ltlon11 · nnd tho ! "Excellcncy, 
co11t11 ot n1n.lnt11lnln1r lnrga oec1111n·· "lty Government hu directed 
lion !orcr11, n.nd by 1•r.q11r.11lln1t tho ; me 'to communlcllle to you· the . 
Hovlct Gov<'l·n111011t. lo l1111L1·11cl Its � tollowlni: rcpl)' to Mr. Vlshln• 
1·c11rc11cntnllvcs Jn 1Tun1:n1·y to . aky's letter ot April 21, 1946, re-
. co11r.1!1·C ·nt nn ·cu1·ly 1lntc with tho , ltUni:: to the economic 1ltuaUon 
· 1 ·unllcd SlnlcH nml British rctll'C· 1 ot Huni:nry: · 
11r.nln.tivc1J tho1·c In llevl�lni; " pro- j "l>ly Govo1·nment Is unnble to 
1 J;"rnm which woulil hrlng to nn ! a:;rce with · the Soviet Govern· 
I end the proce111f ot dlslnteg1·ntlon ·: mcnt. that 'the !ultlllment by' 
In Hnngllry, o.nd nt the snme tlmo l Hungary of Its rtpllratlona obll-" 
1 provide· a trnm�work within , gllliuns nnd the presence ot occu-
1 which . the .re�nbllltntlon ot tho . ,! petlons troops In Hungary do not 
. country and ,Jts rclntcg'l'atlon with "and cannot .exercise any 1erlou1 1 
,. '' the: general Eu1•opcan economy . Influence on the economic eltua· · 
'I might be MCOlllp)lehed, j' tlon ot the country.' . : · i Ih ·a: reply dated April 21, Mr. 1 "My Government ' wfahes to.1  :. A. Y. Vlshlnsky, the · Soviet :.brlnr to the attention ot the' S()-·! \Deputy-Fo�eign Mi�lster, 'rcject�d .: ; viet Gove1·nment the tact that ' 
the Unltcd Stntcs proposnl on tho · halt ot the current · output ot 
grounll thnt the worklni:: out ot . . Hung11rlan manufacturing lndu9-
An <'<"onomlc rC'lmhllitntlnn plnn · ; try, wh1ch la · operating at o�ly 
tor Huni:n•·>• fl'll within the cum·: one-third ot the pre-war. level, Is. 
I 11,•t<'nce ot the1 Hun,::nl'inn Govet·n· ! abiiorbcd by reparations · ·and l mcnt. Mr .. Vlshln::1lty nlso denied ' other requirements · ot the occu· · thnt the cost to HungRl'Y ot Soviet · '. pylnr Power. Jn the case ot · .l repnr.atlons and oceuplllton wnll' In . heavy Industry. coal, Iron, metal 
nny wny rasponslblo tor the de-.. ·and machine production, which la . 
I tcrlorallon of economic.condition• . very urgently required for Hun. 
In Hungary, and 111legcd tho.t the'. : gary'1 rehnblllt11tlon, · reparation• j !llllure of the United St11tca to re- ·; alone .abs.orb between 80 and 90 
\ turn to Hung11r.y ·trom the United ., . per cent o( the current output. 
1 States-occupied· zones in ·Germo.ny I • Except:for 
·some bridge and rail· 
·1 and Austria dlsplnced ·property. I wny construction necessuy_ to to.· 
utlmate� In value at $3,000,000,000LI .. 1 cilitate the movement ot goods; 
l·w&1 one oC th•· prlnolpal · rea.eone , Hungllrla.n heo.vy Industry Is pr.o­
for Hungary!& :pr�nt .'eoonornJ� · . I duclng pructlcally nothinr for do-
' �-l���l.�����j_,,_,. ;�" \ I mc11tlc requirements. 
· 
.. Soviet Requl11ltlon!I Itemized 
. . .. · 
I "With reference to the eco­nomic burden plo.ccd upon .. Hun· t gary by · _the �ovlet occupo.tlon 
l ·torcu, I am lnstr.ucted to inform . 
j .th� V.l�t Oo��_rn�ent �� re�a�I� ._ 
.. . 
· • . . .. ' . . ... ' : : 
. , ·  
. . . .. . 
.� 
6New York Times, · July, 1946,- � ·  11. . \ .· .  
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'"formnllon In th11 JIO!lll<'l•iilon M try n�d t·amoVl\IA ll'Otn the coun- gnry'11 pr111l11ctlon cnpnl'lty and g11rlnn Oovcrnni11nt, would ex· 
my 011vcr11m<'nt to the dCrct thnt · t�yi nni� /nclui�lng$l <����&f 00�0 . nnllonnl lncnm11 wn11ld b11 cut to nrnlne thf economic llnd flnnnelnl t.000, 00 101111 ot whrnt, ryr, bnr-� r• "  .,, " c.' " , • " • • . ' hnlf or k:1A In the 11p11ce ot ll fr:w Altunllon or the country and the ley, <'Ol'n 1111d onl!I wrl'r. t:ll<cn by �:"c<', t�in f' "'17ty rc.mot11'1t ''1�11," month11, n111I th11t tho rcp:i rntloru' motho•li. by w,hlch' lllllJl11to.nc1 lht Red Aa·my In I111n1:nry In 1 1.•ni;tu y 11 on Y I\ pnr 0 1 11 pnynblc by Hun:-;nry In l�of5, rorj co11l1I he �IVl!n, · 
IOl!I, mo:otly •hn·lng thr f11·st iilit totnl, "1:11 11.nca �nly n 11ni·t �t 1th� f'xnmplc, would rqunl 24 per c11nt , " 'WC! Nl;ould 11xp11et frorn ths 111011tht1.• Th Iii flt!lll'I' mnv he COil\• ! ��mo;r• rtopcr y llV�� re cl lr j of lhr. nnllonnl Income. J,fkcwl�c, : work ot the' comm Ii.Ilion I\ 11to.tr.·, p�r�d with JIJJS Hung:\rfl\11 pro·'. th 0 t ther e�l "t
nell,lt d �y° ��� ! It did not Corc11ce thnt Jlun::nry ment or who.t tncn1111re1 and whnt dncllon of npp1·oxl111ntrly 7,18!1,· • S " let (!0:11 .n'::t��t f11 � ronsly ex· I would be l'l!CJ1tl1·ell t�. 11111·rcndcr torr.lgn 111111l11t11nM are n11ce111111ry, 000 tone ot thciir. foocli<t11rf11, OC 1 ' OV el " l:ll':ie t)llnntlllell o( $:001111 nnd In the prc�c:nt l'COnomlc ltlllll or 
1locl111 ot food llV:\l lnhlo for tho �fr.c{�tcdl Tbhh\�
on�lu�l�� �11 t
li"· 11crvlcc11 ovr.r nmt nbovc Jt11 rep&• tho country, wllb Jt11 present bur· · 
111pport of the liunr.nrlnn urbnn H
en e 1• 1° C
y e nc t' ,I\ st
1t rntlons ohlti;nllon11. · don11 nnd requlremcntll, In order populntlon In the second ho IC of· ungnr an overnml!n 9 e • thl\t tho country mo.y recover eeo-' 
1945, th11 Reel Army Ahi;orhcd . mo.tc ·of total nAtlonal wco.Jth ,1n. "  U. S, A.111,11 :S·l'owcr rrol{rom I nomlcnlly nnll be able to meet nurly nil ot the· mt'�nts, one-sixth 1943• excluding houses l\nd ��I d· . "My Government hnA n�tP.d the tho ta·lple obllrra.tlon ulslng from ot the wh<':it·nnd rye, moro thnn �5t100oamounted t� only $ ' OO,-, posltl�n taken by tho Soviet Gov· ropnro.tlons, other o'bllgatloria ui:i· 
a qu:wtcr ot tho lc�11mc11, nenrly •· · "Since the Hung:i.rlo.n Go�crn· ·ei·nmcnt with re11pcc•. · to tho fnr• . dor tho arml11Uco a�rcome!'.t an!! lhr�c·q11:\l'tcra of thr. 11\rd, one· ;.mcnl h onl now at the request mulntlon by tho Soviet Union the pre-wnr foreign debts.' • . " • tenth or tho Vt'�ctnhln oil, nnd of my Government In th,. cour11o Unlt11d m111tdom and tho United :· "Tho ·.soviet chntrman ot the. 
O�o·Cl(th oC tho milk and dall'y · or · pt't'J'nl'ln� completo jj11t11 or States, or a proga·nm which would . ,C9r,trol . Comml.s�lon refused to p1,01h1ctii. . ' I11111r,n1'11tn p.roporly believed to bo ns!llst the rehnblllto.tlon of Hun· .·accept or to con•lder this report, 'A�co1·dm� to thr. m�st recent ' 1ocnt�d In tho Amo1·lcl\n r.ones oC ' gnry and ltll rclntogrntlon with : nor ·would ho nr.rM to a propoiin.! r��o1 �s .;c�ervcd, extensive i·equl- . Gt!rmnny o.nd Au11trln, my Gov• the gencro.l economy or Europe. ot tho United Sto.tea represent11.• '\11011 n,. ° Coodsluffn wns tl\klng ·• crnment 111 not y11t In a po11ltlon The Soviet Government mo.y be tlvo thl\t there be e1to.bl111hr.d a g nee :is lnte .us AprlT, l!HG. My � accurately to determine the toto.11 assured tllat It 11 not the policy subcommittee or the Control Com· rc��rc�;nei��.fmfsc't i mp?s!lible. to ' vo.tue or 11uch prope1·ty, Tho n1ost ot the Government of the United mlaslon to dl:!cu111 qucat1on1 ot 
the :stnt�mt�: or t��
m:c!��:t G��� " lmport.o.nt 11lnglo Item ot Hungo.r-:St11.tes .to force acceptnnce hy l1 Hungnrlan fn
du1try, finance and 
emmcnt thnt 'the Soviet Com· , ln.n paoperty In tho Amerlcnn Hungary oC any economic . pro- , economlCll. 
mnnd In Huni;nry hns n Ith • �ones npprl\ra, however, to bfl the "ram. . . . . . . .. U. S. 'Again Asl<1 Soviet Help . i. 
c�rricd out nor 111 cari• In 
e . er gold which wne removed from "The United States, Jn propos- l ., · . 
any rcqulllitions., · Y 
g out 
.l Hungnry to Austria by former Ing trlpal'tlte discussion of an , In vle.w oC the position taken f .  
"My Govct·nment hna , offlclnla of the Hungnrllln, Na- economic program tor Hungary, · by the chalrmnn, my Government ! 
tho.t in tho opini n cit th 
_;0\e�. tlonnl nnnk, and wl1lch the 1 had In mind the discussion of aid 1 cnnnot concludo tho.t the· willing· 1· 
Gov�rnmont, 'th� real crc���s Unltod St11tcs Government un<\11r-·, o.nd uslato.nce which tho three neH of t1:1e Soviet cho.lrmnn •to 1 . for tho scvci·e econ . d fl etnnds nmounta to approxlmo.te· · Power11 could give to Hungo.ry· · a.cqu11.lnt himself with such con· 1 
• 
nonclal situl\tion in �.f1��g:� Ill'; ly $32,000,000. . ' once the economic obllgo.Uons of : slderntlbns I\� m11.y be advanced 
the expe11dit1,11·e11 ln�urred by her u S to n�atoro Gold 1 that country were c111·eCully de- · by the repi esentl\tlvea ot tho in tho war ai:-alnst the United Na· ,, 
' · i tined o.nd scheduled so as to pct• , United States • • • concerning 
lions and t11c ro.vagini ot the . With respect to the !!tntua of mil their. dlschArge without de- I Hungo.ry'• economic altuntlon' country by the Germ:i.ns and the ,Hungo.rlan proporty locat�d In p1·lving the people ot Hunga.ry of . conatltutea a so.Ustnctory proccd· lol'mer Hun"'nril\n rulel's • 1th� �le[l�o.n t�on� �r t
Ggmo.ny . their means or livelihood 
.
The • urc for the solution or these prob-
"1 am lnsl;:'uctcd to mention for �!�nt �T1i1' �� ln�orc
�
�c� to 0�0c;·.�� · United Stat�s h&11 no de�lre to lc�11· lhe lnCol'mo.lion of the Soviet th t G t I tl!I d ' I mpose a plan Cor Hunga1·y'1 . I am Instructed ni;aln to cnll Government lh:\t, on the bnsl• of thn Hmy 
ov
l 
e1·n
G
n1on u1s n
t
o 
f 'let. econo'my but does desire to lend attention to tho ohllrrntlon freely·, I. bl ti 't  o uni;o.r o.n ovcrnmt'n ° 11 • · ' ' undc1·'-ken ·by the Soviet U lo ... re in e ea motes, I h:111 been lntontlon to return to Hungl\ry . assistance to Hun&'aa·y through a I 
"' n .. 
calculated thot the total war the looted gold In lll'I custody, and' !  concert of policies such aa waa . o.t the Ynlta Conference, In which d&'!1:ll:'e to Hungo.1:1an manutac- to expedite restitution . or ldcntl· envi11a1:"ed In the decla1·atlon made I �ho three hcnda of sto.te ngrced luring Industry, 1ncludlng- re-· ti bl looted pr6perty bythe llfree.Powere at the Crimea.� to Concert the policies of their movals, amounted to $3<5,000,000, �.R�stitutlon or co�mer�lo.l In• Con!ei·ence. . �h�e� Governments In usl11tln!:' oC which $124·20�.000 was due to · lnnd wnter craft on the Dnnube "Hungarian Government orll· · the peoples ot tho former i · removals by Soviet torces. · ".will be dcfe1·red pending the out- clala have, In tact, reque11ted such • Axl• so.telllte State11 or Europe to 
Clolmll of Russia Refuted . ''come of discussions between th'o assistance of the three Powers. •olve by .democratic means their. 
"N t h I b t I t. United States mlllto.ry authorities The Huni;-ai·lan Fino.nee Minister · 
pressing political and economic 
o e as a so een o. ten o ., · . . problems • · 
the view ot the Soviet Govern· . and the Soviet autho�ltles In 1ubm1tted to the Soviet �conomlc . ,, · 
n1cnt that •one of the mnln rea· 1 Vienna with a view toward e!ltab· : advisor ot th• Control Commls· · . Pursuo.nt to thli agreement
; 
1on1 for the ditlicult economic i llshlng principles of freedom ot slon a report · on the Hungo.rlnn the United States Government 
situation In Hung:iry • • • Is the ; movement of ves11els on the Dan• economic and flnl\nclal eltuntlon aga.ln requests tha.t · Instruction� 
fact that a tnrgc qunnllty o! Hun- • ube under the flags which they under do.te of Dec. 3, 19f5. Thie be 1ent to the Soviet represcnto.­
i:11rlt\n pi·opel'ty nnd valuables now fly without danger· of 11clz.. rcpo1·t concluded with the follow· tlvo· ,In Hungo.ry to concert with 
conttnul':1 to this dny to rt'nioln ure . . Thia program or restttutlon Ing 11tnteme11t: .the Amerleo.n and British repre­
ln thl! Amm·lcnn zone ot occupn•. ls In accordnnce with and In Im· " 'The only Wl\y that we cnn 1entatlve� there In ho.ltlng tho 
lion on tho lcnitory of Austt·il\ plemcntatlon oC the statement ace ollt of our scrlou11 flnnnclnl , pruont . economic dlslnte&'rntlon nnd southern Gom1nn�•. where made by the Secretary ot State· o.nd economic <\l rClcultlcs I• a. plnn ;and to provide a framework with· 
thi.� p1·op1'1·ly wns 11hlt1pocl by tho to the Hungarian Premier In ; of rcco1111t.1•ucllon, to be cnnlcd ! In · which the rehal>llltatlon . ot 
SnlM:i.y Government dlll'ln� tho . Washington. : 011t with tho 1\111th1tnncB ot the Al· , that country, and Its early rein· 
pcl'iod or tho ndvnnce of tho "As pointed out In the orig· lied Powc1·a, the objective of tegratlon with the gcne1·al econ­
lroo1111 of the Red A1'111y.' The .,
.Ina� letter of March 2, 19f8, the which would ho to 1·nlso produc· omy of Europe, will bo possible. j 
Soviet Govol'llm�nt mr.nllon11 a United Stlltes Government, at the tlon to n·sublllttntlo.lly hli:hcr level "Fino.Uy, an Immediate consld· I 
tti:urc ot nbout $3,000,000,000 o.s I time ot the signing of ,the Hun- thnn At p1·c1cnt nn<I restore eratlon Is tho.t the prompt lssu-. lhc catlmo.ted valuo ot this prop- ,I garlan armistice, reserved the equilibrium In the country's eco- anco ot auch lnst1·uctlon1 would 1� 
1rty. . · . rl&'h: to reopen the question ot . nomlc: nnd flnnncio.I atfnlr11. . have a aalutai:y ertect on the! 
''In connection with this est� ? Hun.,.arlan reparo.tlons. My Gov· " 'Since, however, we cnnnol tlno.nclo.l 1tablllzatlon progra.m i 
mntc, I nm instructed to dh·cct : crnmcnt agreed to the nrmlstlce worl( out a plnn of roconatrncllon 11whlch the Hungarian Govcm­lhe att<inlion ot th<i Soviet Gov· 1 as a mean� ot fo.cllltatlng the until It 111 known who.t aupport .mont 11 Initiating on Aug 1 and I m1ment to otilcllll Hungo.rlan 11tJ\· j �f�e1r ted''t'�n�tlol�h of h�•tflltlee� we may count upon from the Al· :'In the Interest of which' the Usli<il, which e•t!mA� all ;flun- I 11 ove a w care u man- lied Powcra, thor• la an urgent United States Goyemment la re-: 
�rio.n war damages attl'lbu!cd . �omen�i �ungaey �lght hav• nece11lty that the Allied Powcrt . l tumlDI' to Hungary monetaey · to Germana and Itallan1, lncfud· 1 • en �I • o pay ,000,000 In ahould aend a commlulon which; . �old reported . to be ftl\lecl at l in"' clHtnlctlon withil'! Jb.e c:oun- , .re,p
a
'Ilradl
o
dne, l t . " .wltjJ_tb--.e®."raUQn .ot U.e .Uun-..,abo• ..
. .., ooo· 000 ,. · � · ... - · - - . no oreaee that Hun. 1 "" -· • • • • • •• 
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(Document No. 7) 
Soviet Reply to the . Accusations of the U . s . 7 
(2) Note from the Vice Minister f<>r Foreign Af!airs·. of the Union of 
Souiet Socialist Republics '(Dekanono:ou). to the United State• 
Ambassador to the. Unicm of Souiet Socialist Republics (Smith)i 
July 21, 1946.l · . . . · . . . : 
. . . In connection with your Je_tter of July 22, 1!>46 addressed to �finister' 
· of Foreign Affairs V. M.- Molotov regarding the economic situation of 
1 Hungary p.nd the payincnt by ·Hungary of reparations to the Sovi�t 
· Union, I consider it 1,ccessary to draw your attention to the fact that 
' the data' cit.eel in your letter and the. conclusions which you draw on the . basis of this dab do not correspond to reality. 
. . 
. : 
In your· �ettcr you maintain that the d�ffict.t1ties observed a�· present, 
in the economic life.of Hungary are allegedly the result 9( the fact=that· 
the-bulk of the current production of Hungarian industry is being con-1 
snmcd by reparations "and by the satisfaction of other demands, � you . .. 
express it, of the occupying power. You assert, moreover, that rcp�ra• 
tions consume from 80-00 percent of the production of heavy industry�'. 
including the production of iron, metal and machines. You ndd, that,' 
mong}ver, from the supplies of the urban population the Red Army 
allegedly received from Hungary during the first months of 1945 "al· 
most nil the supplies or meat,. one sixth of the wheat and.rye, more than 
Qne quarter of the. vegetables, aJmost three quarters or the supply of_, 
Jard," etc., and that thus reparations paid by Hungary, on the one hand,, 
and the above withdrawals for the supply or the Red Army on the other . , 
hand, are the cause of the grievous economic situation of H!.1,-igary.; 
1Thc unfoundedncss of such an assertion cnnnot fail to strike any·un-
' · . . · . : .
. . 
. prcjudiced person, particularly if one fa�cs into nccount the fact that tho. 
'entire sum or Hungnrian reparations deliveries to the Soviet Union for· 
: Hl45 did not exceed $10,000,000, that is, constitutes a quite insignificant 
J : ·sum. This fact alone is suffic�ent to dcmonstrnte the complete lack· of '. 
i 
. foundation of the. assertion in yo�r. letter thnt.··the bulk or Hungarian I 
· productio� is being cons�med by reparations. · . . . ,., j The extbnt or the unfoundedncss· of these ti..c;:;ertions iS apparent from I · ·the. fact that the Hungnrinn Government addl'C8Sing on May. 28 or this · 
year,· a rcque5t to the Soviet Government· to fix a plan ·ror reparations 
deliveries for 1946-53 itsclC fixed the amount of these de1ivorjcs for 1946 '. 
�-.. ���'�'�· . .. �nd�r 1t�csc �i1::
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Raymond Dennet and Robert Turner . eds • •  Documents on 
American Foreign Relations, Vol. VIII . (Princeton. New Jerseya 
Princeton Unive.raity Press. 1946) • pp. 1 JJ2-J.)4. 
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thnt th<' l'<'pnrntions ohli�ntions o( Jlnngnry nre cxCCMive, "cruAhing" 
nnd �o on i:-1 th•prh·<'d o( nny foundation. · · The 80\'i(•t. Gon-rnmcnt, taking into nccotmt the economic difficulties ; 
of Ilungnry, nll'('ndy n Y<':lr ngo made con�i<l<'rnhlc conc<'l'.<:iona to the , 
· Hnngarbn G(n·ernment, <'Xtcnding the term o( r<'rmrntion deliveries to 
<'i�ht. Y<'nrs Crom six years, prcsrribcd by the Mrnistice agreement. The·; 
So,·i<'t Go\'crnmcnt fully sath:fiC'd nlso the nbovc requcat o( the Hun- '. 
gari:ln G°'•ernment for further conccssio!'ls to Hungnry rcgnrding repara- ! 
tions, Cully ncc<'pting the plan' proposed by the Ilungnrian Government · 
on !\foy 2S for further rcpnrat.ions dclivcric.'3 to. the Soviet Union. : 
Ac<'ording to this plan, reparations deliveries for 1946 arc fixed nt a sum,. 
o'f �21,S00,000 ; for 1947, 23,000,000 ; for H>48, 25,000,000; for 1049-53;i 
30,000,000 anm1nlly. At the snme time the SoYict Government released , · 
Hungary from p:tymcnt of a. fine of 6,000, 00 for non-f ulfillmcnt on time ·. 
of reparntions de lh'erics in the first year in which the reparations agree-
. mcnt wns in force. To' the :i.bove must be added, that nccording to the ! 
So,;et-Hungarbn trade ngrccment, Hungary received from the Soviet 
Union in the pn.st year 1945, goods to the amount o( $6,300,000, while 
nt the snme time Hungary itself delivered to the Soviet Union goods only 
' to the amount o( $26,600. II,. thus, there nre taken into account good! 
' recci\rcd by Hungary from the Soviet Union to the vhlue o( 6,300,000, 
then, in the account, it turns out that all Hungarian dcliverica for the , 
Soviet Union do not exceed $3,i00,000. . , 
In your letter you state that the American Government agreeing to � 
the conditions of the annistice "ith Hungary did not foresee that 11 the � 
productive power o( Hung:i.ry and its national income would be reduced \ 
by half or even more in the course o( a Ccw months and that, for example, 1 
reparations subject to payment by Hungary in 1945 would equal 24 . 
percent of the national income." For a statement of this sort there are :· 
no foundations of reality. The above cited data prove fully convincingly 1 
that the exten.t of reparations pointed out in your letter, subject to ; 
· de�ivery by Hungary in 1945 to no extent correspond to the real scope of 
:.these deliveries, constituting an entirely insignificant amount. , 
'This is the real state of affairs regarding taking of reparations from , 
· Hungary for the benefit of the Soviet Union.. . · · 
·' . 'The situation also is the same with regard to the data on the supplying· . 
the Red Army at the expense of the Hungarian economy cited in your . 
letter, particularly the data regarding wheat, rye, oats, meats, etc. 
All these data are entirely incorrect. In rcnlity the Soviet forces received 
not more than three percent o( the total amount of these cultures of the. · 
1!>45 harvc.c;t and of fats not more than eight percent by head o( swine. · 
The Hungnrian Government did naJ; make deliveries of industrial 
products for the Red Army, with exception of fuel and o. certain amo�t: 1 
of commic;sary supplies. _ . · ' . . l 
Citing ilc; data, the Government of the U. S. made use o( <:Icarly in:-;l 
,correct information which can only create conCusion. . I 
• It is impossible not to note the quite arbitrary cha.rncterizntion con­
tained in your letter o( the economic liluation of Hungary. The data a' 1 
. the dispo61ll oI the Soviet Govetnmcnt do riot confirm this cha��� .• 
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tion. In rcnlity the cnpacity of the induHtrinl cutcrpri;c., of II�ngl\ry 
. curtnilcJ n.s the result of the war to 60 percent of the prewnr level, had by 
the miJ<lle of July I 946 risen to 70-85 percent in the production of pig 
iron, steel, rolled metnl and machine building o.nd to 85-90 percent in : 
· light industry. · IC the .output of industrial production in Hungary in . 
1915 constituted 30-35 percent of the prcwnr level at the prc.o;cnt time, . 
the output. of production has been brought to 60 percent of the prewar 
level. Thus, dC8pitc the existing difficultic.,, Hungo.ry, since the termina.-
. tion of the war, hn.s increased the productive cnpo.c:ity of its induHtry by 
20-25 percent and by 25-30 percent the output of induKtrial production. 
111csc successes have been nchieved despite the fact that the Germans 
. and the followers of Szal!:hai carried off to Germo.ny a lo.rge quo.ntity ol 
· the most valnnble industrial equipment and ro.w mo.terio.l' which, like 
the removed Hungarian gold, fell into the ho.n<ls of the American Gov­
ernment and to the present time has still not been returned to Hungo.ry.� 
Such n situation, deriving fr'Om the policy carried out by the American• 
authorities creates extremely difficult economic conditions for .11ungary .1 
and is in complete contradictio11 with the statements of the U. S. Gov-· 
. .  ernment regarding the ncc�<sity of o.ccclerating the economic rcs.toro.­
tion of Hungary. In your letter of July 22 it is stnted tho.t the informo.- · 
tion regarding the amount of Hungarian property co.rried off by the. 
Germans o.nd the followers of Szalshni which is alreo.<ly for the second. 
year in the American zone of occupation is exnggero.ted. But the Ameri-· 
can Government, :is you state, is still prepnring lists of Hungarian · 
property plundered and carried away to Germ4ny and Austria and haa 
still not determined the Ynlue of this property. The Hungarian Prime 
Minister Ferenc Nagy in his statement in Parliament on February 7 of 
the present year declared that the Hungnrio.n Government hnd registered 
the property located in the .American zone of occupation of Germany and· 
Austria at more than 2 billion. Besides this, the Hungarian Prime 
Minister added that a.s the property which had been carried away came 
to light this sum �vo�ld reach about 3 billion. TI1is fully corresponds to 
the figure of 3 million indicated in the note of the Soviet Government of 
April 21, 1946. 
Speaking of the ceonom.ic situation of Hungary, it is impossible n9t 
to note that despite the difficulties existing in this sphere, a number of 
new factory shops and plants have also been restored and reequipped. 
It is worth noting suclr facts. as the constru'ction of a new plant for the · 
production of machine too�s, the new "Rcniks Electric Resistance Plant", 
and a number of shops for the production of automobile pistons, the re- '  
construction of the tractor shop }. n  the "Hofok-strnns" plant, the restora:. . 
tion and reequipping of various shops ih �he '� Rossman ", " I<ozma ", and 
1 other plants. The exp:msion of 'the aluminum rolling and wares plant, 
large scale work on the rec:quippirig. of. the 11Hnns" electro mechanical 
plant. All these fac·ts· indicate that the process· of the restoration of in- 1 
· dustry is proceeding in Hungaf'i and that the repo.rntions obligations in 
Hungary arc in no way hindering this process. In the snme ·way is re-
' f uted the assertion con ta hied in your letter that the bulk of Hungnrian ' . l
.
Pr<><;luction of current output is' allegedly being consu�ed by �paro.tions 
· 
. 
.' nnd tlint nothing n'nlhins for the restoration of Hungarian economy �nd 
· 
for the int('n1nl nN.'ds .of Hungnry. Such nn nsscrtion is refuted also by 
thC' foct that during the St'COlld half o( 1945 almost 50 percent of the, 
entiro rollro mctnl output went to the needs of Hung:iri:in economy. . 
In your IC'ttcr' of July 22 there is contninc-d t� enl.irely incorrect �r- . 
�ion th�t the. SoYiet .
nuthori�ics have nllc-gedly removed in Hungary '.· 
mdu$tr1:1l eqmpment m the nmount of $124,000,000. Such ·statements 
do not h:i.,·e nuy foundation nnd only elicit surprise with regard to the 
sour<'<'� of the iufonnation "·hich h:is been utilized in this connection. 
c1'11c Soviet forces removed from Hungary as trophy equipment certain 
1'militnry ent�rpriscs of B vnlue not exceeding $11,000,000. · 
'With regard to the proposal of the American Government that the 
rcpl'('�nt.:ttives of the Soviet Union, U. S. nnd Great Britain in the Con- ' 
trol Com�i..�ion jointly work out a plan for the economic restoration of . 
Hungary, the Soviet Government as before, considera this proposal not .• 
Aeccpt.'\ble in:ismuch as was pointed out in the letter of tho Ministry °'" : 
.foreign Affairs of April 21, the working of such a plan belongs exclusively· · tC? the competence of the Hungarian Qovernment. . .  '. · . .. · . · . · . · : · 
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(Document No.  8) 
u.s. Note Regarding Politigal Developments 
in Hungary 
. -
.Text of New U. S. Note on Hungary 
! ll°L\Sfll:-0.GTO�', March lT IJI'I 
,-Tlr1• Stntc Drpo1·t111c11t p11bli.�l1rd 
·ro11i,f'flrt th1: foll<>ll'ill!I tr.:ct of th.c 
• .�crond ]lrotcst nd1frc311cd by Brig. 11Gt11. Gt'Ol"flO H. 1''rc11111. American 
. rrprarutntlun in tlio Allied Con­�tml Ce>1111111.�.�ion for Htmgary,. to 
Lir.11t. Gm. V, P. Svirldov .R1111alan 
·n�ting chairman of the 
' conuni.t-
�011: . 
r hnvo tho honor to o.clmowl­
edi:-o tho rC\cclpt of your commu­
nlcntlon or Mnrch 8, 10"7, In reply 
to tho poto which I addreiosed to 
· you on Mr\l'ch 51 1M7, cnnccrnlng­
. pollticnl dovelopmcnts In Hungo.ry 
. and on lnatructions from my Gov-
ernment, to traniomlt the follow­
. lnl) comment ot the United Statoa 
Government thereon. 
· Tho United States Government 
. h11.11 c1u-0Cully considered the So­
viet views •ct forth In your com­
munlco.tlon. · However, it la noted 
that your"lttter !alls to -take a.c-. 
count or .•.t:he following clrcum-
11tances alluded to In my note of ¥arch 5. 
People's Court Scored 
. (1) Invcsti�a.tlon of the plot 
: 11.gainst the stn.te has to do.te been 
conducted only by Communist­
dominated police organs. While 
tho Smn.llholdcl's' party haa en· 
dcavored to obta.in agreement to 
, a po.rllamentary Investigation, on 
an !ntel'-party baala, oC allega· 
j tion• concerning the Involvement 
, In th• coiaplracy of rnembera of 
tho Nntlonnl Ai:11cnibly, tho Con\• 
m11nl11ta hnve declined to Accept 
such ·" Jlroccdu1·c ; 
(2) Ot four rcrl'cscntntlvcs ot 
polltlcnl pRrtlcs who, with " jul'lst 
chnlrmnn, cnmprl11e the People's 
Court, which Is now conducting 
trlnls of certa.lil lndlvlclunls a.I· 
lcs:-cd . to hl\VO been Involved ln 
this plot, three l\re roprcscnta• 
tlvea of parties o.llgncd In a ml· 
norlty bloc na ngalnat ono ao� 
lcctcd by tho ml\jorlly Small· 
holders; • · 
(3) Concerning the l\rtest of 
Bell\ Kovl\cs. l\ltho\lgh normnl l\T• 
rests by occupation force• !or the 
purpose of maintaining - tho ac· 
curlty of such forces ·could not 
of course bo objected to on the 
grounds of unwa.rrantcd Inter· 
vcntlon, (he a.rrcat of Mr. Ko­
vacs by tho Soviet authority ca.n· 
not, on the !ace of It, b� con· 
aidcred of auch & nature. It Is 
noted tha.t the arrest was not 
made until the Hungarian Com· 
munlst party had, without avail, 
retorted to numeroua atratagcma 
to obtain the waiver of Mr. Ko­
vacs' parliamentary Immunity 
and his arrest by the politic.al 
police. D\!l'ing that period thore 
was no Indication that he might 
be auspected of actlvltlea agaJnat 
the Soviet. occupatlqn fo.rce1. 
Attempt to Selu Power Seen 
In "the clrcum1t.ancea, the United 
States Govemment cannot, ln 
�e light of all the lnCormaUon 
available, ·&pee with the In-. 
. ; . . 
. . . · 
to1·prl!tntlon. nt Hungnrlnn }'olltl· 
cnl davr.Jnpn1cnt11 contnfnl!d In 
ynur communlcnllon undr.r ar ... 
knowlr.d�mcnt. It 11cr.m1 clcnr to I 
tho United Sto.tc11 GovcrnmP.nl 
thnt minority gro11p11 unrll!r tho " 
lcndcm1hlp ot tho Hunrrnrlnn Com· ! 
munlst po.rty nro' ntlomptlng to : 
11ch:o pow<!r through rc11ort to · 
cxtracon11tltutlonat tnr.tlca. . 
In the nplnl�n ot the United 
StntC!s, thla ck rly thrcatcn11 tho ' 
contlnuo.nco o democracy In . 
Huns:o.ry. In 1 ch " sltu:ttlon, I 
tho United Stii.I 11 Government 
con11ldcrs that the powcra 1d;:;nn.- • 
tory to the agreement coneludcd : 
at Yo.lta. In regal'd to llbcrll.lcd : 
Europe aro obligated to under· · 
tako concerted" action to l nvc!'ltl• ; 
gato politico.I condition• In Hun· • 
l)ary. Tho need !or such consul- · 
to.lion and lnvcstll)atlon becomes 
"II tho moro Imperative because 
of tho !act that there Is a dla­
agrecmcnt between the Soviet and • 
United States Governments on a 
maUer of so basic Importance to 
. Hungary, , • 
In my Government's view It ' 
cannot be contended that such an i 
Investigation would, as you sug. 
gest, Improperly Impair the legal 
right• of tho Hungarian.courts or 
that my Government'• concern . 
with regard to· the case of Bela ! 
Kovacs constitutes an ln!rlnge· 
ment of the right of the Soviet oc-­
cupa.tlon authorities to take rea­
sonable meuurH for the mainte­
nance of the HCUri� of the oo- : 
cnlpaUon force.. " • : • I 
. .  
(Document No.  9) 
United States-Hungarian Prewar 
B ila Leral Treatios9 
1 (1) Note from tl1c Goa:er1ime11l of tire Unitetl State• ,,;·11,c GovernmcJ!l 
of llmrgnry ICcgnrtling Prcumr lJilaternl Trcntic• and Otlrcr Inter· 
nntio11al ln�tr11111c11l• 1ci11, llm1gary.to be Kept in Force or Re11l11cd, 
Jtlnrc1' 9,1948.1 . : " · . 
I have the honor to refer to the.Treaty of. J>ence with Hungary, signed at 
Paris February 10, 1947, which came into force, i� accordance with the pro� 
visions of article 42 t11creQf, on Septembcr, 15, 1947 upon the deposit of in-· 
· struments of ratification by the Union of Soviet �ocialist Republics, the United: 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northez:n Ireland, arid the United States of 
-America. Article 10 of_ the :X-reaty of �eace'reads as f�llows: 
. 
· 1. Ench Allied or Associnted Pow'er will notify Hungary, 'within a period of 
six months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, which of its pre­wnr bilateral treaties wi.th Hungnry .it desires to keep in force or revive. Any, 
provisions not in conformity with. the present Treaty shall, however, be de­leted from the above-mentioned treaties. 
2. All such treaties so notified shall be registered with the Secretariat of the, 
United Nations in accordance with Ar ticle 102 of the Chuter of the United 
Nations. ·. . . . 3. All suc'h treaties not so notified shall be regarded as abrogated·. . . . ! 
I have the honor, by direction of the Government of the United'States of 
�mcrica and on its behalf, to notify the Hungarian Government, in accordance: . 
• with the provision of the Treaty of �eace quoted above, that th� Govemrpent · 
i of the United States of America desire$ to keep in force or revive 'th� (allow· · 
ing pre-war bilateral treaties and other international agreements with Hun-• 
gary: .' . 
. . 
' . r- . .  
-.<: :· -. . 
! Ar bitfation · · · · • · 
1. Arb
.
itration treaty. Signed at Washington January 26; 1929. Ratified by the' 
.U nited States February 28, 1929. Ratified b)" Hungary July 6, 1929. RatiAcations' exchanged at Washington July 24, 1929. Effective July 24, 1929. [Treaty Series: 
112 -
797; 46 Stat. 2349.) . · · : 
1Commerce 'l. · · ·· · ;. 
: 2. Treaty of friendship, co�merce and' consular rights, and exchn·�ges of notes.'' .  
Signed at Washington June .24, 1925. Ratified by the United States June 16, 1926 . . " 
Ratified by Hungary April 1, 1926. Rati6cations exchnnged at Buda{>Cst Se,Pte_mber 4, 1926. £Elective October 4, 1926. [Treaty Series 748, 44 Stat. 2441) . '. · · .· 
'conciliation '=·� .
· 
. 
1 3. Conciliation treaty. ·Signed at Washington Janµnry 26, 1929. RatiA�d by th�· ·· '. .· · . /United States February 28;1929. �ati6ed by Hungary July 8, 19
.
�
:
·
�
Ra�� · . 
l-- �  .. -��- p,..�� .191!-��_!!._1_941 ....... .:.... . . . 
. 
. . 
: . . :· . 
. . 
. . 
. \ ·. 
9oenn�t and. Turn�r ,  .Qll. cit. " ,  Vol . x ,  (Princ.eto� ; New 
Jersey a· Princeton Ul"l:iversi ty. Press , 1949) , pp . 640-641. · 
; . 
; ' 
. - :. 
. .  
.. 
: . . . 
. . . . .. . 
cxch:mgc<l nt Wnshi�gton July 24, ·1929. Effective July 24, 1929. [Treaty Series 
798; 46 Stat. 2353] · 
· Com1rigl1t . . i 
· 4. Copyright convention. Signed at .Dudapcst Jnnunry 30, 1912. Ratified by the'. 
. United States July 31, HH2. Hntificd by Hungary August 11, 1012. l\atificatfons· 
: exchanged at Wnshington September 16, 1.912. EfTccUvo October 16, 1912. (Re· 
vived M11y 27, 1922) [Treaty Series 571; 37 Stat. 1631) • 
De.bt-F11nding 
. 
I 5. Dcbt-funcling ngrccment. Signed at Washington. April 25, 1924. Effective as 
of December 15, 1923. [Combined Annual Reports of World War Foreign Debt" 
Commis$iOn (1927) 132.) 
6.' Agreement modifying the debt-funding agreement of April 2.'), 1024 (Morato- . · rium). Signed at Washington May 27, 1932. Effective as of July 1, 1931. [Printed by' · 
the Treasury Department 1932.J · · · 
Extradition . 
7. Treaty for the extradition of fugitives from justice. Signed at Washington July i 
3, 1850. Ratified by the United States ·December 12, 1856. Ratified by Austria·� 
Huognry November 16, 1856. Ratifications exchanged December 13, 1856. Effective 
December 13, 1850. (Revived May 27, la22.) [Treaty Series 9; 11 Stat. 691 and 18 : 
.Stat. 20} . 
Pa1111ort Visa Fee& 
8. Reciprocal arrangement for temporary waiver of visitors' visa fees. Signed. , 
April 6 and 21, 1936. Term extended to Mnrch 31, 1937, by notes ·exchanged at 1 
Budapest October 9 and 31, 1936. Term extended to September 30, 1937, by notes · 
exchanged at nudapest March 22 and 2.'l, 19:37. Term extended indefinitely by notes • 
exchanged at Dudnpes� August 18, September 21 and 23, 1937. {Not printed.] 
: Ponal · • . . 
1 9. Parcel post convention. Signed at Budapest July 3, 1928 and at Washington 
i August 16, 1928. Rati.Jied by the United States August 21, 1928. (Post Office De·. : . partment print.) . . 
I 10. Agreement for collect·on-delivery service. Signed at Budapest December 15, 
; 1930 and at Washington January 15. 1931. Rati.lled by the United States January ' j 21, 1931. (Post Office Department print; 46 Stat. 2894) · . . 
I 11. Convention for exchange of money orders. Signed at Washington April 3,) 1922 and at Budapest May 6, 1922. Effective June 15, 1922. (Not printed.) · . . - . . . 
. Relatioru . 
; 12. Treaty establishing friendly: relatipns. Signed at Budnpest Aug�st 29, 1921. ' Ratified by the United States October 21, 1921. Rati.6ed by Hungnry December 12, : 
� 1921. Ratifications exchanged nt Budapest December 11, 1921. Effective December ' 
: 17, 1921. (Treaty Series 660; 42 Stat. 1951.) , 
, This noti6cation will be deemed to be eff ecth·e on the date of the present 
f • • • •DOte. _ ' 
: It is understood, of course, that either of the two Governments may propose 
· re�ions in any of the treaties or other agreements mentioned in the nbo,·e · 
. list. 
· 
Further, it shall be understood that any of the provisions in tl1t' treaties 
· and other ngrcemcnts listed in this notification wl�ch may be. found in par· • 
) ticular circumstances to be not in conformity with the Treaty of Peace shall . 
• be considered to have bc:en deleted so for 11.s application of the Treaty of Peace . 
� is involved but shall be regarded as being in full force and eHect with respect : ; to �tters not covered by the latter treaty. . . 
. 
· 
· ! 
-- ·- - - - · - - - .  -- -·- · ---- ·--· - -
-
·
" :. 
· . 
(Document No � 10) 
Search for a B i 7partisn F o rei"n p ] "  A 10 i.., o . . 1 cy e;r0�ment 
. (2) 1.cllcr from tire S�r.'rct�ry of Stnle (ilfor1/1nllj io tlrp C/,"airman �J 
tl1c Commillce 011 Foreign Affnir1 o/ tlic llorue o/ Reprc1entati"e'I (Eato1&), Fcl1ruary 3, 1947.1 . I 
'. I have your letter of Janu�ry 29. advising me of the adoption by the Com�; . 
, mittce on Foreign Affairs ot the resolution, a copy of which accompanies yout­
, letter. TI1e rcsolutiop invites the Secretary of State to cooperate with the Com.' . 
'.mittce in various 'respects so ns to aid the Committee in the formulation arid) ' 
. ' 
• De�t OI State Prcu �eleue 92. February 4, 19471 Departmeot o1 St1to,' Bulkfl1to XVI., p. 183, t 
'. .) 
fc"xt-Cution of ·a bi-partisan forcib'll policy and also to aid the Committee in co-i 
:opNating with the Prcsid<'nt and myself in tlu� discharge of our r<>sponsibili­ti<'s. The resolution also states the desire �nd purpose of the Committee to dis· 
charge its obligations to the people and .to the House of Representatives of 
recommending legislative action only after fuU knowledge of the facts andj 
policies involved. · 
1 • Let me say immediately that I am glad to accept the iAvitation of the Com·· 
mittee and that I am in sympathy with the desires evidenced by the r�solu­
tio.n and your letter to further mutual cooperation 'between the Committee 
: and the Department of State in the furtherance of a bi-partisan foreign palicy, 
and to assist.in fol6lling our respective responsibilities t� the people aQ4 their 
Representatives. You will appreciate that it would not be appropriate for me 
. to co�ment upon the portions of the resolution which are concerned with the 
·relationship between the Committee on Foreign Affairs and other committees . . of the House of Representatives. Perhaps it is not inappropriate, however, for 
:me to say that the Department of State is in agreement with the desirability 
lof avoiding unnecessary duplication of studies and hearings. . 
·
. 
� I wish to thank you for the expressions in the resolution of the desire and . . 
:purpose of the Committee to cooperate to the fullest extent with the President 
and myself. On behalf of the President and myself, we fully reciprocate. I am: 
confident :ve can work out the details satisfactorily. . . · . 
· . 
i The report of the subcommittee referred to in your presentation of the �eso-· 
•lution to the House on January 29, 1947, recognizes the constitutional respon·� 
sibilities with respect to the conduct of foreign affairs. Without any deroga· � 
ition from these respansibilities, .I am confident that. they can be best ful8:11ed: '. JEr the coo�ration _E� in the resolution of your Committ�'.�.:· .. : .�'. ... :_�.�: 
.. 
i o· · · Dennet and Tu�ner ,  .Qll• cit . , Vol .  IX , pp. 22-23. 
·.'· 
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(Document No • . 11) · 
Sovie� Violations of Treaty ·obligations11 
Document Submitted ]2x the Department of 
S tate to the Senate Foreign Relations Committe e ,·. 
June £71�* 
TEXT OF RESOLUTION 
( S .  Res.  213 , ?Oth· Cori�. , 2d sess) 
Whereis the President -0f the United States 
declared in hi's addr.ess to the Congress on March 
1 7 ,  194 8 ,  that one nation has "persistently 
ignored and ·violated" agreements which ' " could · 
have" furnished a basis for a .just peace ; and 
Whereas such violations have · been proclaimed 
the cause for international disturbances which 
have led to the reque'sted . consfderation by this 
Congress of drastic l·e,gislation affecting the 
peoples of this Na�i9ri 1 Therefore be it 
Resol�ed,  That the. President of ' the United 
States be , and i s  h.ereby ,. requested to furnish 
to the Congress full and complete information 
on the specific violations of agreements by the 
nation r�ferred to in the President ' s  address 
on March 17 , 1948 , before the Congres� a . • •. • 
' 
Document Submitted by the Department of �tate 
:. 
11Ibid . , pp . 919-933. 
· . 
. · . 
·, 
• I . 
. .  
*Senate Report N o .  1440 , 80th Congress , 2d session, 
J une 2 ,  1948. 
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111. EAsTEUN AND SouTnE.\STEnN EunoPJC 
· POLAND 
"This Polish Pa·o,·igionnl GoY- On ·scvera.l oc<'nsion� prior to the 
crnnH•nt. of N n.t.ionnl Unity shnll elections n.1i<l f�llowing p<'rsistcnt 
be J>lcdgcd to the holding of frcn reports of r<'prchensible met.hods n.nd 1111fcttcrcd elections n.s soon ns cinploycc\ by the Government 
· pos:'ible on the basis of univcrsnl · ngninst the democratic opposition, 
. sufTrnge n.nd secret ballot . .  In these this Government remincled tho 
dcctions n.11 dcmocrntic n.nd anti- Polish Provisional Government of. 
N'nzi pnrties·shn.11 hnve the right to . its obligations under tho Y nltn. nnd· 
tn.ke JHl.rt nnd to p1it forwn.r<l cnn<li- Potsdam agreements and wn.sj 
: dat<'s" (Crimcn:n Conference, J4'eb- joi!'l�d . on these occasions b,y thoi 
; n111.ry 12, 1945). · n1·1t1sh Government. On Jnnn-j "  
· "'l'hl• thr<.'c powers note thnt t.he nry 5, 1947, the Dt•itish n.n<l Soviet1 
Polish Provisional Government in Governmeut.s were o.ske<l to n.sso-1 
n.ccorclnnce with tho decisions of cintc themselves wit.h this Gov­
' t.he Crimen Conference has ogree<l ernment in nppronching the Poles: 
I to the holding of free o.nd unfct- on this subject, o.n<l tho British ' 
, tercel elections o.s soon ns possible Govcmmcnt mo.de similar repro-! 
' on tho bnsis o( universnl sulTrngc sentn.tions to the Soviet Govern-· 
! o.nd secret bnllot in which nil dem- ment reiterating the request tho.ti 
! cratic nnd nnti-?-4 o.:r.i parties shnll the Soviet Government suppor�i 
. hn.vo tho right to to.kc po.rt and to the British n.nd Amcricnn Govern-I 
· 1?.Ut forward candidate& • •. .,. ments in co.Hing for n. strict lulfill-! · (Potsdam agreement, August 2, ment of Pola.nd's obligations. Thot '.1946). Soviet Government refused to pu-1 
1 .  
1· 
• ' " "I·. 
i .�: · ...... . . . ; ;.. . . ... ' � .  
I 
. . . . .  
t• · il"! ... . . 
ticipo.to in tho proposed o.pproacl\ to the Polish Government. ·The· 
Viol.ationa 
British and American representa­
tions were summarily rejected by 
the Polish Government as "undue. 
interference" in the in'ternal affairs' 
of Poland. . 
or tho 444 deputies elected to 
the parliament in the elections of 
J o.nuary 19, . 194 7, the Polish 
Peasant Party (reliably reported 
to represent a large majority ot 
the population) ()btairied only 28; 
places, thus · demonatre.ting thei 
--- .....---�-,,.--..---·- j�_#iciency wi�ch the_ &O!�� 
, ·.'· 
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'In. EA&Tt.:nN AND SouTm:AsTt:nN Eunon:-Continued 
POLAND-continued 
Agreemcmu Vi()la(ioM 
mcnt hnd pn•pnrcd the ground. 
On .Janunry 2�, the Dcpo.rl mcnt ·, 
o( · Stntc issued a rdensc to tho ! 
press stnting f.ho.t rcpo1·t!! received ; 
from our l�mbo.ssy m Polnnd im- · 
mcdiatelv pl'ior lo o.nd subsequent ; 
to the elections, bnscd upon tho ' 
obscrrntions of American officials, � 
confirmed thn fcnrs which this 1 
Government had expressed that : 
the election would not be free. . 
HUNGARY 
: 1 .  Undt-r tho nrmistico ngrcc- 1.  Tho U. S. S. R. represent&- : · 
· mcnt &n .Allied Cont.rot Comfl\is,o tive. on the ACC for Hungary · sion w·:l..S estnl>lishM under . tho· consistently acted unilo.tcra.Jly in ;_ 
chl\irmt\?;ship of the U. S. $. R . .. the nnme or tho ACC without, · 
1 nn<l wid1 pnrticip1Ltion of tho consulto.tion with or notice to. his 
jUnitcd .$u1tcs niul United King- United Stn.tcs n.rnl United King­
i dom (Mi!1istfoo ngrcf!ment, Jn.Ji-· don� coJlcn.gues, thus dc�ying th�� 
uary 194.,, art. 18 n._nd �nnC'X F)� n,n�:·sef!l�lnncc o( effective pnrtic1-. 
· �· . : · .. pl\tlon. m ·tho work o( tho .ACC. .: . 2. The thrc<: hcn:cJ�. of the Otjv- . · 2* Gontro.ry to Urn Y n.ltl\ ngr.ee­
crnnll'nts of tho· Umon or Soviet Jll<'nt; tho U . . S. S. R., net.mg 
.Socinli;;t Republics, the United tln·ough the Hungnl'io.n Commu­
iStntes, nnd United Kingdom de." nist Pm·ty nnd its own ngmcics nnd : 
clnrcd tb1?ir mutun.l· ngreemcrit to n.rmed forces in Hungn.ry, far · 
concert durin� t.11c tcmpornry pc- from concerting its policy toward } 
1riod or instnbility in lihcrn.ted nssisting 'the lhmgo.rin.n people to ; 
1Europc the policies of their three soh•e their problems by democrii.tic ' ·:Governments in .n.ssisting tho mcnns, unilntcrnlly su.b.,·crted the � 
:peoples ·Iibern.tcd from tho doni- will -0f the Hun�nrinn · people to · 
:mn.tion or x nzi Oermnny o.nd tho totnlitnrinnism m negntion of­
.peoples of tho former Axis sntellitc funclnmcntnl freedoms. For ex;- · 
:eta.t.cs of Europe to solve by nmplo- . 
'democn1tic . menns their· pressing (1) General s,·iridov, Depu�y ; 
.politicnl and economic problems Soviet Chnirmnn o( .the ACC, 
·(Yalta agre�mont, February 1045). without consulting tho United · 
; Stntcs nnd United lGng�fom ACC 1 
· reprcscntntives, dissolved Catholio .1 
.f youth oq:nnizn.tions, Juno 19·t6. ! : . .. (2) SoYict armed forces arrested ; 
: . / .· Bela Kovn.cs, member of Parlio.-
1 .  ment and former secretary general · of Smallhold�ra Party, lt'ebruary ! . .. l 1947. . . :. · .· 
. .. 
l . _____ ------- .... I , •  . ' 
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III. EAeTEnif AND SouTREA&TE�M Eunor�.::..Coniiri�od 
·KU�O�RT�ntinuod·. 
J• • •  
·�rumtt&U 
. ! 
, I 
Violaliom I 
f. 
· 
· (3) Gencrnl Sviridov·· prceipi-
t.ated a politico.I crisis ennbling the 
CQmmunist minorit,Y to lorco the 
resignation of Primo Minister· 
Nngy, l\foy-June 1047. . (4) Tho Sovi£� Government ro-1 
Cused repented United Stntcs pro-: 
posnls thnt it join in trip1trtito 
examination of Ilungary's econ· 
omic situnj.ion with a view to 
assisting Illungnry to solve ita 1 
pr<'ssing economic problems, 1046. ' 
(5) Discriminatory economic I 
agrecmcnt.s were forced upon Hun· , . 
gnry, including tho estnblishmcn\ 
or joint Soviet-Iluntarinn com­
pnmcs, 1945-4 7, 
(O) The Soviet AOC contended ; 
that only tho occupo.tionnl forces 1 
who control tho airfields cnn per· 
mit the Ilu11gnrinn Government to . 
nr�otinto nir agreements. Not,.. f 
withst.nncling, the Soviet.it formed 
a Hungnrinn-Soviet civil nir trans- i 
port compnny. 'fho Soviets also 1 
permitted the Ilungnrian Govern- l 
ment to negotiate a{trecment.� with· I 
certain othcrcountrrns but not with . 1  
, the United St.ates or Britain. . 3. Upon the cessation or hos- 3. ·Despite repre.tcd . requests, 
. tilities, it was agreed at Potsdam the U. S. S. R. declined to discuss 
· that the United States, United t.he re\'ision or procedures for the · · 
1 Kingdom and Union or Soviet ACC's as �greed at Potsdam. · 
:Socin.1ist Republics would consult" Instead, the U. S. S. R. continued · · 
with a vie\v to revising the pro- to net unilnternlly in t.l1e nnme ol . cedures of the ·Allied Control the ACC's in matters of substance . 
Commissions for Rumn.nia, Bul- without consultation with, or no- : 
gnria, al"!d Hungary to provide for tice to, the United States and ; · 
1 elTectivc participation by tho Uni- United Kingdom members. For : 
tcd States and United Kingdom in . example- I 
I
, the work of those bodies (Potsdam (1) Instructions wcro issued by : 
protocol XI, August 1945).. · tho Soviet High Command re-· . . . garding the size or tho llungnrinn · · · ·Army without consulting t.he Drit-. . .. 
' .. 
'·. <': ish or United States represent&• . 
� ·  
.. tivea. 
I . (2) The SOviet deputy:_chairman · L:_. -·· ..::.  ol the ACC ordered the Hungarian 
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HUHOART-continued 
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Gov-0rnmcnt without th6 knowl�. 
edge of ·the United ·states to "d is-: . 
band· certain Cl\tholic youth or-: 
gnnizations in June-July 1946. He: 
· also recommended dismissal ·of' 
certain Government officials. 
· · 
(3)' In tho fall of 1946 pennis-· 
sion was given by the Soviet ele-: 
· ment of tho Allied Control Com·; 
mission, without consulting the: 
Americans or "British, for the• 
formation o( tho.Hungarian Free-1 
dom Pl\rty • 
(4) Early in 1947 tho Hungarian· 
polico were lordered by tho Soviet 
cbl\irman in the namo -of the Allied 
Control Commission to suppress 
the publication of Cil\no's diary. 
(5) In. early 1947 tho SOviot 
chairman stated ho had personally given approval to tho IIungo.rio.n 
Government to resumo diplomatic 
relations with certain countries · 
in the no.mo of tho Allied Control ' 
Commission and ·without prior 
discussion with tho British or · 
Americans. ·-..... .. . · 
(6) In May 1947 theACC chair­
man refused the United· States · . permission to visit Hungarian ! 
Army units. 
· .: 
(7) The Soviets refused to per­
mit free movement of the Ameri- 1 
co.n element of the Allied Control · 
Commission. · · i (8) The Soviets ref used to trans- . 
. .mit. to the American rcpresen� 1 
· · tive do.ta on tho arrest by the · · · Soviet Army of Bela �ovaca. 
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(Doctiment No. 12) 
Representative Reed ' s  Comments on a Book by 
Ambassador Arthur Bliss Lane and 
an Article by G. E.  Sokolosky 
; •.· j " .  f '" ,. 
Aleo, we granted a t00:000.000 loan to tM . ( ' Polleb govemmen\. LAne wlt1raphe4 U..  �: HON• DANIEL A RrED · · ·· · · ·- ... · ' lltate Depnrtment: · , · · · • · • o • i As n pnrt or my ren\Brk3, I am 1na c.�-! "With the groate.t earnHtn ... of which I . i'. o" HEW YoaK : tni: an arUclo by Ocorgo E. BokolskJ ' am capnbto 1 ber &ht department not to ap- t·. JN THE HOUSE CF REPRESENTATIVZ8 : which appcnrcd In the Tlmca·Hcraldi I pron tht Hten11on of 11.17 credit. as Ullt . �· 
M d F b• 2 1948 i 1 Wednesday, February 11, lHB: f , time. When the torrorl1tre act1vlt1e1 of tb• � 011 av. c ruarv , . i l ancurHJ Jll)llce comt' to an end, when fro•·, 'i y k M B k ' I .. '1'H1t1t1: DATii . dow ,.,, the pre11 la roe�,,,�d. and wbtnr �-Mr. REED of New or • r. pea er, : (By 0N>fl0 •. BokolAkY) I j Anicrlc11n cm:i:en1 "" relc1.11cd from Poll•b. r· . . . I hope that. every American clUzcn will I : Ambl\l911<1or Arthur DllY Lnne h111 con•· prl11Un1--not unttl Ulen •hould United St.ate•. ,. . . . I i·ead I Saw Poland Betrayed. Ambos- 1 trlbutcd 1riunen1ely \o tho Amor1c1m poople! 1·  .publlo fund• b• usod to ... let tbt Polle� .. {,;;· ·. ,.: .sndor Arthur Bliss Lnne, the outhor ofj . by publllhlng 1 s11w Poland JJctrnyetl. ft II provlalonal t10nrnment of national unltJ. � ,-.. · " the book, has rendered a patriotic scrv• ' a report to 1111 fellow countrymen on hla Ho end• ht.e chapter: . '/ ! 1 tee to his countrymen. What. be has' j minion to Poland between UIU and ·106'1. I "Jn my oJftnlon, theee minor saln• 1D no f ·.f .· dlsclo11cd ou1tht to put the people on tho- 1 wonder whether tho tlUe 1hould not be: i w11y compeD111.te4 for the lou of preltta• 7 ·1 :· alert as to the danger Inherent. In our1' \ I e:iw l\merlca BetrnyocJ? for when the om·· 1utrorecl bJ the Untied Stat.el when •• · f ;·� '· Present forell:n policy, It Is a fore1Rn otnl• ot a countrJ fore111te ll• honor and. arant.od crodlte ip a government which bad '. .. : .. · · t I 1 I j tower lte . dlitnlty for wh11tenr oxpodlenc1.; aot kept lta word to u• and whlob MJll'Ald i !,: � , , policy that, 1 continued, w II J>llU[M:r ZC; do thq not dtnclOH that It• 1plrlt t.u been; on our lenl•ncy ., wnrrans tar proceedlOlr · l' · ·: : our �hr!Hy citizens, weaken our Re·, I follled lte uallonal morollty "bondonedt io evon arellter attacu on UI• tl'ftd� ol 1.;: , :· public, and cndanr.cr the very existence • Th6• tnl• really begin• at Tohran when, It.I own cit.17,,,na-and of our c1u11e1n1. · . l o '· ·  '. bl our free 1nstltuLlons. • I : orent Britain, which wont to w11r with Oor•1 The book ahould be rend bJ everr Amert-� ;:.\" ·· When existing undisclosed commit.• 1 mnny over Polnnd, obnndoued principle UJK>nf can In humllltJ 1md 1h11m1. • ! • · · men&..� are all made public, our hUmtlla·! demond of Stalin and "' the lnatlgutlon of 
I .-"Ko"iCjlf1m ro1>entlog to nio: 'Let UI wln . •  r •'; . tlon a., a nation wm be complete. Th•1 · Roosovelt. Ltlne anJe: · tho war with Germany nret.' Tho President · V ,1 � word "honor" i:. apparently unknown io "The dlacuealono at tho conforoneo nt Toh•· I let It be undcrotood th11t once Hitler waa de- · •·.;.. &be New Deal admlnJat.raUoo. � ran In . De.cembcr 1H3 among Uoocovelt, tented. be would know how to hnndl• Stalin.'' ' - - -· • -- - ··-· ·-- 1 Church Ill, nnd• Stalin ro1mt.ha11n�han �IDcpftrltal Stalin actunlly got a better deal In Polnnd l ;.:,· ·. ,'.·.1· .'·.· · eecrct • • oven w n • e ""' M • ; from ROOtJovolt nnd Chureblll Ulan he. got j • , ment of State th• truth of what happened . out ot Hitler by tho Btalln-Bltlor alllance. . ' .1 at thl• momentous conferenco waa probnblJ Appnrentty ROoeevclt wu eo 1ure that be • 1 • .. ·: ! not known. eacept perhaps to two or three. · could outros Stalin atter •the war that be ' · I,� .' (l · "Some ltey omclnla •. Indeed, who. h11d the 1 eomplacentlJ permitted Btlilln to ouUoz him ; . .  i • re1pbnslblllty ot making Important roc:om- . while tho war waa on. . I mendotlon• on matter• de1Ung with the Lane went to Poland u our Amba&aador " !. ·' ' 1 United Nation• organization, In convoraa- after the peace and after we :had recognlud ' · " l tlona with me ehortlJ after Prealdent Roose• thnt eountry•a poppet government. our '-.. , velt"• death In April lH&, 4eplored tho tact mlselon to Polnnd wu treated cavalierly. · ........... I thnt no reeordl of the Tehran meetlng wer• \ · n was Improperly and even humlllatlngl7 · ·: . ' I nail able even to them. Perhape none· hlld I . housed. · . � �; " i. · .. 
I 
been made.'� · · 1 u1 diplomatic tetegrarna to It• own OO•- · · · :  For pa;:e after page, foUowlng thll quota- l emment were delayed or not eent at all. · I 
I tlon. Lane record• th• deceptlOlll purwued by . Member1 of the mission and other AnierlcaDI 'yl l President Roolevelt. Be recount. In detail were arrested-. The Ruaalana eatabll•hcd th• t r · ' ··;
· 
tbe relntlons between the Praldcnt &nd ! . fact In the mlncla of the Poll.ah people t.bat · ! · l Charles Rozmarek, prcaldent of tbe P<>Uab· 1 • the United States did not count. : ' ' · ., ·:� 
I American Congre•. RoaDarek wrote to ·\ .: Did we do anything about lt.7 Ot coul'te. ; ·. ·.  · : Lane: · ''. AmbaHador Lane report&: · ; t� - .'.: I "Prealdent RoOllevelt ln bll talk wltb me •. "Over mv pcraonal protest, Director Oen· . i ·1 , • • ; esprcsaed dlltruet of St.alln, b&•lng been I · eral Herbert H. Lehman had appointed 11 ; t.: /' >'· tooled t>J him, u be •tatcd, 00 • number of I " director ot the 1lrat UNRRA ml.salon to p.o.' i i� '; 1 , . occaalom. Be plalnlJ Indicated that be Wal : land th• Boylet member of tbe mmRA coun- L ' · - , fearf\11 tbaS Btalln m1gllt again collaborata I j ell, Mr. MenllhlkoY. • • • It wu no •ur- 1 f;:: · i wlUl IUtler u b• did 1D Ule llllual IRll• Of J J prlat t.o me when ln Au(Ult the agreement · :·· ::. · . '  Ule war, and t.be Prealdent waaWd ai all 009�. , ·concluded ln wanaw provlded tbat tbe Po- ; '/ ::·: !J!..PN"�' lllCb aD: •11�...!'�- -- · tllab Ooverumcnt, and noi UMBRA. 1bould • • . ,-:{. . 
bave completa JIUSICl!ntOD Oftr Ul8 dlltrl• r· ( '. buUon Ol UNRRA euppU.. ID PolaDcl." �. · '1., ' . �-.. - . . ' . · · ·t ' 
. . . 
i ' I ' ;: 
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Mikolajczyk Articles . Presentei in 
. House of Representatives J 
the 
HON. CHARLES J. KERSTEN· 
j OJ' WI&COKllK 
• IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES I I Thursda11, Januar11 8, 1941 . Mr. KERSTEN of Wisconsin. Mr. , 
; Speakel', the Milwaukee Sentinel Is print• . 
. ing a series of most slgnlftcant articles by 1 
Stanislaw MlkolnJczyk, former Prlme 1 
Minister of Poland apd president of the 
Polish Peasant Party. A:s you know, ; 
• 1 MlkolaJczyk recently escaped' from Po· 1 
. l Jand whero it is believed ho would have 
1 been put to death It he had remained. 
The evidence or communistic terror cm- i 
nnnt.lng from all countries Into which the 'i· 
Eovlet Government has placed Its des­
potic hand becomes ovc1·whelmln1J. Hu­
manity c1·1es out at the barbarism of tho 
Soviet Government. Mlkolajczyk's voice I ! Is only ono Jn the chorus. The slluatlon I in Poland Is nil tho more tragic because . 
of the Christian tradition In that land. I 
· The Polish people are highly spiritual and ' 
have a strong attachment to Christian ·1 
. culture. That Is why the heel ol Russia j Pl'csscs hard upon the Polish heart. 
Under leave to extend my remarks. , 
I include the following article from the' 
· Milwaukee Sentinel: . 
•; MlKOLAJCZTlt Tl!l.I.S How REDS TOllTl'1lB ! 
PEOPLE OJ' PoLAND-"MY .N•TloM I" FaolC'I ; 
LINES OJ' Ni:w W••.'' Ha Aa&UTll ' 
·(By Stnnlslnw MlkolnJczrk. former Prtme t 
: '. Minister of Polnnd and ,Pr•Bldent of Ule 1 
. · Pollsb Pcasnnt P11rtJ) . · i 
J· (Iustnllment
. I) · · · 1" · Poland, conquered bJ Adolf Bitler ftnt and 
. Inter forsaken by lta oWJ allies, l1l4J' ·-m to I . be a remote ln� to the reader. 
:. The names Of lta people, lnoludJng my own, r· 
. may be dUllcult to pronounce, and lts trasedf l may be dlliml&aed by eome u the normal 
pll!lht of Eutopeana ·and partlcularly·Polea. · 11 
. But.Poland today la JOUi .When a Pole to-
; day la deprived of h-la Gcd-glven rights or la 
1 tortured vllely_ and put to death tor almply 
l.bellevtng. ateadta&t.11 -m .. .what. mllllona>.ot. 
1 democratic people& elsewhere , take . · tor 
. grnnted, 1ou. too, are belng attacked.. • And. 
ao la the sanctity ot 1our home • .  
A fantaatlc World War began on Poll.ah 
· sou, after being concelvecl 1n the twlatCld 
: mlndl or Hitler, Stalln, Musaollnl, and Tojo, ' And now an even more horrible war hu 
erupted tn �nd.. n ill a. war agalDat. the 
:C1�:?du::e::.=_ 00: .:m:a:� 
• 
llZP& IMPOSS TOK& Olf WOD.D . 
. Juat u World Wnr. II epread it• tentactea: 
out of Poland, thla. war could reach th•· 
homca· ot pcace-lovlng people elsewhere In 
tho world-.and moi'e· quickly 1111d with · a thouaand tlml!ll the venom of th• opening of: itho Ba\Ue of Drltaln and tht attack on Ponrl 
Harbor. · 
I I know, because I IUD a aumvor of tbe open Ina monmenta of ·that war of which I a peak, 
I 
I know the determination, tht pltlle�cu 
and the vigor of Uw new common enemr of 
mankind, communlom . dlrcckcl from Ule · 
IU. 8.8.R. . · · 
. 
I know Stallll peno...Ur. I know tbe men ' 
behind him, and the worktnp of tblll' mlnclll · 
IUlCI the JOke Wblcb UMJ are DOW lmJ)ClalDI , 
-��.!.!_Grid.!_: •. ____ ___ .. _ .. _ . ._!---· 
. ... 
·'· 
·1 
! 
l 
L 
I l 
. I 
I 
· J'orr.ot for a motnen' my nrt llAinf .. ,\& ., 
tho poeltlon1 thnt I .holcl In th• POlllh OO'f" • 
•rnmcnt not only '1urlng the occupntlon by the Nazis but bJ the evon more alnlltel lD• ' 
:vnder pr tod11)'-tho Reda, · : � 
i Simply QDUmo )'OU aro a Pol•, , Uk• mJ• 1 
aclf, and that )'OU aro 1tlll pOMe&led of J'OUf 
'tovo of.personal liberty, )'our fefllna1 on Ule 
1 rlcht• of mnn, and your belief• thnt 101& hnve : 
: tho right to 1pe11k, act, and Yote ao your coii-:.J 
: aclence dlotatc1. . . . . �·I 
. Ml&TVU or MOCXDT, MvallSJI . . " !· One night, wlthou' warn1n1, a IJ'O\IP of i 
: annod eccurlt)' police, trained, directed, anlS I I controlltld. bf a. foreign power, enter• )'O''' . 
· bomo and arreata you. f. ··•· t ' You aak to 11111 their warran' and lblJJ 1 lough at JOU, for their. warren' la &bl ma•\ 
: chine gun th•' II polntc4 at your atomacb. 
! In their poc:kota 11 your HnteDC9. alreadJ 
mado out, and ybur "trlal" In tbe mllltarJ 
cuur�lt you are given ono-wnl be only • ! . 
I Action. · · · ; 1 One of them caaunllJ pulls out a revolver, 
· opcna a drnwcr In )'OUr dolk, puta the ro'folVlll'
l 1 In tho drnwer, urta It out agaln, an4 acc:uaoe 
)'ou or concealing wcnpon• In vlolntlon ·or a,. 
"lnw" thnt 11 auddonlJ a ml&ture o� mockor1'! . and murder, · · · ; I i Your wtro and children and relatlvea anct 
. even iu;soclatea are takor. from JOU, and JO, 
I may never 1co them again an<l---lf JOU llV� 
1 you will olway1 be tormented bJ Ch� terron) . 
lnftlcted upon them. "• · • • 1 
i · You younolf are 1UbJectcd to what couldi 
. be 10.000 \ypes of torture, tar thore la n1>1 
'limit to tho Infamy c:oncoct.ed bJ the Com"'l ,jmunllt torturer. And ti: you aurvlve and aret 
1 relcaeed; JOU muat elgn a documerrt:tn· wtllcb 
I JOU promt&e not to reveal what )111 been =� 
Ito you or JC>ur famllJ, U JOU . ....­
lpromlae, the� are otber � Ul4 � 
!.dUlll!ul'J ... �-arrea__!i!f �· q!1Ji�•rll·;_;� 
.. 
• . . 1'22 -
.· . · 
'. 
]po!o:� �e .. ���:r't•!no:��=�·:�:,d .��:°;; 
thou11h JOU are none of thcee tblnp •Del: 
Jiavo proved It throU!lhout :rour ur1, . I Ypur crlmo? You liked a cort&ln candJda'9 torlomce and had announced JOur·sntentl� !to Yote for him.' Or, perhop1, JOU b-4 Cl� cldcd to run for omce roureelf-co11&tltui 
tlon11111 JOUr rlght.-on a tlcke' tba' dam not happen to plcue Moscow.. · ' · ;  
You would proteai, C'f coune. Yau m111hi even dlO-:.O. tbouao.nds of Polee almllar to you ho.ve don-aUler thnn ''814 '° aucb. u Incredible tyranny. '. 
I But thl11 I• cortnln: You would 1111 to J'OUI'• self, "Thi• cannot happen ln the twentletb contury. Thie cannot be the work or men bJ 
1'hoeo aide we fought the Oermane. • Tb• 
.Amorlc11n1 imd British wlll do 110met.hlng ii.bout thle," )'OU would HJ, knowlng· tbe hoart-warmlng humanity of those pcnrma; ! · 
I Thcrt1 JIH the ultimate tr41gedy, I , What Russia and lta aconta are dolrJS IQ !PollUld todny le nothing but a bold l>C*ver-. 
·alon o1 eolorr.n pacta and promlec1 algniid b)' . 
1etalln, Franklin D. Rooaevelt, and Wlnatoa.· Churchlll, nret at Tohran nnd then at Yol\a,, 
Roosevelt and Churchlll mud have lln• . cerely bellevt'd Ulat thoy could do bualn ... : with RuulL Thoae men, men or gOOd faith.I believed In the eolemnlty or the pacta·wbklb! tho' algnoel with StaJln. . . I l
. 
Tho)' 11mp1J \.mdoruUmated Stalin. · · H� ! 'boclJ can do bUllllOSI With Stalin. �-· tbiJ . : •• \?11 tHUmon)' of a man . wbo Vied for a� 1 · 11ean. and U\1n taUecl under tile . . brutal fGl'Oe °'-'��untn �t. bl �  
. . 
!'. 
; 
I 
l 
' ' !  I 
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(Document N o .  14) 
Representative Wolverton Speaks of the 
Distressing Situation of Polandl 4 
HON. CHARI.Es A. WOL YERTON .i . 
01' JQ1r Jl&U"f 
' .
· '· nt TltR ROl!SE OP P.Q'ft.ESO."TATtva . . •.t 
S:i:i:u!cg, A:;i;wt 1. 1911 
!Jr. WOL\LRTO�. llr. Speaker. the 
concltlon or Po.iand t�a>· is one of the • 
· moss di�lles.sir.' Jn a:ll ot Europe; \'lbal ; c•cmi.i bf- n:ore d�uc;.slnr· tban U>al a · 
: frttdo1n-lo\ing people should be he!d. 
un.��: the dom1Dauon of a foretrn dJcta-
. IOflaJ po.-u? . , Tbt'OUSh ttntt:ries of time the POii.� 
J;>e.:>f'!t> ha\"e fo:.ight �nd di< d In lhe cau;e 1 
1 o� li:>er:; a:td fr'ttdo::l. Time and agatn I · 
the)" h:\\'e sulfcrcd under crud and des- 1 • 
· Polle con4u�rors. B'.lt, nenr has ad\·er- · · a1t1 nr.r dLsttts.s caused them to falter In 
' their lo"le for llbert)' and 1rccdciin. The I Eoul of l'o:and has SUC\'h·cd In &he pa.st ' 
and y.·111 survive th� adH�ra.lt� of U>e 
: pre1:ent. Jt Jlv� to:tar. U Y•ill lh·e to-
• morro.....  It will continue to JIYe until I 
th<: darkM.'>.� of today turns to the bright-
ness of a new day. . . · 
Jn Yc:ar� that hue Ions Passed POiand I 
was th� defen:fer of Christtanit)' against ; 
. the Mohammedan Turk. TodaJ It 1s the , 
defender of ChrlstlanJt1 agaJnsi the utH 
forces of gc>dleSJ eommuolsm. Well do 
I remember the con1ldence �·IUl which 
His Hollnes.s P.:>pc Piu.s XII .spoke of the 
. Cbrhtia:i courage of tee �pie of Po-1 
. land and other central European coun- 1 
· tries, 3 7ear� ago 1"hen I had U>e pnY• t' 
• liege of an audience and OPPorlunlty to 
tal� v:tth him In U>e \'atlcan. At t.hat \ 
lime he palDted A most dark and dts- , 
1 cow ac1nr picture of communtstlc forces I 
: in central Europe, but:tn answer to m1 : QUestlon whether the Catholics or those l 
1 cowuries .-ould falter ID thelr lal&h, his 1 
lac� J!1htened and 'l\"lth coofideoce he • ! said, ''No, I dcn't think ao--tbelr bearu j 
' are right." He pointed out that while 1 force might dominau the physical. It I 
could not change U>e l:eart. How tru� : 
thls Js. Tbe !ame strength o1 spuit that i 
eo3bles the Polish people to malDlaio j 
·: their :illegiance to thelr' church, likewise] 
• E-nables tbem to hold 1lrm tbelr aUe­
! &lance to the principles of UbertJ and 
f:eeciom. __ -·-· -·-- ··-'-
. . . . ' · No nation hu !Ul:<>red 10 badlJ Crom . l the ran�es of war. But. the �ad part ls 1 
I to rclllzc that Poland has not only sur­fcred from the acts or her enemies. but. : 
: also fro01 tt:c deceit of those .-hem she · 
thoui;ht to be her friends. The first to 
!·enter the conftlct a:ralnlt na,z!sm she : 
., conttnu·Cl . to suffer thouith nulsm has : 
been destroyed. Without kno'.':lcdu , 
· · ·· upoo her part r;he Y•as Sll d dov.-n the i 
: rh·rr at Tehran, Yalta. l\nd Potsdam bJ i · 
i>natlons at whose behesl abe entered the I 
t:ar. and. beside v.·hOle soldlers her ov.-n •. 
so!dled h:id fou;ht with heroism and 1 
co1Uaae until tlctory Y•as 1atned._ : � As a result of these secret agreernenu . 
'lnilllons of p�ople In POiand Jh·e, today. 
I under the domination of a dictatorship, · 
, fenrful. m a state er conf�on and un• · · 
1 �aJnty�u·iO the fu(ur�ici;ci aarN• I 
ment.s hue brou&hl U'agtC corucquence9 · 
1 to Poland and Us people. They 5hould 
De\-�r baye been inad�. So looz u tbeJ � 
IRJnaln In force the• will constUute a 
:blot UPoD lhe JDUS:rU)' and honor of the ; 
1naUons rC6Pon.�ble for t.he.m.. nie reai : 
;Poland t.oda1 Iles :>rostrat.e and hrlpless 
... a re.suit ol the pa11dJ , Qf �= . ..!!�9.· · 
· ,should have been her prot.ec:to111. 
i Secret acnement.o; are �ntr8" to the 
1 principle. upon .. hJch thls naUon wu 
. founded. Tbe7 ha\'t� brought distress to · l'o'arld. TheJ ll.tc•1se bave brought. dis­
tress to the people or ow; ov.u NaUon. as 
:we ieali7.e &he cxt.cnt to �·hlch they se� 
·at naurht the prtnclples of l1t>t-rt1. Jus-
l·tice. and fre�om. for wb1ch thls Nation ha:; been U>e Jeadlnc expooeal thlo\llb­
;out the world. America, like Poland. wu 
also &Old <io•u the rtvu .-hen those M• 
lcret a�eements were entered lD\.O. 
' In tbe clan that are ahead It ls our 
ldutJ' to recW.. whenever and Ill y;hat­
ever way we can, the cttat wrong and .. 
.lnJusUce that bas been done to Poland. : 
It ts our dutJ to austalD the splrtt or' 
.Po!and and ber people; and encourage : 
itbem to Uve OD Ill the hope and Tilth the . 
1fa1Ul that libeny. freedom. and Justice , 
. ..w a1aln preYalL BYer remeoibu. the 1 
lsouJ of Poland Is DO& dtad. n llvel and ·[!.iwm conUnue to u,. aw 'ftoland II •JUD , 
•• . . ?. . . ,. -afn:clud. >Ir !i '":. ' �;;;.i:� J 
. .  
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Whlrh crlmlnnlly trw1t r11ttd thr hnne11t 'oltt · ·o1 " brnvo J>e"plo whlrh •llll bellrYl'd th11\ . 
pnct• and r.ruml•MI m11de hJ the thrfl' hll 
'. 1><'Wert1 were mnro than p111,cr nn«t hot 111r. ' Thoro hnve bt'en '1cnrn1111 proteetll from 
, WMhlngton 1md London, but theJ hn\'e bonn 
, Cl\llOU�ly Ignored by nu1111ln nnd by the lleda • 
. who poeci ae Poles and domln11te tbe pollce 
I atl\te. , 
· Thoy l11ugh at auch prote&t1, and when theJ 
· do not ln1111h they carry out reprt•al• which 
Cl\U&C 11ddlttnnnl blood£hed In my lnnd-ucb 
I u the destruction of tho Warsaw beadquar­
. tera or my Polish Pe..ant PartJ by Commu­
Dlate lmmedlatelJ after Mr. Jame. P. Byrn�' . ' apeecb at Stuttgart. 
The only natlge of democracy latt ID Po- � 
· land' today-Sn a countrJ, mind JOU, wblcb : 
Ur. R006ovelt e11rneaU7 hnlled u "the Inapt• ' 
' ration or notion•"-.. lD tbe ·pulptte of \he i · church. 
Only here can th• ao-called llbtrated Pole · · be t.old ho ehould bo free. Onl7 bere can 1 
'. be be openly told to love Instead ot hate, to i 
· tell t.rutba ln1teDd or lies, to belleH ID hla, 
. deatlny. . I 
But the Rrcl oaeaae aplnat th .. la.a\ bar•' I rtc:ide of democracy ID Poland bu now been! 
broucht Int;, the open. At tbe opening -· 
: llon of tbe 6eJm. our Parliament, on Octo·i 
, bcr 29, 10i1, .Toed Cyranklowtcs, Prime lllA·1 
tator of tho Communlet-clomthated Pollab 
oovcrnment. occulOd the churCJll of attempt-I 
1 ln3 to thw1ut the' ''people'• democracy." 1 1 Two wccu. latcr, In a brutal burlesque of, 
! a military trial, Cnrdlnala Hlond aod Sapleba 
were denounced by a apeclally tnatructed wit• 1 
: Des• u collaboratora wlth tho anU-Oonra- 1 
. ; Diont underground. 
'l · Do not be eurprlacd at the newa, lD tbe 'near future, that there hne been other I 
trumped-up . ch•f!Ce a�almt clergymen aa · 
. : "ecollnborntora," "111boteU11," and ••trattora." All \hi• lnev1tabl7 lD the maniacal tradition 
; of dlctotorablpa. t · Poland .. but one country ID Ruula'S o'ltr· 
all pion for conq\leat of the world. But lt ta I 
: a key nation, tor It 1ymbollzee the eaaentlal : 
1 treocbery of the Red plan and lte rutb.:·: 
'. leae lack of conscience:. Tbougb occupied 
throughout•World Wllr Jl, Poland produced l 
. · DO qu1aUnc govcrnm11nt. n waa an Ally • .' :'T(ljfay It la Invade� o'galn ancf la actuatl7 p&J• ; 
· . ! U>g reparatlon1 to Russia. . 
· ·.. Ruesla 'will ·atrtlco tormer .friend or former i Hoe Without dlllcrtmlnatlon. France and · 
, Italy' have but rccentlJ 'barelJ ended Coal• 
•. munlat-loaplred civil war1 wbtch would ban !· 
, been'tbo 1lgnal for Ute Red armJ to plunge , 
, to tbe Aitantlc wtth legtm1 of troopa and Ule 
: mOlt modern armor, to "defend the rlgbte of , 
_:. ; tbe auppreaaed peoplea." ·: 
.- · Ruasla baa loat tbde two recent battlel, · ! but tbtJ were onlJ battlea. Russia baa not \ 
. lost the 111ar It ii waging on tbe dipltJ and 1 · free�om ot au democratic people11 an1 more • 
· than the lou of aome ot lte western cltlee to 1· "Bitler ln 19U-43 meant tbat lt bad lOlt I 
World War �· · . ·1 : 
. • It wlll try again, � and on aian7 front.I, j 
It will do I� utmoat'\o defeat the llanball 
, plan, WhOIO aim II to 9tllblllze and ralae the r 
• European 1tandard Of llvtng- condition. 
Which ta an antidote agatnat tbe Rede' pro-
gram, b111ed on misery ond cbaoe. , 
: Rueel:l .. conteiit ·uiat nothing can atop · 
· the march toward domlnatlon-poll&ttal, 
I economic, and mlllt4.rJ�f the enUre 1r0rld • . Stalin can dle. but Ill• 1uccnaon, ZhdaDOY, , MolotoY, and othen, wlU carry on. 1 
I 'J1ltrf are COUntl• trained men to lllHJ J .i ecbtlODI beblnel &b• �era. watung to atep ] l fonnant uad pumae t.he Rjld .,,acram. To-
�wt. i �l �l ��t.Uaat Pel!�� 
' .. " ... . . .. 
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(Document N o ,  15) 
Petition for "A Just Peac0 for Hungary" ' ·  
. Read by Robert A .  G rantl 5 
HON. RObERT A. GRANT 
0,. INDIANA 
• IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESEHTATIVF.8 
Monda11. Ju1J1 ZZ, 1!146 
Mr. GRANT of IndlMa. Mr. Speaker, 
�merlcans ol Huncarlan orlcln recently 
. met In New York City under the dlrec4 , 
tlon of the American Huncarlan Pedera· 
tlon. t 
Out of that meeting came the fo1lowln1 1 
resolution, which has been sent to me i 
' by the Rluht Reverend Monsignor John 1. · fabo, pastor of Our Lady of Hungary I 
� Roman Cathollc Ch\ll'ch of South Bend, 1 
r . . . ·; Ind., and dean of the South Dend Dean· . 
j ery, Port Wayne diocese: • 
I we, Amcrtcon cttlun• or Hungarian orlatn, at " mua meeting held on thla doJ, June 18, 1 l lOfCI, art.er due eonstderatlon or all racta 
I ancl In full realization or our ubt111ntton• u j eltlzun• ot the United Statce n•k our Oo•· 
crnmont: · 1 l. To prevent the portttlon or Europe Into • 
sonce or tnnuence, either by granttn1 to anf 
grent i>owcr polltlcttl, mllttar1 or e«>nomlo 
, prlYllcgca, or by accflptlng factll nccompl11tt•,, : ed during tho armistice perloct whlrh nre In• 
• comp11tlblo with the freedom, Independence • I and 1onrelgn rlghta or an)' n11tlon. · , 2, To 11aaure to Hungnry, aepnrated todlJ 
, from western Eurnpe, her traditional ancl 
rlchtrul place In the rnmlly or the western , 
• dcmocIRtlc 11atton1. Jn conrormltJ with tha 1 
, Mn9cow Dccl11ratlon (October 31, J0f3), 11'1 • 
aak ror HUnRnry "lhat pnllUcal and econoinlo 
I 1ecur1ty, which 11 the only bul1 tor lut1n1 j 
I pence." . 
I . 3. To put fully Into elfcct In the Hun1Rrlan • ! Peace Trcnty tho prlnclpl11 or the Atlr.ntlo : 
: Charter and In parttculnr to apply the ethnlo : 
:. prlnclplea without prejudice to Hun1ar1 ID . 
• the draft1n1 or her ruture rrontlera. Border : 
1 territories Inhabited · by Hun11rlane OI' i I Hungarian maJorlttea ahouJd bl returned to 
I 
the(r motherland. . ; t. 'I'o prnent peraecutlon Of mlnorltlea 
on rectal bul1, and fqrbld tbelr Hpulalon · 
and conllacatlon or tbelr propertlea u bu , 
t been iiractlced during the armlatlc:e perlocl 
' by Claech<ll onkla. NlnorlUea 1bould be 
, granted run mlnorltJ right.I und• IDt.rn.-1 
l tlonal guarantlai. .. 
: r;, To reatore TraneylYimla u au Ind•• 
pendent 1tate within a Danubian Federation.· 
· •1 Thia 11 Ult only pl'Oper aolutlon capable of 
· eatabllahlng luting peace betweeia HUDlll')' � 
I ancl Rumant_a. 
. . , 
a, To reltne Bun1&rJ of t.ba uabearabla 
bunlen of reparattom and ot oecupatlon 
whlcb prevent reeonetructtoq ah,4 tbnakD 
tbe natton'a 1unl'f8l. · · · . "· To --�It.a Ula eonelualOD ot the BUD· . 
1 prlan � ueatf wmaoui turtber un••· 1 
( rante4 delaJ. · . · · ' ·· .  . . ..... · - ···- --- -
U . S .  Congress,  Congressional· Record , Senate , ·: .. ith · 
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(Document No .  16) 
Reading ·by Senator Tom Stewart of an Editorial 
Telling of the Red S£�zure of 
Czccho:;lov;:l.kia · 
HON. TOM STEW ART 
I tw TKMHr.s&CS ' I . JM THS SENATS OP TBS UNlTm 8TATa 1 . 
: . Frlda11, Februar11 27 <lcotslatfve da11 o/ ; 
Monday, Februar11 2>, 11141 
Mr. STEWART. Mr. President, I ask 
unanimous consenl to place In the AP· 
pendlx of the CoMCRl!SSIOJfAL RscoRD • . 
; vcrY timely cdltonal which appeared IQ ! 
the Knoxville Ncwa ScnUnel, Jtnox\tiUe, I 
: Tenn., on FebruarJ 25, 1949. . ; This editorial accurately and truth· 1 · · 
full1 points oul thal the Red seizure .of 1 · 
Czechostov11kla . strikes a familiar eom- i 
' munJsUc chord and lt la the some old i 
. stol'7 of communlatlc treadlcl7 and be· , • 
i t.rayaJ. I . Certainly, It Ls runnfng true to Sovtet ! · 
form and anyone who has observed tbo j 
1 Stalin finesse �s dcftnUel¥ the same ; 
old pattern being cut. : 
I This editorial points out that we ' 
: should act quJckly on the Marllhall plan 
: and tbllt we should atren.athcn tbe United I ; Nations. It also shows the Importance . 
ot strengthening ourselves here In Amer- I -. : Jca from "'lthln. America should have ; 
no paUcncc with communism. It ·fa tho 
most daniierOUll enemy of the. clvillr.ed 
·world todny. It challenges the right of · 
free people to remain free. Tbla la a ! 
tlm�Jy cditorlol. 
I There being no obJectJon, the editorial , I was ordered to be printed In the RECou, ; 
. u follows: . · i · 
I 
. STAUM'• Inti TOWAU WAii . I 
t Red ulzure of Czechoelovakla bu been 1 I only a matter of Ume ever 5lnce Yalta.• One I 
by one, Stalin has picked oil tbe naUoau of '. 
, eMtcrn Europe. Now only little FtnlaDd la ·1 · · 
' left ln the twilight zone ot phpnJ tr«dom, 
. U Le the same old 1tor1 of Communl.et ·1 · treachery nnd betraJal, Of tbe 8oYld 1tab I 
. in t.be back. It hu been repeated lD eo ; 
. snanJ pl1cea, Stalin '1 mctbod a.Del purpoae .. 
1boulcl be Juiown to all 1.be WOl'ld. And 1es i 
there are l\IU a few even ljl America who ; 
can tbemMl•ai non-CommUDJai. like Mr. ' 
1 Wallace, Who prates. to bclleYe Uias clemoc-_ :. 
ncr can be aa•ed bJ appe-ent. 
8:alln h .. plaJed 1' precllelJ like Hltlu and 
the Jape-onlJ with more aklll. No Nu& or • 
Jap lftb column ner operated wltb Sbe · 
· lDaldlous ptrfecUOD ot Ule ScnleS aceDtll who 
baJt uken o•er eutern EUlolN aDd ·wllo : 
hHe bond 80 deeplJ Into ltalJ, l'ranee, and j 
China. · t 
II U>e 8"81CJ11 lloldl, 8talln WU1 80 Oil , 
' \&DUI lie prcmiba a worlcS_ war; 1111w. � I 
I, cheap •lctorle11 0... -lier naUOna end ID · bla ftnal ddeaS bJ Ule 1tron1 � be 11 trJtng to dttWQJ. · ·. l There II one tbanoe that ht maJ be napped 
'without 1uch a war. It the rematnln1 fl'M 
eountrlet can · trenarorm Ulelr economto 
weakne11 Into 1t.ren1th Uirou1t1 tbt M11nball 
plan, and If UI� can oomblne tn aa dectl". 
clefenM p!ICt under the Vnlt«t 1'atJOt11, l!tllln 
111•1 rotrn' nen f1oed bf pe1wr poww, • : . 
But, whetber bt ntreate or adftnOll to 
war, th• proteetJYI \lllltf ot UM ,,... naUODI 
aow "'"' chleftJ 'Oil Amcrtcaa .ooaomW 
•tN"lth and •llltarr ,...,.,......., . ..,. .. 
-�., ..... .. ..... . 
. •
. J � . . . --· ---· � .--.. _.. .... .... . - ..- .• � 
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vanshing Czecho.s'iov�kian. -'Libe�t � <is Made1�no.wn · by · Repre sentati V'e J'ohn DaV.1.8 !iodge . � . . . . 
7·' �. HON� joHN DAVIS LODGE �0>mmuni.• �1uee haft tieen arnitee1 an41 
· '· · · . 'Jalltd. ·&ooD '1\er9 WW lie �· pmg•, \be , . 4. • OI' CONNICl'JCn ;. •CIODCen�atlOll oamll' Md pertl•pl &be Orllll' 
• IJf 1'UZ BOOSE OP Ra:PRE81CNTATIVD lequ&d ar 1auo-. . . 
�.. ·. · Montfal/, JI arch z, 1141 • · · PrOm now on, lDto aa SDdeftnlte tuturt, \be ,  
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Cuohoalo•u peopl• can look fonrard onlJ '° 
Mt. LODGE. Mr. Speaker, under leave the drelld .ouncl aod 17mbo• of th• poUce 1 · · · : : . ·COC11'i:84m IWftlllfAUT · . · • •. , to extend my remarks in the Rscou, I 1\at-•bai Dean AoheM>O. forann Vndll � . oouwnlcl wu accepted becRUftO hSa OGm• Sn elude tho followln1 · arUcle from the BocntarJ or 8tate, 0009 •11•4 "the IUlooll·cm 111il.Pta\ PartJ bud •on 88 petcen• ol tbt : . · '  ·Washl..nton Dost oU'ebruarJ 2D, 11148: . : · , th• door a• Dt11l• Ula\ •wt� .. terr• �to. m• . 1  •otea In the Aprtl :111411. election, anq h14 . . > Pel 1'0D\eD" ·" · · ,. · • � · ·r 1, .. --0 ... e the b'""e-' 1ln"I• part7 In Ul• etate. IVaoPa F&Aann. M CUCH Linnm VHU . .;,..··�·�a'.uea" \ ", '. I • ft.� ;;orntaed ""\;, ·cOo�rate wltb Ult DOD• · ·.. ' · , (Dy: J'&dln•nd Kubn, .Jr.t · The OEeeb• ban 'heard ti ali befora. · tune. • Communl11t partlta In· the cablo8'; be 19' , •· · What bappcood ID PralU• 111• week W¥ Jt•ra ago aien snooth nmer'• meohanl&ed ' tbe ooimtrJ hat• ·PD Ulna GemocnicJ and ' ·D'lwdor mod foul-tbe murder of Ula ot'fSI armlc• rum"led Into Pr11ue, brlDllDI wt\b 'tr" tn1tl.tutlone wtthtn Jta �er,, al lOllJ ; , llbortlM and Crea lnnltuUom ot 12.000.DOO them Ulo blacll-mbtrted ..ec:n• pollco, Ul• con•. u tt 1ulted b!Jt.p� · 1• � peopla. . ..- · centraUon cnmpa, and. th• U"n« ·4ea\b of Du• from the daJ be beu.mt Premier,] . A •eek ll4IO t.b• pc<;?l• of C�hOlloulta Jfad rule. Tllen, u now, th• OZOoba loa\ ericctt01lotalitla ceaeed to follow an ID4S1>1nd· . ·cnuld ren4 wha& lbCJ l� .. , What Ul., Ulotr llbertJ, and It took t••l'I of oocupaUooj en• torctan potlc7. Her dCJleKatca at forele.11' . 11'ktd. •ot.a.u tbey liked. Their countrJ wu and war to"' U>em freo, . • · .• · , confennCH yoted obcdlentl) an4 mono\oo In Ula &Yid •Pberol of lllOuenca, Uad to Jn tbo eyca or \he rttmlt.lnlng 1tll' natton1 I moua11 with the SO•lel Union and J&e aat.el• nu.uta bJ a mWtarr aod poUtlc:al 1lUUM11, of Europe Ult• wconcl u\lttotlon of C.ecb, • • me.a • .  OnlJ In vado and oultur.i ,elatlone : · 1>u\ Ill tta lDtnDal atratn ii wu •WI t....  , frffdom � not onlJ troglo but -deadlJ 1«>r�·· : wtUa Ul• outer world did t;be �chi dltrw ! . · · The Cuch� could read attacb OA tbllr ' oui. l'W wwtero F.urope &ookod upon .\he. · .trom their 8o•le• maatenl, an4 ·Ua•D tbeJ . · · · OOVcrnllllM.-nt ID DOWp&pn'I cl UI• oppoalUOD ·; C7,ech . people .. 81HIO In. language bu' I. dl4 '' bJ permllllDD. . . "· '• . putl,..  Tbe7 could. so to � Amertc:an or lwcr;tcrn � cunun, uadlll� aad aoblav•-! j,.. Tbe Gnat proof flt t.helr .JoQ independence, : · 8ov1ct 6.llxla, aa tbq d>QN, 'J'bq eoul4 bUJ inent. · . · .· · · " • '  · .. ' · , m �mer&caa '>"'•cam• Wt . .ummer Ill tbl) ·forelp publlcaUOlll. � ClOUl4 IDO'fl � The 8tgh\ Of Uloae people bl&ng awallowecl l'att.ennath ot 8ecn\arJ· MU11hall'1 fainoue �va-.ei Wbter1 �117 'lrilbed, · 1 • • • · Into \bl sovtc• •11tein bu given w�tcm, ; 8peu ac Banard; The lllltlab Md French :. Todaf Sb• ,_-com.maaatn .... .,.pen :Europe a greater 1hoc'lt Ulan an,ihtn1 alnce ; IDYlied tbe Ozecbl, &ogether w1Ul all ot.bor .  Uft bMa � Ofet llJ • dAM&pUaed Cola• the end ot th• war.· ln f'arll aiid London. . 1 suropeaJt countrle• ucept Spain, W oom.• to . . •nm�. �lJ. Jlallllel111 8' ·tllil --- I •till hall proatrata troin th• wound• o.r o� .. Par1a and dttcUM tluropeaii economte OOOP't•' 
• • • •· • •· • · • ·-· · · • • • • · • 1 war, si Joou .. U Ruaala I• on tho march auon. Tbe ar.tcha accaptecl prompUJ. ' , onco more; .. lt. the KreD'llln h&I regalne4 I BU\ 1• wu Do\ Jong before 'th� Pramter ··Uie 1DtUattYa· WhlC!h S.cretarJ Mnzahall � ao4 UMlr .Welp· ·MtnlatU, '"" l&UQ1Jlr. J 1 ·trom si lo.a\ 1ummor. SACll. eoun� again. ! w.r• iummonecl to Moeeo•. n. OMObl 11oou a• &ta neighbor, a1 IJ CU4,ln HlUer'e.dlJ, : were compollad to wtuiqraw \!Mir aocepiaaoe 
'! 
I and aab, "Wbo'• DU\!" . . .. . . . . . . : �d UM futa tnvUatloa. 'nlaJ OcoUnM. '° . , .' And there. ta a haunting &enae tn wntern. . 1.  take pan .aa \bl. llardlall piaa, ·Pd thelt• ; Europe that onlJ th• United 8tate1, aatllll epoUemen at IMlma aDd abl'Oa._ baian at-t •Ith more ll'lft.nesa and etrang\h than n.�r: teckllll I\ M an ll&ltlPP.' 1M ...._.\a UMi , tS'efore, C&!l preUD\ ·1.hl �bOllOYllk JI&\• I , .... Of Suropa. ' : \•·:'" ' i'_f_, ..._. •.,. ' • , tern from belllg followed . �  UalJ before. 
·- - ·- · .-- · -,. : aummer. ; . •i': · � · .. . ··-. ·.I · . 
.. , · If the HnM of ahock haa not J•t hit oatclal I · WaahlDg\OD-'aDd there I• littl• 1lgn 'tba\ . . : 1t hu-J\ 11 beca\16e th• Vnl�.4 8tatea. IODB1 · ,.aao wroia oir czechOllOftkla u a ·genutne111 tndependen' C:OUDU'J. omc11� .bet• baft1 · �fe1' tba• UM death wanant d 'Clechoal��! . 
. Jlllerttea wu algDad ali'n!:mt . I. Jean ago, OD! ·.;$he tatetl&l d•J WblD Prealdan' "'uar; ae-; 
I ._....... me-A\ Gottwald. . . &'- ��l 
��.!!..�.��. )!-.:, · :' ·' 
. I 
' .. 
. . .  
i . "
. 
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·!· urml111it1on to 1lve atrlctly Am11rlc11n t111lp 
to countrln who wo11ld not dClno11nce ue for 
11lvln1 thllm the re1llrf th111 Mllcd for, tn. 
plftce of lntf'fnRtlonnlly administered roller 
on tbe UNlUtl\ model. · 
The rllcord ahowa, howo•er, thM th• United 
l!ltRtll• continued v;lvln� anrne help to the 
C1.eeh1 lonR nrter thclt foreign pollCJ pD!lleCl 
iDtO YlrtUl\l Soviet control. 
C7.c-eho11lovnll.la h11d received " tot11l of 
: nom '11at mnment olftot.tl Wuhtnaton no i t208,260,000 from UNRRA up to th• and of 
Iona-er r.;ardf'CI OucboeloYakla u u � . 1040, '10 percent of It contributed by th• 
pendent oouutr1 abl• to carq out •� owa Unlttd State•. It bnd u�cd •0.30•.6114 of th• 
PQ!lclee lo ate own tnweata. 1&11 d•" ll� 1urplu1 property credit before »yrnu cut ll 
ertlH an4 parllamentllr)' uuututloiu 1wer1 . jolr. It bad recolnd •3,0t2.000· In direct and 
admirable, but tb•J could be •lpecl °"' 111 Indirect lend-leaae help following the llbera• 
Uwi a1o�ofa.11n1t1r.t� tbeXremltn., • : · • .' '") .tl'D. Yet In Pebruaq or lnat year lt 1ot f.;. · '· . .. · .. • : 'l'OVOll WT PASllmJ. -i.,! ,, . .<I> '·�� '•�.000.000 from the· sxport·lmport Bank to . 
. • .: When the.crlita 11nlll y cnm• llllt' weeli, tb� buy American cotton. and two million foi; 
·:. czooh• eubmUtcd D\ore tamely than 'thelrt ;to�np';�· from theae auma, the ezcchl aaked,v ' •'tea1-cultured and ' Je11°dc1noeratlo · BalllDQI · but did not get, a furl.her cotton credit of. ; � JltlgbbOTI. ·They are tough people, 10 tougb· t•el\t" mtlllOD and a eurplwi property.endlt • tbat.t.be old A"8tr1an Empire could not crush • 1 t th• 
· , thelr national erilrlt In hundred• 01 J•An(· of the eame amount. They a ao aen 
But their traditional role under Auaula and.. 1World Bnnk a letter of tnt.ent t« a '3&0,• 
B1Uer Oennany wu thA• of pus"e realel«�'. 000, .00-reconstructlon l<Mln. but no formal 
f"i noncooperat.on, and IBboteura, rather than. application haa ner been recei
ved. 
• llCtlTt rct>tlla. · It remain• to be aeen bow thef• . ; &MALL av11"1t&1' TVllN . r' will w1tb1tand \bt 8oYld 'Hl'llon 'ol Ml�ll• . i The aelzure of power by the COmmunl1tt · .; arlnn rUle • . · . " :,:: · :··, . _. •· v�'. probn�I)' e11t1ngul11hc. 11ny hO,CI the C�cha . ..:.· The O\'erturn II\ "'ogue differed ln� tbree; .may hi>Ye bad or getting cconomlo help from 
· � reiipoctl from th• ·. Oommuntat . cnuri• ' lo!. . the 'l"eat, ucept tor the Indirect ettecte to 
JrungarJ, Rum1ml11, and Poland(· Th4JJ · .,, .118 CJ!pecte<l from a rcvlnl of eut-weat trade 
•. ; dltrcroncca' In dctaU, but tb.e1· ar� ..-01111 ell•.' · :.inc:ser· th� ·:abrahnll pl11n. 
, &mining and remembering, tor tho Oiltcb ·: The economic congequencee will be eerloua · .  ovcnum contain• olilca to •11•� ·ma.y IM ·e•"i ·· : In other wnya. czecha1lovnkla until now ha1 i � ·peoted trom tbe Corumunl1t1 elHW:here. ·. � been a r:atlon of amall-bualneM men and • 
• :- · In the 11nt tl•ee, th·cre waa Do Jll'd.Armf' aome 'big lndustrlea. Until now the am11ll J 
Qctually In Cteohoalonlr aotJ, and not 1v.ri bus1nessc• h11ve been 111lowtd to follow path& : .' pay Bovie& troopa oatenalbly gUArdlnr oom•J · of tree cpterprtao even thou·sh the big lndU!• . 
, .. ··01unJcat!on ll11c1 a• they .�hl .Jn HungarJ1? trlea h11110 been nottonall&cd. T?le advent al �  
· � The aotuai uamp. nt Red AnnJ )>oota waa a atralaht eommunlat regime Ill upected �I 
, ,; not ne�drd. SoYld territory adjoin• Czech�; lead to tho gr11du111 natlonall&lng of 1111 bual· , · aluakla at ll.4 nnrrow ell.Item border. and• ·ncues, and the gmaJl-bualneu man lll&Y be • l Bovlot ari.ntld power 1polre u loudly tn· t� ·driven to the wall. · 
: ·. ab.cuce � It·&& had beeQ on tbo ·�· · ':' · ;  .Polltlcnlly,,the n- regime la alao upectecl : " · IA. the. eecl)nd· pince, . the OzecbO<'IJUY&lc' to movo gradually after ltl llRhtnlng aelzure . '�: overturn wae the ftrat Jn .eastern Y.urope I� � · ot power. 'nle achedUled ,1�tton• •Ill be 
i' ·wblch the 1radc-untona playc!f a ·prom�en&.! 'held. with the oppo11ltlon lcl\dere In Jail or . -.-..:ancS perhaps dcclalve pnrt. · In Pot;i�d; and1 • pnwerlcaa to apoak: therefor11· • r1ggcd re�ul' ( 
. · atlll ptore In tho Bnl.knt\. countrlu, trade-' la· almORt certain. The p11tl1Rmentarf forma !Ii. \Inion• an oomparathrc11 weak. Jn Q:ecbo-j ll\llY be preserved until a new SO•let-type eoo·. ' · alovekla, . an · 1n.duatdal couqtl')'. tbe1 are· etltutlon c11n be wrlUen. but thef will be a . '.:.;atrong, dtaclpllncd, and well organized. Th• hollow mockery. · .' · aeh:uro of Communist power Jail' week ·could Whether or not President Benet remain•, . . not bHe taken· place 10 amootbly .wl�bou' hta power to control even ta appear• gone. He · 
. ,tbell' connlYance and cooperation. · ·. , ;-., had bla value to the eommunlall u a ay�bol , .� · Finally. CZccboelov11kta wae ono or ·tbe·rcw: !ot the Czechoelonk· NaUon. He had com· ! , European a>untrtee where an Jmpo�nt w1n1i promised with them In a wbollr •lncere belief ' ·.•ot tbe 8oc1Qllat Party had continued t o ·� that east and weat could llH together ID I <:"" opcnto with tbe Oommuntata.. ·Althoucb peace and that eztcho61ontla, u bridge be· . � European aoclnllsm and · communlam· � : tweerl them, could belong to neither aide. I , dtndly enemloa, the let\ wing ot Czoeb ao-. , u he •taylid, the eommunlell, beln1 what . ..  clallam hnd a leader, fonner Premier Zdene�1 ·they are. would have uaed him untU It eulted - .! · i'lerllnger. who waa ready to do the .Olmmu•. tbelr purpoee• to dtscard blm, jun u they ' �'.'. Dlall' bidding. It may yet be tha� Soclalls•! l dllc:arded Ktng Michael, llkewlH a 17mbol , 
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,:� leader Pietro Nenni Jn .Italy will plaJ. Ui•� iol the atate In Rumanla. i . ;, : Fler1tn1er role when communl.am I• relidy io: . us aoAo "° aoMs . . . ·1 ' , � for power In the Medlterranean. ;�: '·" · T · . . .• • :· · · . � :·; '  ; •• I . What can tbe outer world do·aboUt It now?·. 
:.. • : . ' STJIN'llS Dl'�M· "nfOYl:l "' ': i"·.· 1 !1 .Probably It le too lat•· 'to do anything tor I . , · •· ., momenta like tbeilll an Axnerlcan �,,. ,ezechOlloftlda e11ccpt to keep open enry poe· 
• '.· wonder whether the United States could: no\ · alble channel of communication to the Czech :. · · 
" ,ban aand the Czecba from �tbelr Jireitea( ;people, the lllllJorlty of whom are demoeratlo : . I pursatOl'J. · Leading C7.eehe, frlendly to• tb6'' !\o tbe marrow of· tbelr bone:i. . · 
; .: ·Weatez:n world, ban often complalne4 �ar:.  1 It la not too late, boweyer, to take to heart 
: Secretary Dymef belped to tJirdw JlielJl 11,:;q. the le.saona of thla lntut Soviet trlumpb. · . 
'1 "Busalan arma ID 19" lsJ euttlna air Amer\ The piattem of blOodleu conqueat hu n�w ! 
:- economlo help. , .. • � "  .. · ... '. : .. • .. · ,: � I . �.'J . tak�n tbe So•let ayetem fartber west than· I l' �· The reuone were told ·ln \tie Byrilea· �1' ; It has eter penetrated before. �.:,Speaking Prnnkly. ·At ·the Par1a .. Peace eon .. I • 'nle finger of future trouble now points 
I ·  fere114;9 ol io.e; ADdrel vfabiDBtty. of .Bu'••' j ll(luarely at Italy, where the government II ' 
I ·  bad Ju.at blahed a· 'denUDclaUOn . .'of the''l 'ebaky; tho communlata atrong and ably lect,. 
' .;. United · Statee for fir11nB to ·:dominate. \ha 1 tbe SoclnJlsts �lvlded, A genefal election In . ( world by band-otat.. Byrn.ea· noUced t..O of' I Jtaly la due April 18. It la wbolly likely th11t . I tbe Ccocboalonlt delept.a .. .-pPJ.audtng . . the Communlat machine will begin A drum·· 1 . beaiUlJ. · · .• . . -; . ! : ·�, . . !I' , ,  • beat to dlscredlt \he election real.II ta ln ad·. 
1 
• • • • • -� ': t vance aa It did ln Greece. and tben attempt ' :· At. tba$ '9rJ Ume, � rcmcmbv� .Ule,7 a coup d'etat of the kind It engineered wltb.. · •  
·.:.Olecba bad bceo allotted • tli0.000,000 SW-, � · aucti deadly skill and precision In 'l't!ll!Ue; l · � phaa�P.roperty credJt trom tbe l1ll1ted 8tatec. � . · • . . . 
Be· aleO dltco'feNCI tbd a Oonununlat 111\n.; , 8o tar American pollCJ mall.en hne no' 
"'t.ter, wttbout t.be kncnrled&e ar Jl'Qrelp MID.;', . ' faced up to tbla •ltuatlon. Thell' thought.II : later· MonrJlr, ba4 eon&r&o\ed to ·-releJMSi anct energl«ie bin. boon dnoted to getting 
. tl0.000.000 ·or \bll to. Jlumaola.a• a lllaberJ the European reoo•ery progt'lim pnaeed_ 
� :;ft.te oJ ID�t. . < · : "" ,: . . .. '.�.': : l.J •. , .� ,'1 ,.promptly by Congrea and followed up by t.b• 
' · :·· DJfllel �lllpUJ wt otr'jb1t· ·cn41\ wtta i : western Europeans. . 
. ;"t1\he �l&t• ie"marllt taa t· M«dlcl· auit WU$ ct '! Bocre,tary Manb111l baa eald alrea!fy tb"' 
I 'olflft� - o..oM �11' '·1>• � ·,bcj : Euro11e 1  lmm11dlate l\lture depend• nn r.RP, ..... --....";"'1uon.t1e0ta•·· .• , .�·( .�": .. : . . .  •. , ,, , , ''."" · and thnt t.here c11n be no tru• peace until ��·; � . r-"'!!";:;. a ..!'  .....  ,.._,.. .. ��.� '"' •;,. . f American economlo help can repair t.ho weak• · •nosaea of the weatern 1:uropean countries. I I Dut the pnat weelt'• evonta han mllde 1' 
• 
·,clear &hat flCOnoml!J.help a. not enouah. Un·: 
11111 we.tern Europo la tlahtened aa awl.fUy · 
aa poulble, by polltloal a1 weU u economto 
• meaaurea, t.bere may Jet be a raoeUUcm at. 
' 
\ . 
: . ·. 
·. ·· ·. 
. ·. 
� .  
·-·· . . 
; ." 
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(Document No .  18) 
Deplorable E�e:it;, _<r": C��c-hosl. ovakf� ne�re.,cn ta.t1 \JC l· Trl S t e .fan 
as Told by 
HON. KARL STEFAN . - !  or HEDRA!>KA 
JN 111.E HOUBB OF REPRF.8ENTA11\lm . 
. Jlonda11, !'larch 1, l!J4B 
Mr. STEFAN. Mr. Spenkcr, this past 
·Frii:tny, over radio :;tat.Ion WOL ln Wa.c;h· 
.Jngton, nt 8 o'clock in the morning, Mr, 
Ocorge E. Reedy, the popular commen-
tntor, discussed. the fall of Cuchoslo- ' 
vakia to the Communists. I quot�: l . The fall of Czechslovokla to .the Commu- ! nlgt:i has brought the United Btntee to ltl 1 
����i:ft t:!r:��a��r.
crl�e����! !��la g:; J· · 
. making no nttempt to disguise their deep concern.· . . Ot coune, Czechoslovnkla" Iii only one of a 1 .Iona 1erlee Cf nations to fall to the Com· 1 .munl6ts. It hoa been preceded by practlcallJ · ) nil of caatern t.'u;·ope. 8oYlet domination of • bortk'r countrle.e hns become tbe pattern ol I the. postw11r world. : ·· : But the foll of. Czcchcislovakla presents a 
I idllferent picture. Tho other. notion• bad •been under RUSll nn domination In one form �,. another for 1enral centurtcs. I 
Their. �ai10�. whtcb irew-ou&Oi. tl\; rtn•-:· 
World War, WKS patterned alter our awn. · 
1Its government was modeled on the llne11 ol 1 .  
our Government, and Its people had a pas• • 
. alonate devotion to liberty. Tbef haH j 
proved It over and over. . 
� From a 1lrateg1c 1l1mdpolnt, the capture of j 
CEeChOliloYAll:la w111 lmpoct1mt to the Ooro•J 
munlata. U advance• tho Rusalun ephere ot 
lnftuence to western Europe Itself, and It 
brings to UH 8oY1et.a an Important lndu.eUlalj 
prize. . 
� The 8o•l1t Union hRa nlway1 lacll:ed a pool! 
of all:llled worll:era. Osechomlovakla a1 an tn• 
dW<trlnl nation bas plenty. Before the war 1•! 
· wu one oi tbe ma.t lmportant manufactur• · 
.i 1ng ce11ter1 on lhe Continent. 
1 There I• little doubt t.laat Rueala Wlll bl 
able to make good uae ot UUs pool Clf work• , 
men, Tile Germans proved that It could bl­
do111, and the Communists an fUllr H ell· l 
clent u the NozJ1. The C&ecba wlll work-t 
whether they want to or not. · • 
! All ot tbeae thlnga considered, It Is not 1ur• ! 
/prl1lng that the Untted State., Great Br1tatn.:, 
,· and Prance have Joined to deno\lllc:e the I 
Communllt 1troke. Their language Is bitter.! 
·and undlplomattc, but lt Is JustlAecl. · j The three-power _note call• the coup a "d� ,: 
gul1ed dlctat.orsbtp of a 11.n&le panr." n • 
call• tbe crlll.9. wblcb waa µgeci to brlng tt 1 'about "artlAclally and deUberatelJ b1stl· 
,pt.eel.'" No wordl are minced-« softened.· 
; . Such language, at courM, doea notblns but '. 
.gtn the three natlona a cbanoe to blow off I · ismn• ateam. Tber .are atlll tacecl wttb � � 
1 problem ot dolaa. eometb�g to bait 4 furUMr' , . . . 
! So•let . adftllce. CmcballoHkltl • IDUA )le )· 
·_wrJti.n oer. �·boc*ll. .:.-:'""-'· ... ·- =-- '- · _,_.. 
p .  Al266. 
&.cret.ory of Stato Muahlll  hH aireadJ 
asked Congrc11 for more aid to Orecc-the 
onlJ non-Communht country adJolnlng the 
Soviet sphere. He wants '2711,000.000 to." 
1trcngthen t.lle Orec'lt Oonrnmtnt. ' But the real fear le tha\ the Communlats 
·have dcaJgns on Prance and ltatr. T.boee 
are the two \IUlnerable points In .we11tero Eu· 
rope. The Communl8ts know they cannot . 
take them except bJ force from the outalde. ; 
; A 1trlke, at elt.ber bJ 8o•let force. would 
•put thl• countrr directly on the 1pot. We 
would ellher baH to ftght or ge& au.& of EU•. 
rope altogether. Neither alternative woUlcl 
be a h11ppf one." Either alternatlye could bl · 
dlsastrou.e. · . The true 11l11nt1lcnnce of the fall of CZccbo• 
slovakla Is this: •  TbeN are now no more· 
butler• In the world. Prom here on out ID·' 
ternntlonnl dlplomac; 18 played for keep1. ·. 
'Anr further Soviet ezparialon meane we mU1t 
put up-or •hut·up. · 
� Mr. Speaker, and so ends the comm'en-' 
:tary Jest Friday morning of Mr. George: 
:E. Reedy. · ! 
I Much of what Mr. Reedy said about 
'.Czechoslovakia and her current sltua­
, tlon I am sure most of us will agree with. 
: However, I wlsh ro most earnestly cor- · 
,rect Mr. Rcedy'.s remark that "CZecho·:  
:siovakla must be written oil the books."' 
. Mr. Reedy and the world must never. 
iforget that czechosloYakla is a young re- : 
!public, younger even .than our own United 
, · :States. And youth has vitality, strength, . ;and courage. Nor must the world forget· 
i that the people of CZcchoslovakla cherish 
ln them- heart.'I a deep love of liberty as � 
•passionate and sln�ere as 1.s our own. . I It ls true that a Russ.Ian rider sits 1n 
I. the Czech saddle. But If I know those · people, and r think I do, the i;plrU of • 
· idemocracy wW not cUe aa Jon; as one·: Czech lives. . , : 
I, It la a1ao my belief that the Ruasian ! rider trilU ftnd thnt he lit.a astride a' 
j1trOD1•wUlcd and bueklDI mount.·- · , ·-·- - ... --- -. -· � - . - . . . .  � 
� . 
1)0 -
. ... 
.  
(Document No ,  19) 
Telegram Showing F � D . R .  ' s  Change of Atti.1;
.ude · 
Toward the Soviet Union19 · .. . · 
'· . . 
: . · 
THE .WHITE HOUSE·,. : · : • . . .. . 
March 24 '
· 
194.5 ". 
· . . . 
. .1_ • \ Pers�nal arid . Secret f:r:om the President· to Stalin a.· 
Amba�sador Gtomy�o �as juit info�med thi Stat� . 
Bepartm�nt. of the composition ·of th_e· Soviet · delega-
tion . to the San Franc i's co Conf ere nee ,  While we have . .. . . · . . · · . . 
·the highest respect for Ambassador Gromyko� s. charaq- · ... ',°." . . :-
_ . ... ". . · - :  
· ter and capabil,i ties and ·know that . he . would .ably ..
. · ... " . . - · · . · 
represent his country , I cann�t . . help being, deepl·y · . �: . ·· · . .. . ,. · .. · 
d isappc;>_inted · that ·Mr. Molo"f!ov . . apparen"tly does not · · 
plan :to attend • . - Recalling the friendly and frui.'t·- . 
ful cooper�tion at Yalta between Mr, Molotov , Mr. 
Edeh , and Mr • . Stet:tinius , I know the Secretary of 
State has been looking forward to continuing the 
joint work in the same spirit at San Fr�ncisco for 
· th� �ventual realization: of our mutual goal , the 
establishment of ·an effective international organ­
ization to insure a secure and peaceful future for 
the world. . 
• • , If (Molotov · ·s )  pressing c.tnd heavy responsi­
bilities in the Soviet Union make it impossible for · 
him to stay for .the entire Conference , I very much 
· hope that you will find i t  possible to ·let him come 
at reast for the vital opening sessions , S ince all 
sponsoring powers and the majority of other countries 
attending will be represented by their· M inisters of . 
Foreign Affairs , I am afraid that Mr. Molotov ' s  
absence will be construed all over the world as a 
lack of comparable interest on the part of the Soviet 
Government in the great objectives of this Conference.  
ROOSEVELT 
19Elliott Roosevelt and Joseph · P ,  · Lash •  eds·. ,  F .• D . R .  
H i s  Personal Letters 1 28-1 l} , (New York • .  Duell , Sloan 
and Pearce , ·1950 , PP • 1577-1578. 
·'· 
- lJl 
(Document N o ,  20) 
. . f 'th U � � R 20 . Survey on Ambrican Opinion o· c . . �  • •  
, . 6 
lit the mind of the U.S. public, there is little doubt of the impor­
tance of friendly relations with Russia. The following attitude scale 
.shows the Russophobes in a minority of less than I 0 per cent, those 
cool toward Russia a mere 1 1  per cent-both together about balanced 
by those who say. it is important to keep ori friendly terms with Rus­
sia. But most' significantly, the scale shows that the largest segment 
of the public wants to put a stop-loss order on its endorsement of 
Russia's importance. Success or failure of the relationship is looked.' 
on as a joint responsibility of the two countries. 
' 
With . which one of these four statements do you come closest toj . 
'agreeing? 
It Is going to be very in1portant to keep on friendly terms with Russia after 
the war, and we should make every possible effort to do so ........... .. ,. 
It is Important foi' ihc U.S. to be on friendly terms With Russia iftcr the 
war, but not so Important Ulat we should make too many concessions 
to her . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .............................................. 49.2 
IC Russia wants to keep on friendly terms with us aner the war, we 
shouldn't discourage her, but there Is no reason why we should make 
any special effort to be friendly ... . � .............................. . . . . . .  :..... 11.3 
We shall be better off ir' we have just as little as possible to do with Russia 
after the war . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ................ .... !............................... 9.3 
Don•t know .......................................•.. '...................... ....... .. 7.5 
I . Hopes for success arc down a little from last January and "don't 
know" answers have increased; probably because of V·E strains, but 
hope still predominates. \ : 
Thinki11g back for a moment to our relations with Russia a few 1 
'years before the war, do you think .Je will get along better with � 
.Russia In the future than we did In th'e past, not so w�ll, or about; 'the same? J · I · . . · . Janua 171/uurvey · . · · ; Better • • •  :. . . . . . . ......... 48.3 42.4" • 
Not so well .............. 22.0 19.1 
About the same .. .  ;, . .. 20.1 23.S 
Don't know ............. 9.6 .lS.O 
I l I I 1 · I 
!Russian Motives-the U.S. View I I • 
I What docs the ·u.s. public deduce as Russia's purpose? The first 
qu�stion e�pJOring this a��-
a·:
b�ought ap almo.st exact stand9ff: : . . ; · 
. . - ·-
.
. �·. ., .. - ·-... 
. , ' , 
. " 
·�:. 
20 . . . . . . . . . . . "U , S ,  Op inion on . .  Russ·1 a ,." , .Fortune XXXII , No , 
. 4 ,  
(September , 1945) , PP� .. ·.·_�.3:,).;2�� �'.". ) .
.. " · 
. .
.
. ... .. .. . • '• . : . ·. ': 
• 
'· 
.· 
- .1J2 -
,.. .. . . . . . Would you describe Ri1ssia as a. peace-loving nation, willing lo fight . 
• •only If slle //Jinks sllc. has to .defend herself-or as an aggressive nation· 
l11tat would start a war to get something she wants? · .. · 
Peace-loving ............... .. 
Al?,l;rcssivc • . . . • . . . . • • • . • . . • • •  
Doth (volunteered) ....... .. 
Don't know ................ . 
38.64,\ 
37.8 
8.4 
15.2 
' ' 
Although th� �ussian attitude toward the world thus seems to1 
puzzle Americans, there is little feeling that the Russian p·cople are. 
·definitely hostile to the U.S. Yet only a bare majority feel sure or 
' Russian f riendlincss: · 
Do you feel that most of the common people In Russia are ·now'. 
.pre/ly friendly toward the U.S., or no/ so frl�ndly, or th/ll mos/: o/1 them don 't have any feeling one way or the other? · ' 
I Friendly toward U.S.' ...... 52.74.\ ; · 
Not so friendly .. . • .. .. • .. .. 7 .0 
Not one way or other • . .  .. • 22.0 
Don't know .......... :...... 18.3 
I A ·good part of the U.S. public apparently a�;sumes friendship on · 
! the part of the Russians because it has a clear conscience-whether ' 
:justified or not-on its own behavior toward Russia. Asked if the 
1 U.S. had done anything since ·the last war that may have given the 1 
!Russians reason to doubt our.friendship, 73.7 per cent answered tha t ·  
1 there was nothing they could think of. Among those who could think , !or unfriendly acts, mention was made most tT-cqucntly ·. ,. ! �: .... failure' 
: of the U.S. to recognize the Russian Governmenl. . : 
i Russian interest in the countries close to her is appraised by th1. 1 · 
U.S. public, perhaps correctly, in military and political• terms. As 
:follows: 1 
:· Which one of these do you think is tile m'ost Important reason . 
1behind Russia's interest in the countries lying along her borders? 1 
She wants to spread communism ...... . 
She needs things they can p'roduec ... .. 
She wants 'to be able to count on them 
� . 
· in case of attack .................... . 
25.6% 
16.4 
29.4 
l She wants to Improve conditions for people in those countries .. • ........ 8.7 
) Don't know ............................... 19.9 . j I I 
I Military security is seen as paramount, political security as.a closej 
j�cond .. Whatever ominous implications there may be in Russia's pol-: 
jtcy on her Manchurian border, either the public is ignorant of the:. 
: aituatio�, which is quite likely, or else does not consider ·it nearly soj 
-·-· - --·--·- ---- · · . . - . - ---,-- - --·- -
. • 
.. 
. ., .· 
_ . . . .  
lJJ 
. . , 
j important as shortening the Japanese war. Asked if they would like· 
, to sec Russia join us in the war .against Japan or would rather she' 
I stayed out, 7 1 .4 per cent of the people wanted Russi? in, only 18.S 
I per cent wanted her. to stay out. The compelling reason probably lies� 
· in public feeling about the toughness of the Japanese war. Only 26.9' 
: per cent of the people think Japan will give up before she is beaten · . 
. as Germany was; 62.2 per cent think Japan will fight on. I I I 
1 Good R11ssia11 Points and Bad 
! 
i The public was asked to volunteer its own ideas about Rus5ia's 
. good points and bad points. Forty-three per cent could think of no: 
particular good points, 33:.per cent could think of no particular bad ! 
i points. Those who· ai1swcr'ed. scattered their replies over a wide range. 1 
. On the asset side the Russian military performance was mentioned , . 
' most frequently, but it was. closely followed by approvai of the· re- � 
distribution of. wealth, of cqua1ify, a�d of economic security. Rl;ISSian . .. 
educational opportµnities werc'. frequently mentioned, as well as ad• I :I vances in indU}trial . production. When personal characteristics were ; 
considered,. Ru5sia1i patriotisll),. courage, and industriousness came in , 
I for praise. · · 
. 
. , Foremost among the bad points Americans see in Russia is com- t 
!munism, followed by Russian hostility to religion and various·aspects · 
of .Russia's dictatorial govern�cnt and lack of personal freedom. A'. 
number of Americans believe that Russia's· foreig.n policy is purely "; 
" selfish and a·cquisitiv�. Objections to Russia, however, concentrated. ' 
• :: • •1 on.matters of government and· policy..:.only 1.8 per cent had any hard· . 
:words to say about the Russian people� ' 
. 
. . . 
.. 
When asked more specific questions about Russian policies, the .)  
pe�ple continued to show high proportions who had'· no information 
or opinion. For instan�e: . , . 
: Which of these things have you liked about Russia, and which 
;haven't you liked so well? . ; 
Ll/ccd LI Iced Not Don't . \·" """ Ille� know 
The way she handles her ·diplomatic : � 
relations with this country ...... · 18.�. 8.5� ·42.6�· . . 3Q:�
:. ·, . . 
·The way she handles her military 
campaigns ......................... · ' 66.9 3.0 , 4.2 25.9 · � 
'file way she handles our news l , correspondents ..... ; .......... ... . 8.5 3.5 .39.7. 48.,3 The way she handles justice and the I legal rights . or her own rcop�e 16.1 2.5 24.1 S7.3 i . . 
I " �--•·H--·- ... - •·--, - ··-- ·-
·.' ·. , . 
· · t" . .  ·: . 
. . ' ., l ·" 
.
. . ,• " 
. : .· �· . 
. . 
J •• 
• . .. ·. ·· · . . . 
. " 
, . . . .  . . 
, 
,I ; 
. I 
" 
.  
. .
. 
. . · .. . 
. . 
. . . 
. ' 
tom men ts made 'by those expre�sing' 81� o�!njory on o�� last of. these: ·;. 
questions repeated lhc:fceling that Russians have little in the way. Of 
personal rights� Those who said they like Russian Jl:lstice we�c fre- l 
quently at .a loss to say wh.y. . : . .
. . . . · · .- i . .. . '· :- . .: . 
. . Most of t'he U.S. people have. acquired · the belief that the Russian ·j ·.·. :· . · . :  : · · 
Government considers itself to be .a.bove the source of law. · · · . . · . . 
Do you tbink the Russian. Govemment pays a lot of a·ttention to :: '. · ·. · 
wliat ·the R·ussia11 people (and /JCO[Jle 111 the rest of the world)' think, · .: · 
or that it decides wllat it ls 'going to do without taking what the>' I. 
· think much Into account? · 
.
. i Tiie Russian People In the 'ell i people - of the wo,/d j 
Pays at,cntlon to them . ....... 16.0% 16.� 
I Decides without them ...... :. . 64.8 67 .6 . 
Don't know ..................... 19.2 16.4 . . I 
Thus public opinion, the balance wheel df American politics, is be� l 
licved to have little weight in Russian policy making. : 
When the people were asked to compare Russia and �he U.S. on a. \ 
number of points, only very small minorities gave Russia the advan- � 
tage. Asked "which country gives its people as a whole a better i 
chance .to get ahead,,, 86. l per cent named the U.S., only 2.3 per ; 
cent named Russia. Seventy per cent think that the U.S. also gives '. 
its people as a whole a better sense of economic $ecurity, and 75 per i 
cent think the U.S.· has a better s.etup for e.ncouraging good new ! 
inventions. And U.S. eminence in these and other respects is not be- . 
lieved to be threatened-65.5 per cent think that the U.S. will be ; 
more important than Russia in world affairs twenty·five years from : 
now. Only 6.3 per cent think that Russia will then be more impor­
tant; only 1 1 .5 per cent think the two nations will be of about the : 
same importance. Her military acc.omplishments alone bring Russia : 
abreast of the U.S. in U.S. opinion. Asked whether Germany could : 
have been defeated this year if Russia had not been in the war; 84 
I per cent said "No." But eve,i. fewer ·belieyed .t hat Russia and Brit�in 
1 could have done it. alone-92 per cent thought Germany could not ; 
! ·--· __ .. h.axe .P�9o_ d_ef�at��-!��.!�.Jear if _01�\l.·.�!J1Jld n9!_Q��n .in .tJ1e �ar. ___ .: _ _  : 
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